United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO SEAL [RE: ECF 352,
355]
BETH
LABSON FREEMAN United States District Judge.
Before
the Court are two administrative motions to seal from
Plaintiff FiTeq, Inc. See Mots., ECF 352, 355. FiTeq
initially filed a motion to exclude Defendant Venture
Corporation’s counterclaim for direct damages and also
filed an accompanying motion to seal. See Mots., ECF
352, 353. FiTeq then re-captioned the motion to exclude as a
motion in limine, and re-filed both the substantive motion
and the accompanying motion to seal. See Mots., ECF
355, 356. FiTeq’s first sealing motion, located at ECF
352, thus is DENIED as moot. FiTeq’s second sealing
motion, located at ECF 355, also is DENIED.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Historically,
courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and
copy public records and documents, including judicial records
and documents.’” Kamakana v. City &
County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435
U.S. 589, 597 & n. 7 (1978)). Accordingly, when
considering a sealing request, “a ‘strong
presumption in favor of access’ is the starting
point.” Id. (quoting Foltz v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir.
2003)). Parties seeking to seal judicial records relating to
motions that are “more than tangentially related to the
underlying cause of action” bear the burden of
overcoming the presumption with “compelling
reasons” that outweigh the general history of access
and the public policies favoring disclosure. Ctr. for
Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 809 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2016); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79.
However,
“while protecting the public’s interest in access
to the courts, we must remain mindful of the parties’
right to access those same courts upon terms which will not
unduly harm their competitive interest.” Apple Inc.
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 727 F.3d 1214, 1228-29
(Fed. Cir. 2013). Records attached to motions that are
“not related, or only tangentially related, to the
merits of a case” therefore are not subject to the
strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto Safety,
809 F.3d at 1099; see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at
1179 (“[T]he public has less of a need for access to
court records attached only to non-dispositive motions
because those documents are often unrelated, or only
tangentially related, to the underlying cause of
action.”). Parties moving to seal the documents
attached to such motions must meet the lower “good
cause” standard of Rule 26(c). Kamakana, 447
F.3d at 1179 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
This standard requires a “particularized showing,
” id., that “specific prejudice or harm
will result” if the information is disclosed.
Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002);
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations
of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated
reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc.
v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.
1992). A protective order sealing the documents during
discovery may reflect the court’s previous
determination that good cause exists to keep the documents
sealed, see Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179-80, but a
blanket protective order that allows the parties to designate
confidential documents does not provide sufficient judicial
scrutiny to determine whether each particular document should
remain sealed. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(A)
(“Reference to a stipulation or protective order that
allows a party to designate certain documents as confidential
is not sufficient to establish that a document, or portions
thereof, are sealable.”).
In
addition to making particularized showings of good cause,
parties moving to seal documents must comply with the
procedures established by Civ. L.R. 79-5. Pursuant to Civ.
L.R. 79-5(b), a sealing order is appropriate only upon a
request that establishes the document is “sealable,
” or “privileged or protectable as a trade secret
or otherwise entitled to protection under the law.”
“The request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing
only of sealable material, and must conform with Civil L.R.
79-5(d).” Civ. L.R. 79-5(b). In part, Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)
requires the submitting party to attach a “proposed
order that is narrowly tailored to seal only the sealable
material” which “lists in table format each
document or portion thereof that is sought to be sealed,
” Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(b), and an “unredacted
version of the document” that indicates “by
highlighting or other clear method, the portions of the
document that have been omitted from the redacted
version.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(d). “Within 4 days
of the filing of the Administrative Motion to File Under
Seal, the Designating Party must file a declaration as
required by subsection 79-5(d)(1)(A) establishing that all of
the designated material is sealable.” Civ. L.R.
79-5(e)(1).
II.
DISCUSSION
Because
FiTeq’s motion in limine is non-dispositive, the Court
applies the good cause standard. With that standard in mind,
the Court rules on the instant motion as follows:
-
ECF No.
|
Document to be Sealed
|
Result
|
Reasoning
|
355-7
|
Ex. J to Hosie Decl. in support of
Plaintiff’s motion in limine no. 1
|
UNSEALED.
|
Venture-the designating party-declares that the
exhibit need not be sealed. See Jones Decl. ¶
2, ECF 359.
|
355-8
|
Ex. L to Hosie Decl. in support of
Plaintiff’s motion in limine no. 1
|
UNSEALED.
|
Venture-the designating party-declares that the
exhibit need not be sealed. See Jones Decl. ¶
2, ECF 359.
|
355-9
|
Ex. N to Hosie Decl. in support of
Plaintiff’s motion in limine no. 1
|
UNSEALED.
|
Venture-the designating party-declares that the
exhibit need not be sealed. See Jones Decl. ¶
2, ECF 359.
|
IT
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