United States District Court, E.D. California
MELANIE C. LATRONICA, Plaintiff,
v.
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSING
COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND (ECF NO. 1)
Plaintiff
Melanie Chantell Latronica, proceeding pro se, filed this
action on July 28, 2016, along with an application to proceed
in forma pauperis. Plaintiff seeks relief from judgment from
orders issued in cases decided by Judge Morrison C. England
and Judge Richard Seeborg. For the reasons discussed below,
the Court recommends that Plaintiff's complaint be
dismissed without leave to amend.
I.
SCREENING
STANDARD
Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must dismiss a case
if at any time the Court determines that the complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In
determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the
Court uses the same pleading standard used under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
“[A]
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “[A]
complaint [that] pleads facts that are 'merely consistent
with' a defendant's liability . . . 'stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further,
although a court must accept as true all factual allegations
contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a
plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
states that she is removing this action from other federal
courts in which the judges assigned to the cases issued
orders adverse to her. Plaintiff contends that the actions
were filed in the wrong districts which made it impossible
for her to ultimately prevail on the merits of her claims.
(Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that she was given
the death penalty without due process, is innocent, and is
not in her body. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that she
was stolen as a baby and has had 46 years of life long
torture in living hell. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff states
that when she filed some of her cases the defendants did not
answer; and on August 22, 2012, Judge England entered
judgment without due process. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff's complaint is largely unintelligible but she
appears to seek relief under Rule 60 for opinions issued by
Judge Morrison C. England and Judge Richard Seeborg alleging
they are responsible for her lifelong torture issues.
(Id.)
A.
Judicial Officers Are Entitled to Absolute Judicial
Immunity
Plaintiff
alleges that Judge England denied her due process by entering
judgment on August 22, 2012. The Court takes judicial notice
of Latronica v. State of California, No.
2:12-cv-01047-MCE-GGH PS (E.D. Cal.). In this action Judge
England issued an order on August 22, 2012 adopting findings
and recommendations which recommended dismissing the action
with prejudice for the plaintiff's failure to file an
amended complaint in compliance with a court order.
Latronica v. State of California, No.
2:12-cv-01047-MCE-GGH PS (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012) (ECF No.
13.)
Absolute
judicial immunity is afforded to judges for acts performed by
the judge that relate to the judicial process. In re
Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended
(Sept. 6, 2002). “This immunity reflects the
long-standing 'general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him,
shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'
” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d
916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher,
13 Wall. 335, 347 (1871)). This judicial immunity insulates
judges from suits brought under section 1983. Olsen,
363 F.3d at 932.
Absolute
judicial immunity insulates the judge from actions for
damages due to judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of
the judge's court. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d
1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). “Judicial immunity applies
'however erroneous the act may have been, and however
injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the
plaintiff.' ” Id. (quoting Cleavinger
v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985)). However a judge is not
immune where he acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction or
for acts that are not judicial in nature. Ashelman,
793 F.2d at 1075. Judicial conduct falls within “clear
absence of all jurisdiction, ” where the judge
“acted with clear lack of all subject matter
jurisdiction.” Stone v. Baum, 409 F.Supp.2d
1164, 1174 (D. Ariz. 2005).
To
determine if an act is judicial in nature, the court
considers whether (1) the precise act is a normal judicial
function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's
chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then
pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose
directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the
judge in his or her official capacity. Duvall v. Cty. of
Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended
on denial of reh'g (Oct. 11, 2001) (quoting Meek v.
County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.1999)).
Here,
the acts for which Plaintiff seeks to hold Judge England
liable meet the test for judicial action taken within his
jurisdiction. Judge England adopted the findings and
recommendations issued by the magistrate judge after
Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint. This is
clearly judicial conduct over which Judge England had
jurisdiction and that falls within Judge England's
judicial capacity. ...