California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
No. BS141354, James C. Chalfant, Judge.
Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Thomas S. Peters, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Ronald S. Whitaker, Assistant City
Attorney and Gerald Masahiro Sato, Deputy City Attorney, for
Defendant and Appellant, City of Los Angeles.
Manatt, Phelps & Philips and Michael M. Berger for
Defendant and Appellant Xerox Business Services, LLC.
Ahdoot
& Wolfson and Theodore Walter Maya; Zimmerman Reed, Caleb
Lucas-Hansen Marker and Bradley Christopher Buhrow for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
WILLHITE, J.
When a
person challenges a parking citation, the Vehicle Code
provides three potential levels of review: initial review,
administrative hearing, and de novo appeal to the superior
court. (Veh. Code, §§ 40215, subds. (a)-(c), 40230,
subds. (a), (d).)[1] As to the initial review, section
40215, subdivision (a) provides, in substance, that the
request for initial review is made to “the issuing
agency, ” that the “issuing agency shall
cancel” the citation if certain specified circumstances
are satisfied, and that “[t]he issuing agency shall
advise the processing agency, if any, of the
cancellation.”
In this
appeal by the City of Los Angeles (City) and Xerox Business
Services, Inc. (Xerox) from the trial court’s grant of
petitioner Cody Weiss’ petition for a writ of mandate,
we consider whether the City, as the “issuing
agency” for notice of parking violations in the City
(see § 40202), must conduct the “initial
review” of challenged citations (§ 40215, subd.
(a)), or whether it may delegate that duty to Xerox, its
“processing agency” (§ 40200.6, subd. (a))
with which it contracts “for the processing of notices
of parking violations” (§ 40200.5, subd.
(a)).[2] Based on the language of section
40215, subdivision (a) and relevant legislative history, we
hold, as did the trial court, that the City is required to
conduct the initial review, and cannot contract with Xerox to
perform that duty. Therefore, we affirm the trial
court’s issuance of a writ of mandate. We also affirm
the trial court’s award of approximately $722, 000 in
attorney fees to Weiss pursuant to the California private
attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5.
BACKGROUND[3]
I.
Weiss’ Citation and Petition
In
March 2012, Weiss received a parking citation for a violation
of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 80.69(c), for exceeding
a two-hour posted time limit on La Jolla Avenue in Los
Angeles. Weiss timely contested the citation by filing an
online statement claiming his vehicle “was not
parked... in excess of two hours.” He provided no
evidence to support his statement; he simply
“decline[d] responsibility” for the parking
violation, and “request[ed] that this citation be
dismissed immediately.” In April 2012, after an initial
review performed by Xerox, Weiss received a letter advising
him that an initial review had been performed and the
citation would not be cancelled. Although Weiss could have
sought administrative review of this denial, he did not.
Instead, he paid the $55 citation.
In
January 2013, Weiss filed the instant petition seeking a writ
of mandate directing the City and Xerox to provide a legally
sufficient initial review, in compliance with section 40215,
subdivision (a), once an alleged violator exercises his or
her right to challenge a parking citation under that
statute.[4]
II.
First Trial Phase
The
trial court bifurcated the trial on the issues raised by
Weiss’ petition. In the first phase of the trial, the
trial court deferred the question whether Xerox, a processing
agency, was authorized by section 40215 to perform initial
reviews. Rather, the court first considered only Weiss’
claim that the initial review process, as currently
constituted, did not comply with the statutory obligations of
the initial review under the Vehicle Code, in that (among
other assertions) it was too rigid and did not provide
sufficient discretion to dismiss citations. As most of the
evidence presented in this phase of the trial is largely
immaterial to the issues on appeal, we summarize only certain
portions.
Since
1985, the City has contracted with Xerox to act as its
processing agency. As part of Xerox’s processing
duties, the City delegates the duty under section 40215,
subdivision (a) to conduct the initial review of contested
citations. Xerox is paid based on the number of parking
citations processed per month, but does not receive
additional compensation to conduct initial reviews.
Xerox
performs the initial reviews through its Parking Violations
Bureau (Bureau), which is staffed by a subcontractor. About
five percent of parking citations issued by the City result
in a request for an initial review. In fiscal year 2013,
Xerox conducted 135, 291 initial reviews.
