United States District Court, E.D. California
THOMAS P. COOK Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et. al ., Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND DISMISSING GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS (ECF
NO. 12)
LAWRENCE J. O’NEILL UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT TO PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Judges
in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest
caseloads in the nation, and this Court is unable to devote
inordinate time and resources to individual cases and
matters. Given the shortage of district judges and staff,
this Court addresses only the arguments, evidence, and
matters necessary to reach the decision in this order. The
parties and counsel are encouraged to contact the offices of
United States Senators Feinstein and Boxer to address this
Court’s inability to accommodate the parties and this
action. The parties are required to reconsider consent to
conduct all further proceedings before a Magistrate Judge,
whose schedules are far more realistic and accommodating to
parties than that of U.S. Chief District Judge Lawrence J.
O'Neill, who must prioritize criminal and older civil
cases.
Civil
trials set before Chief Judge O'Neill trail until he
becomes available and are subject to suspension mid-trial to
accommodate criminal matters. Civil trials are no longer
reset to a later date if Chief Judge O'Neill is
unavailable on the original date set for trial. Moreover,
this Court's Fresno Division randomly and without advance
notice reassigns civil actions to U.S. District Judges
throughout the nation to serve as visiting judges. In the
absence of Magistrate Judge consent, this action is subject
to reassignment to a U.S. District Judge from inside or
outside the Eastern District of California.
I.
Background
At the
time he filed the original complaint in this case, Plaintiff
Thomas P. Cook (“Plaintiff”) was a California
state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis[1] in this civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed
his original complaint (ECF No. 1) on December 31, 2014, and
the first amended complaint (ECF No. 7) on March 24, 2015.
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint
(“SAC”), filed on December 30, 2015 (ECF No. 12)
is currently before the Court[2] for screening. According to the
SAC, Plaintiff was paroled on September 20, 2015. ECF No. 12
at 1.
II.
Screening Requirement and Standard
The
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
In this case, Plaintiff is no longer a prisoner in state
custody, as he was paroled on September 20, 2015.
See ECF No. 12 at 1. Nevertheless, as Plaintiff
continues to proceed pro se, the Court will apply
the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which
is substantially similar to the standard set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a) for prisoner complaints. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court reviews a pro se
complaint to determine whether the complaint is frivolous or
malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. A claim is legally frivolous when it
lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Thus, the
critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however
unartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis.
See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.
1989).
As a
pro se litigant, Plaintiff is entitled to have his
pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved
in his favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342
(9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
his complaint contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.”
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations
are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge
unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, to survive
screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court reasonably to infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quotation marks omitted). The sheer possibility that
a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere
consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the
plausibility standard. Id.
If the
Court determines that the complaint may be cured by
amendment, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend and
provide him with notice of the complaint’s
deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,
1106 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court will deny leave to amend if
“it is absolutely clear” that amendment of a
claim would be futile. See id.
III.
Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff
has asserted claims against the following Defendants: the
State of California; the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); Edmund G. Brown;
M.D. Stainer, director of the CDCR; Support System Homes, a
substance-abuse treatment center; and Scott Grinnell, a
parole agent, employed by CDCR (“Agent Grinnell)
(collectively, “Defendants”). See
generally ECF No. 12.
The SAC
contains two main claims, both of which arose out of events
that occurred after Plaintiff was released on parole. First,
Plaintiff alleges general discrimination against him by the
State of California and the CDCR on account of his status as
a registered sex offender under section 290 of the California
Penal Code (“CPC”). Id. at
1-2.[3]
Plaintiff alleges that after he was paroled from Valley State
Prison on September 20, 2015, he was taken to Support Systems
Homes Treatment Center for thirty days of substance abuse
treatment. Id. at 1. Plaintiff had already completed
nine months of substance abuse treatment while he was in
prison. Id. Plaintiff alleges that “[b]y
completing these substance abuse programs in prison, [he] was
promised many things such as assistance with getting
ID/license, [a] social security card, employment placement,
clothing, transportation[, ] and so on, ” and that he
has received no help on his re-entry into society from
Support Systems Homes. Id. Furthermore, he alleges
that his treatment is paid for by “the Stop Fund,
” such funding is being misused and his account is
being charged for services that he has not received, and asks
that the Court “look into these accounts and the use of
discrimination” against persons who have registered as
sex offenders under CPC § 290. Id. at 1-2.
Plaintiff states that “if you register 290[, ] you have
nothing coming, no help with reentry into society, ”
and that “no matter what a 290 does, he/she will do the
max parole, [and] be treat[ed] as if their crime just
happen[ed].” Id. In connection with this
allegation, Plaintiff requests that the Court review his
parole conditions from 1998 to 2015, alleging that each time
he has paroled, his conditions have worsened. Id.
Plaintiff has also attached various documents
“concerning [his] civil rights, ” which include
information and records relating to the State’s funding
of substance abuse programs for inmates and parolees,
id. at 5-10, an administrative complaint he
previously filed, id. at 11-16, the CDCR 602
complaint form he attempted to file against Agent Grinnell,
id. at 17-18, correspondence which relates to the
STOP program, id. at 19-27, and copies of recent
state court rulings concerning CPC § 290, id.
at 29-32.
Next,
Plaintiff alleges that after he was released on parole, Agent
Grinnell interfered with his medical care. Id. at 3.
He states that on December 17, 2015, “after being sick
for weeks, ” he was able to get a day off training and
go to the ER at the Santa Clara Hospital, and Agent Grinnell
called him and ordered him to leave the hospital while
knowing that Plaintiff was sick and in need of medical
attention. Id. Plaintiff did not want to violate his
parole, so he left the ER. Id. Plaintiff asks this
Court to issue a protective order against Agent ...