United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUA SPONTE
CERTIFYING ISSUES FOR APPEAL RE: DKT. NO. 71
MARIA-ELENA JAMES United States Magistrate Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Pending
before the Court is Defendant City of Rohnert Park’s
(the “City” or “Defendant”) follow-up
Motion for Summary Judgment addressing the City’s
potential Monell[1] liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
regarding the “Randolph rule” stemming
from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 71; see also
Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of City’s Mot. (“City
Br.”), Dkt. No. 76.[2] The Court has carefully considered the
parties’ positions, reviewed the record and supporting
documents in this case, and explored the relevant legal
authorities. Ultimately, the Court DENIES
the City’s Motion; however, as explained below, the
Court also sua sponte certifies two issues for interlocutory
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): (1) whether the
Randolph rule applies to this case, and (2) whether
reasonable suspicion was required for the search in this
case.
BACKGROUND
On
February 5, 2016, the Court issued an Order on the
parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. Order re:
Mots. for Summ. J. (“MSJ Order”), Dkt. No. 59;
see Barajas v. City of Rohnert Park,
___F.Supp.3d___, 2016 WL 454068 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). For
purposes of this Order, the Court incorporates the statement
of facts from the MSJ Order (see
“Background” section at pages 1-4). Simply put,
this case is based on allegations that police officers
conducted a suspicionless search of a probationer’s
home over the objection of the probationer’s
co-residents, Plaintiffs Elva and Raul Barajas
(“Plaintiffs”)[3], despite the fact that the probationer
himself had agreed to “warrantless” searches as a
condition of his probation. The probationer is not a
plaintiff in this case; only the co-residents bring suit.
In the
MSJ Order, the Court found, among other things, that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), applies in the context of
probation searches such as the one in this case. See
MSJ Order at 10-13; 18-22. In Randolph, the Supreme
Court held that “a physically present
inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police
search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of
a fellow occupant.” 547 U.S. at 122-23. Put another
way, the Supreme Court explained that “a warrantless
search of a shared dwelling . . . over the express refusal of
consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified
as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the
police by another resident.” Id. at 120
(footnote omitted) (holding search invalid under Fourth
Amendment when a physically-present occupant expressly
objected to a search, notwithstanding the consent of a fellow
occupant). As the Randolph Court explained,
“in the balancing of competing individual and
governmental interests entailed by the bar to unreasonable
searches, . . . the cooperative occupant’s invitation
adds nothing to the government’s side to counter the
force of an objecting individual’s claim to security
against the government’s intrusion into his dwelling
place.” Id. at 114-15 (citation omitted). In
comparing the individual’s interest in protecting the
sanctity of his home, the Court found “[d]isputed
permission is [] no match for this central value of the
Fourth Amendment, and the State’s other countervailing
claims do not add up to outweigh it.” Id. at
115. Consequently, this Court examined the “totality of
the circumstances” of the search in this case, weighed
the competing interests of the City and Plaintiffs, and found
the Randolph rule “applied to the facts in
this case as the government’s limited interests in
conducting this search do not outweigh Plaintiffs’
continued interest in the privacy in their home.” MSJ
Order at 19, 22.
Ultimately,
the Court found that “[b]ased on th[e] record, a
reasonable jury could find that Plaintiffs can prove
Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by entering
their home and conducting a warrantless and suspicionless
search of their joint premises over their express
objections.” Id. at 22. In doing so, the Court
noted the record was unclear about precisely when police
officers entered Plaintiffs’ home as compared to when
Plaintiffs objected to the officers’ request to enter.
Id. at 17-18. If the officers entered the home over
Plaintiffs’ objections, the Court found a rational jury
could conclude the search was unreasonable under
Randolph; however, if the officers entered the home
before Plaintiffs objected, the Court found the
officers’ lack of reasonable suspicion alone did not
make the search unconstitutional under United States v.
King, 736 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S.Ct. 1492 (2014). MSJ Order at 18-28.
According to the majority in King, “[u]nder
California law, Defendant’s agreement to the
warrantless search condition as part of his state-court
probation was an agreement to be subject to suspicionless
searches.” 736 F.3d at 806 n.3. Thus, while Plaintiffs
had sought summary judgment on the ground that lack of
reasonable suspicion made the search unconstitutional, the
Court found the probationer’s warrantless search
condition meant he consented to suspicionless searches; as
such, “if a jury found Officer Tatum entered the home
before Plaintiffs objected, [the probationer]’s consent
justified a suspicionless search of the home he shared with
them.” MSJ Order at 24-28 (but also noting,
“[t]his finding does not necessarily mean the search
was automatically reasonable simply because of [the
probationer]’s consent; it means only that the Court
cannot grant Plaintiffs summary judgment on the ground that
reasonable suspicion was categorically required to perform
this search.”). In sum, the Court found “a
reasonable jury could conclude it was unreasonable for the
officers to enter Plaintiffs’ home over their
objections without a warrant and without reasonable
suspicion.” Id. at 32.