The
initial review is conducted by Bureau clerks, who must adhere
to 46 Business Processing Rules (BPR), drafted by the City
(or by Xerox and approved by the City). Each BPR contains
scenarios regarding common complaints and specific types of
citations (e.g., citations involving parking meters, disabled
person placards and license plates, and residential parking
permits). Clerks receive training on the BPRs when hired,
when BPRs are changed, and at weekly meetings. The City also
issues memoranda to provide guidance.
When
considering a contested citation, the Bureau clerk refers to
the applicable BPR, if any; if that BPR permits dismissal of
a citation, the clerk dismisses it. If no BPR addresses the
particular challenge, but a motorist has presented sufficient
evidence to overcome a citation, clerks are instructed to
refer the matter to a supervisor for a decision. The motorist
learns the result of the initial review through one of 97
form letters drafted and approved by the City, on City
letterhead, sent to the motorist by Xerox.
Considering
this (and other) evidence, the court concluded that, setting
aside the issue whether Xerox was authorized to conduct the
initial review, the City’s system of initial review
complied with the Vehicle Code requirements in the scope of
the review, in the fairness of its procedure to the motorist,
and in the fairness of its substantive decision-making
process.
III.
Second Trial Phase
In the
second phase of the trial, the trial court considered the
question at issue in this appeal: whether section 40215,
subdivision (a) requires that the City, as the issuing
agency, conduct the initial review, rather than its
processing agency, Xerox. At the court’s request, the
parties briefed the issue extensively. In its ruling, the
court reviewed the statutory framework, its legislative
history (including pertinent existing, amended and repealed
Vehicle Code sections), and case law. Conceding that the
question was close, the court concluded that changes to the
statutory scheme in 1995 reflected the Legislature’s
intent to place a nondelegable duty to perform the initial
review under section 40215, subdivision (a) on the City, the
public agency that issues parking citations.
In
September 2014, after Weiss dismissed his remaining claims,
the court entered judgment in Weiss’
favor.[5] The court issued a peremptory writ of
mandate, ordering the City, as the issuing agency, to conduct
the initial review of contested parking citations, pursuant
to section 40215, subdivision (a), and “not to
contract, subcontract, or otherwise delegate [its] duty to
make such initial review decisions to any other entity or
‘processing agency’....” Xerox was
permanently enjoined from making initial review decisions as
described in section 40215, subdivision (a).
IV.
Attorney Fees
After
extensive post-trial briefing, Weiss was awarded $721, 994.81
in attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney general fee
statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The City and
Xerox timely appealed from the judgment and order awarding
attorney fees. We consolidated the appeals.
DISCUSSION[6]
I.
The Writ of Mandate
A.
Standing
Before
considering the principal issue in this case-whether section
40215, subdivision (a) requires the City, as the issuing
agency, to perform the initial review of contested parking
citations-we must first consider Xerox’s contention
that Weiss lacks standing to seek a writ of
mandate.[7]
A
traditional writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1085 is a way to compel a public entity to perform a
legal, typically ministerial, duty. Under this statute, the
trial court reviews an administrative action to determine if
an agency’s action “was arbitrary, capricious, or
entirely lacking in evidentiary support, contrary to
established public policy, unlawful [or] procedurally
unfair.... [Citations.] ‘Although mandate will not lie
to control a public agency’s discretion, that is to
say, force the exercise of discretion in a particular manner,
it will lie to correct abuses of discretion.
[Citation.]’” (Klajic v. Castaic Lake Water
Agency (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 987, 995, fn. omitted.)
“As
a general rule, a party must be ‘beneficially
interested’ to seek a writ of mandate. [Citation.]
‘The requirement that a petitioner be
“beneficially interested” has been generally
interpreted to mean that one may obtain the writ only if the
person has some special interest to be served or some
particular right to be preserved or protected over and above
the interest held in common with the public at large....
[Citations.]’” (Save the Plastic Bag
Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th
155, 165 (Save the Plastic Bag).) “The
beneficial interest must be direct and substantial.
