United States District Court, N.D. California, Eureka Division
ORDER OF SERVICE
NANDOR
J. VADAS United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff,
a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted
Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc.
5.)
DISCUSSION
Standard
of Review
Federal
courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in
which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any
cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1), (2).
Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1990).
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only “‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’””
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,
. . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United
States Supreme Court has recently explained the
“plausible on its face” standard of
Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide
the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009).
To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,
and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under the color of state law. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Legal
Claims
Plaintiff
states that he has received inadequate medical care.
Deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th
Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies,
Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
banc). A determination of “deliberate
indifference” involves an examination of two elements:
the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the
nature of the defendant's response to that need.
Id. at 1059.
A
“serious” medical need exists if the failure to
treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further
significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Id. The existence of an
injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find
important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of
a medical condition that significantly affects an
individual's daily activities; or the existence of
chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that
a prisoner has a “serious” need for medical
treatment. Id. at 1059-60.
A
prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she
knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious
harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, ” but he
“must also draw the inference.” Id. If a
prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was
not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment,
no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of
Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A
difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison
medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to
a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662
F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiff
contends that several doctors and nurses did not provide
proper medical treatment for his valley fever. He states that
he was denied medical care which led to unbearable pain in
his joints and bones, serious coughing, burning of the lungs,
abscesses on the skin, loss of weight and other ...