Nonetheless,
the Court granted the individual Defendant officers qualified
immunity for their decision to conduct a probation search of
Plaintiffs’ home over their objections on the ground
that Plaintiffs’ rights under these circumstances were
not clearly established. Id. at 22-24 (citing
Smith v. City of Santa Clara, 2013 WL 164191, at *8
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2013) (declining “to resolve the
underlying constitutional question of whether the Fourth
Amendment permits a probation search where another resident
of the house is present and objects” but concluding the
officers in that case were entitled to qualified immunity
because it “would be reasonable to believe that a rule
that applies to searches generally does not apply the same
way to probation searches” and it was “not
clearly established that Plaintiff’s refusal could or
should trump the consent included as a condition of [the
probationer’s] probation.”)).[4]
Regarding
the City’s Monell liability, however, the
Court found that “as to the potential violation of the
Randolph rule, . . . the parties have not
sufficiently addressed Monell liability for this
claim.” Id. at 36.[5] As the Court specifically
noted, “[b]oth parties focused more on whether
Randolph actually applied in this case but did not
devote much argument or evidence as to whether the
City’s action or inaction was the moving force behind
the potential violation of the Randolph rule.”
Id. Finding Randolph applied, the Court
denied the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Monell claim, but did so without prejudice to give
the parties an opportunity to file further summary judgment
briefing “concerning whether a City policy or custom
was the moving force behind the potential Randolph
rule violation.” Id. at 37. The Court would
have simply granted the City summary judgment if it had found
Randolph inapplicable, not given the City a further
opportunity to file a follow-up motion about its policies and
practices.
The
City has now filed that follow-up Motion, arguing that
“[j]udgment of dismissal must be granted to the City
because Plaintiff cannot prove under any set of facts that
the City was the ‘moving force behind the potential
Randolph rule violation.’” City Br. at
1; see Id . (“Plaintiff [sic] cannot prove
that the Municipality ‘caused’ injury.”);
id. at 5 (“For a Monell claim to be
actionable, the municipality must cause (moving force) the
constitutional deprivation both in law and in fact.”);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (summary judgment is
proper where there is “no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.”).
Plaintiffs
respond with testimony from the City’s Rule 30(b)(6)
witness, Chief of Police Brian Masterson, who testified that
the search of Plaintiffs’ home “followed our
agency policy” and that the officers were
“supposed to go in” even if Plaintiffs objected
to the search. Blythe Decl., Ex. A (“30(b)(6)
Dep.”) at 11:55, 26:14-24, Dkt. No. 77-2. They contend
this, along with other evidence, raises genuine questions of
material fact as to whether the City’s policies or
customs caused the potential constitutional violations in
this case. See Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 77;
see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986) (the party opposing summary judgment can
defeat the motion by “sett[ing] forth specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial” (internal
quotations omitted)).
DISCUSSION
At
first blush, the City’s argument-that Plaintiffs cannot
prove the City “caused” the potential
constitutional violations in this case related to the
Randolph rule-seems uncomplicated. But the
City’s causation assertions are not so simple. In
addition to challenging the traditional bases for application
of municipal liability under § 1983, the City also
contends Plaintiffs cannot prove such causation
“because the Randolph rule as applied to
probationary searches ‘was not clearly
established’ and for all intents and purposes
didn’t exist until February 5, 2016.” City Br. at
1. The City asserts it is entitled to summary judgment
because it “could not ‘cause’ a
constitutional violation for acts that were not
unconstitutional at the time the officers conducted the
search.” Id. at 12; see also City
Reply at 9, Dkt. No. 78 (arguing “municipal immunity .
. . . is warranted on this record” as
“[r]easonable minds differ on the application of
Randolph to the instant probation search” and
“[a] definitive and final answer is a long way
away.”). Plaintiffs disagree, arguing “it does
not matter whether it was clearly established in November
2014 that Randolph applies to probation searches.
Municipalities are not given immunity for unconstitutional
policies and practices, even where implemented in good
faith.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 12 (citations and
footnote omitted).
A.“Municipal
...