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
In the
instant case, Weiss unsuccessfully challenged his own parking
citation at the initial review, then elected to pay the fine
rather than pursue further appeal. Given his choice to pay
the fine rather than pursue further review, he lacks a
beneficial interest in the outcome of this mandamus
proceeding (he has paid the fine and his citation cannot be
overturned), and thus he lacks general standing to pursue
mandamus relief. (Save the Plastic Bag, supra, 52
Cal.4th at p. 165; see Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999)
21 Cal.4th 352, 361-362 (Associated Builders).)
In the
trial court, relying on these principles, Xerox demurred to
Weiss’ petition on the ground that he lacked standing.
The trial court overruled the demurrer, concluding that Weiss
has standing under the “public interest”
exception to pursue mandamus seeking prospective injunctive
and declaratory relief. On appeal, Xerox challenges the
court’s ruling. We conclude that the trial
court’s ruling is squarely within the doctrine of
public interest standing.
“The
exercise of jurisdiction in mandamus rests to a considerable
extent in the wise discretion of the court.”
(McDonald v. Stockton Met. Transit Dist. (1973) 36
Cal.App.3d 436, 440, citing Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County
of L.A. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 98, 100-101 (Bd. of Soc.
Welfare).) Under the doctrine of public interest
standing, “‘“where the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the [petitioner] need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result,
since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in
having the laws executed and the duty in question
enforced.”’ [Citation.]” (Save the
Plastic Bag, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 166.) Indeed,
California “courts have repeatedly applied the
‘public right/public duty’ exception to the
general rule that ordinarily a writ of mandate will issue
only to persons who are ‘beneficially
interested.’ [Citation.]” (Tobe v. City of
Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1116-1117.) In
determining whether a petitioner has public interest
standing, the court also considers the burden on those who
have a beneficial interest, and would have general standing,
but who may be disinclined or ill-equipped to seek review.
(See Driving Sch. Assn. of Cal. v. San Mateo Union High
Sch. Dist. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1518-1519
(Driving School).)
In the
instant case, given that the standing issue was raised by
demurrer, we (as did the trial court) accept as true all
facts properly pleaded in the petition. (Evans v. City of
Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) Weiss alleged that the
City issued 8, 000 parking citations per day, or 5.7 million
over a 24-month period in 2009-2010, generating revenue of
$335 million, or nearly three percent of the City’s
budget, but failed to comply with its statutory duties in
performing the initial review required by section
40215.[8] Based on these allegations, the trial
court concluded there was “no question that ensuring
that the City follows the proper procedure for [processing
and collecting] parking tickets is a matter of public
right.” Further, the court also agreed with
Weiss’ allegations that only a short window of time is
available within which to mount such a challenge,
[9]
and that typically only a minimal fine is at issue on any
individual citation. Thus, given the burden of mounting a
challenge to the initial review procedure, it was unlikely an
individual motorist would do so. Accordingly, the court
determined that Weiss had public interest standing to seek
prospective relief, because unless such standing is
available, the important public interest raised by his
petition would be effectively insulated from judicial
review.[10] (See Driving School, supra,
11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1519 [public interest standing granted
for writ seeking order that school district desist charging
tuition for drivers’ education because individual
students were unlikely to have the financial resources or
interest to challenge the district’s statutory
authority].)
The
trial court’s reasoning is unassailable, and certainly
not an abuse of discretion. It falls well within the proper
bounds of public interest standing, and serves the purpose of
that doctrine: to promote “‘the policy of
guaranteeing citizens the opportunity to ensure that no
governmental body impairs or defeats the purpose of
legislation establishing a public right.’
[Citation].” (Save the Plastic Bag, supra, 52
Cal.4th at p. 166.)
B.
Whether the City Must Conduct the Initial Review of
Contested Parking Citations
Having
determined that Weiss has standing to seek prospective relief
by writ of mandate, we turn to whether the trial court
properly issued the writ. Because resolution of that question
rests on statutory interpretation (i.e., whether §
40215, subd. (a) requires the City, as the issuing agency, to
conduct the initial review of contested parking citations),
we review the trial court’s ruling de novo.
(Marlton Recovery Partners, LLC v. County of Los
Angeles (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 510, 517.)
1.
Issuing, Processing and ...