United States District Court, N.D. California
IN RE $16, 000, 000 USD ASSET PROPERTY/PROCEEDS OF SALE/CARGO LOCATED AT 1325 BROADWAY AVE., OAKLAND, CA 94612
ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL RE: DKT. NO. 9
MARIA-ELENA JAMES United States Magistrate Judge.
20, 2016, Jeremy Lafitte-an alleged “Real Party In
Interest/Lien Claimant”- filed the following documents:
(1) “Notice and Petition of Enforcement of Maritime
Lien, Adjudication and Declaration of Condenmend [sic]
Captured Prize Property and Asset Forfeture [sic]”
(Dkt. No. 1); (2) “Petition in the Nature of a Precipe
to the Clerk for Instant Immidiate [sic] Judicial Review and
Hearing Ex Parte” (Dkt. No. 2); (3) “Petition in
the Nature of a Motion for Issuance of Order and Warrant for
Arrest” (Dkt. No. 3); (4) “Petition in the Nature
of a Motion for Issuance of a Prejudgment Interest
Award” (Dkt. No. 4); and “Order for Issuance of
Warrant for Arrest” (Dkt. No. 4-1) (collectively
“Petitions”). Through these Petitions, it appears Mr.
Lafitte alleges, among other things, that he was in a dispute
with employees at a Citibank branch over his attempts to open
an account without a social security number and that while he
“was a visitor . . . 0n bored the vessel CITI BANK 1325
Broadway Oakland ca 94612 . . . . Lien Claimant died from the
Default of Obligations by Lien Debtors[.]” Dkt. No. 1
at 2, 6.
15, 2016, the Court denied Mr. Lafitte's Petitions with
leave to amend. July 15 Order, Dkt. No. 8. The Court found
the Petitions largely incomprehensible and as such, could not
determine whether (1) Mr. Lafitte has a basis for his
purported maritime lien or (2) the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction over his claims. Id. Nonetheless, the
Court granted Mr. Lafitte until August 16, 2016 to file an
amended petition or complaint and encouraged him to seek
assistance from the Court Legal Help Center. Id.
then, Mr. Lafitte filed a Notice of Emergency Interlocutory
Appeal from the July 15 Order. Notice, Dkt. No. 9. He has
also filed an Application with this Court seemingly seeking
its certification of an Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). See Dkt. No. 9.
Lafitte's Application is improper in a variety of
respects. First, his Notice of Emergency Interlocutory Appeal
should moot any request to this Court to certify his
interlocutory appeal. Second, under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(3), there is no need for the district court to
certify an appeal; district courts certify appeals from
interlocutory orders under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). Third, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) only
applies to interlocutory orders that “determin[e] the
rights and liabilities of the parties” in
“admiralty cases”; however, Mr. Lafitte has not
established this is properly an admiralty case, as the Court
found in the July 15 Order.
the Court DENIES Mr. Lafitte's Application as the Court
has no grounds to certify an appeal. Additionally, in light
of the Notice of Emergency Interlocutory Appeal, the Court
STAYS all proceedings and deadlines in this case pending the
Ninth Circuit's resolution of the Appeal. The Clerk of
Court is directed not to accept further filings by Mr.
Lafitte in this matter unless those filings are ordered by
 On July 1, 2016, Mr. Lafitte consented
to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Dkt. No. 6.
 The original filings do not contain
page numbers so the Court references the ECF page numbers
assigned to the documents.
 Section 1292(b) is “to be used
only in exceptional situations[.]” In re Cement
Antitrust Litig.,673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982).
“It was not intended merely to provide review of
difficult rulings in hard cases.” U.S. Rubber Co.
v. Wright,359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966). To certify
a case for appeal under § 1292(b), a court must find:
“(1) that there [is] a controlling question of law, (2)
that there [are] substantial grounds for a difference of
opinion, and (3) that an immediate appeal may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”
In re Cement, 673 F.2d at 1026. “A party's
strong disagreement with the Court's ruling is not
sufficient for there to be a 'substantial ground for
difference'; the proponent of an appeal must make some