United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT
RE: DKT. NO. 81
MARIA-ELENA JAMES United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiffs
Elva and Raul Barajas (“Plaintiffs”) have filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint against
Defendants City of Rohnert Park (the “City”) and
Officers Jacey Tatum, David Rodriquez, and Matthew Snodgrass
(the “Officers” and collectively,
“Defendants”). Mot., Dkt. No. 81. Specifically,
Plaintiffs seek to add a state law claim under California
Civil Code section 52.1-the “Bane Act”-to assert
that (1) the Officers violated the rule set forth in
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), and (2)
the Officers’ behavior, including the way Officer Tatum
entered Plaintiffs’ home, was threatening and
intimidating in light of the same facts supporting their
harassment-based claim. Id. at 1-2. Defendants
oppose this Motion. Opp’n, Dkt. No. 82.
Where,
as here, a pleading deadline set in a pretrial scheduling
order has passed (see Dkt. No. 12), amendments to
pleadings are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16,
rather than Rule 15. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4). When a party
seeks to continue the dates set by the court, it must first
show “good cause” for modification of the order
under Rule 16(b). Zivkovic v. So. Cal. Edison Co.,
302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). The good cause inquiry
“primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking
amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,
Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992); see,
e.g., Jimenez v. R. Sambrano, 2009 WL 937042,
at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2009) (discussing Rule 16
standard).
Plaintiffs’
primary motivation in seeking to add their Bane Act claim is
to “compel resolution” to an issue Defendants
dispute: namely, whether the Randolph rule applies
to this case. See Mot. at 2, 4
(“Plaintiffs’ request to amend the pleadings to
add the Bane Act claim also directly responds to
Defendants’ recent strategy to avoid liability under
Randolph.”). On February 5, 2016, the Court
issued an Order on the parties’ cross motions for
summary judgment finding the Randolph rule applied
in the context of probation searches like the one in this
case. See Order re: Mots. for Summ. J. (“MSJ
Order”), Dkt. No. 59; see Barajas v. City of
Rohnert Park, ___F.Supp.3d___, 2016 WL 454068 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 5, 2016). In doing so, the Court specifically noted that
“[b]oth parties focused more on whether
Randolph actually applied in this case but did not
devote much argument or evidence as to whether the
City’s action or inaction was the moving force behind
the potential violation of the Randolph
rule.”[1] MSJ Order at 36. Finding Randolph
applied, the Court denied the City’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Monell claim, but did so without
prejudice to give the parties an opportunity to file further
summary judgment briefing “concerning whether a City
policy or custom was the moving force behind the potential
Randolph rule violation.” Id. at 37.
The Court would have simply granted the City summary judgment
if it had found Randolph inapplicable.
As
such, Plaintiffs’ attempt to now force the issue
through their proposed Bane Act claim is unnecessary-the
Court has already resolved this issue. Moreover, the Court
certified the issue of whether the Randolph rule
applies to this case for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth
Circuit in an attempt to conclusively resolve the question.
Dkt. No. 86. Asserting a Bane Act claim at this point does
not provide the mechanism for Plaintiffs to resolve these
questions.
Finally,
the Court cannot otherwise find Plaintiffs have diligently
brought this claim. The Bane Act provides a private right of
action against a person or persons who interfere by
“threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to
interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the
exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws
of this state . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.
“There are two distinct elements for a section 52.1
cause of action. A plaintiff must show (1) intentional
interference or attempted interference with a state or
federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the
interference or attempted interference was by threats,
intimidation or coercion.” Allen v. City of
Sacramento, 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 67 (2015), as
modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 6, 2015),
review denied (May 20, 2015) (citations omitted).
Considering the elements of a Bane Act claim and the facts
present in the record-and even in Plaintiffs’ original
pleadings-the only possible explanation for the delay is that
Plaintiffs are attempting to resolve the constitutional issue
discussed above. In any event, the Court agrees with
Defendants that Plaintiffs have not been diligent in
asserting this claim, and that allowing such a claim now
risks additional timely and costly motion practice.
The
Court thus DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint to add their proposed
Bane Act claim.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
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Notes:
[1] The Court did not find the Officers
actually violated the Randolph rule at that point
because it was unclear whether the facts underlying such a
...