United States District Court, C.D. California
(IN
CHAMBERS) - DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL UNDER FRCP RULE 9 AND MOTION FOR ARREST
OF JUDGMENT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION UNDER FRCP 34 (Dkt.
1504, filed July 26, 2016) DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR
Proceedings:
ACQUITTAL UNDER FRCP 33 (Dkt. 1505, filed July 26, 2016)
Ronald
Gerard Boyajian, Pro Se
Attorneys for Defendants: George Buehler, Standby Counsel
CRIMINAL MINUTES - GENERAL
Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER JUDGE
On May
9, 2016, defendant filed a motion for a judgment of
acquittal, Dkt. 1416, and on May 10, 2016, defendant file a
motion for a new trial, Dkt. 1417. On July 11, 2016, the
Court denied both of these motions. Dkt. 1488. On July 26,
2016, defendant filed motions for reconsideration of the
Court’s order denying his motions for acquittal and for
a new trial. Dkt. 1504, 1505.[1]
In his
motions for reconsideration, defendant identifies two pieces
of “new evidence” which he contends warrant
reconsideration of the Court’s prior orders. First,
defendant states that he has identified a warrant for his
arrest issued by the Menlo Park Police Department in 2009 for
failing to provide notification that he had changed his
address, as required by the terms of his sex offender
registration. Defendant also attaches an exhibit which
appears to be a warrant for his arrest for violations of
California Penal Code §§ 290.012, 290.013-the
sections of the California Penal Code which require convicted
sex offenders to provide notice to local authorities whenever
they change their address. Dkt. 1504, Ex. 1. In his motion
for a new trial, defendant contended that the Government
failed to produce this arrest warrant before trial and
requested a new trial on the grounds that, had the Government
made this arrest warrant available to defendant, he could
have relied on it to demonstrate that he was not a resident
of California when he committed the offenses charged in this
case. The Court rejected this argument. First, the Court
noted that defendant had submitted no evidence that the Menlo
Park Police Department had actually issued a warrant for his
arrest. In light of the exhibit attached to defendant’s
motion for reconsideration, defendant has now arguably
submitted evidence that the Menlo Park Police Department did,
in fact, issue a warrant for his arrest. Nonetheless, in the
Court’s prior order it also stated that:
[E]ven if the Menlo Park Police Department had issued
arrest warrants for defendant for failing to notify them that
he had moved, that would not warrant a new trial. At
trial, the Government was required to prove that defendant
was required by California law to register as a sex offender
when he traveled in foreign commerce. Even if a warrant
had issued, it would merely demonstrate that at some point in
time defendant failed to comply with one aspect of his
registration requirements. Moreover, the Government
submitted evidence at trial that defendant was required to
register as a sex offender and, in fact, did so in Menlo Park
in September 2008, prior to traveling in foreign commerce.
Dkt. 1488, at 6 (emphasis added). This reasoning is still
applicable notwithstanding defendant’s new exhibit.
Second,
defendant presents the declaration of his DNA expert, Marc
Taylor. Dkt. 1505, Ex. 1, Taylor Decl. Defendant contends
that this declaration “verif[ies] the provenance of the
specimens tested at Bode Labs as proven with certitude to be
taken from SL.” Id. at 2. In his declaration,
Taylor states that he has been able to obtain a DNA sample
from S.L.’s mother and that he has been able to compare
that sample with the DNA swabs delivered to Bode
Laboratories. Taylor contends that the swabs purportedly
collected from S.L.’s mother were a “perfect
match for maternity with the major female contributor to DNA
in the reference sample tested by Bode in 2009.” Dkt.
1505, Ex. 1, Taylor Decl. ¶ 8. However, even assuming
that Taylor was able to obtain a DNA sample from S.L.’s
mother, and that he was able to compare that sample to the
DNA swabs collected by Bode Laboratories, Taylor’s
declaration still fails to address the fact that, during
trial, defendant failed to establish a proper chain of
custody for the DNA swabs allegedly obtained from S.L. in
Cambodia. And, even more to the point, as the Court has
explained in numerous prior orders, even if defendant could
establish that the relevant DNA swabs originated from S.L.,
the DNA evidence in this case was of “exceedingly
limited relevance.” Dkt. 1421, at 3. Specifically, as
the Court explained in a recent order:
[A] total of three swabs purportedly collected from S.L. were
submitted to Bode Laboratories for testing. These swabs were
delivered in a box marked, “oral, ”
“genital/penile, ” and “breast.”
However, Bode Laboratories was only able to test one of the
swabs. And, while it was conclusively established that this
swab did not contain defendant’s DNA, it is impossible
to determine whether this swab was collected from
S.L.’s genital area, as opposed to her mouth or breast
. . . [M]ore significantly, the Government was not required
to establish at trial that defendant engaged in sexual
conduct with S.L. during a particular time period. Given the
fact that DNA material may only remain on a person’s
body for as little as a few days, the most the DNA evidence
could establish is that defendant did not engage in sexual
conduct with S.L. during the period immediately preceding his
arrest. This would not preclude the Government from
establishing that defendant engaged in sexual conduct with
S.L. during an earlier time period.
Id. When taken together, the limited relevance of
the DNA evidence coupled with the issues regarding chain of
custody, support the Court’s determination that this
evidence was properly excluded pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 403. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
“new evidence” presented by defendant does not
warrant reconsideration of any of the Court’s prior
orders.
Finally,
in both of defendants motions for reconsideration he appends
lengthy “replies” in support of his original
motions for acquittal and for a new trial. These documents
combined span roughly one hundred pages of single spaced text
purportedly setting forth a basis on which the Court should
either vacate defendant’s convictions or grant him a
new trial. The Court has done its best to decipher what
defendant is attempting to assert in these replies; however,
it appears that many of the arguments raised by defendant are
duplicative of issues the Court has already addressed in
prior hearings and orders. And, to the extent defendant has
raised any new issues in these replies, the Court finds that
they do not provide a valid basis for reconsideration of the
Court’s prior orders as defendant has failed to
adequately explain why he could not, through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, have included these arguments in his
original briefing. See also C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18
(“A motion for reconsideration of the decision on any
motion may be made only on the grounds of (a) a material
difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court
before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable
diligence could not have been known to the party
moving for reconsideration at the time of such decision
. . .”) (emphasis added).
Accordingly,
the Court finds no basis to reconsider its denial of
defendant’s motions for acquittal and for a new trial.
Defendant’s ...