United States District Court, N.D. California
In re: AutoZone, Inc., Wage and Hour Employment Practices Litigation
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING AS MOOT
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE; GRANTING MOTION TO
DECERTIFY; GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND
CHARLES R. BREYER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a wage and hour case involving California Autozone stores. In
December 2012, this Court certified a Rest Break class,
defined as: “All non-exempt or hourly paid employees
who have been employed at Defendant’s retail stores in
the State of California at any time on or after July 29, 2005
until the date of certification.” See Order re
Class Cert. (dkt. 174). The Court denied certification
“as to all other subclasses.” Id. at 1.
Three and a half years and much discovery later, Plaintiffs
have moved for partial summary judgment, see P MSJ
(dkt. 289), Autozone has moved for partial summary judgment,
see D MSJ (dkt. 282), the parties have each filed
motions to strike in connection with the summary judgment
motions, see P Mot. to Strike (dkt. 306); D Mot. to
Strike (dkt. 312), Autozone has moved to decertify the rest
break class, see Mot. to Decertify (dkt. 264), and
Plaintiff Jesus Lozacruz has moved to remand his case only,
see Mot. to Remand (dkt. 309). The Court found this
matter suitable for resolution without oral argument,
pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and ruled from the bench
at the motion hearing, see Minutes (dkt. 324). The
Court promised the parties that it would set forth its
reasoning in a written order. Id.
order will address (A) the cross-motions for partial summary
judgment, along with the related motions to strike, followed
by (B) the motion to decertify and (C) the motion to remand.
Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
parties each move for partial summary judgment: Plaintiffs
move as to the certified rest break claim, while Autozone
moves as to the remainder of the claims, which are
“shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose of the summary
judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The burden is on the moving
party to demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute with
respect to any material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 323. A genuine
issue of fact is one that a trier of fact could reasonably
resolve in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute
is “material” only if it could affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248-49.
moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the
nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything and
summary judgment must be denied. Nissan Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir.
2000). If, on the other hand, the moving party has satisfied
its initial burden of production, then the nonmoving party
may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but instead
must produce admissible evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at
1103. The nonmoving party must “designate
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). If the nonmoving party fails to
make this showing, the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Id. at 323.
not a court’s task “to scour the record in search
of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v.
Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal
citation omitted). Rather, a court is entitled to rely on the
nonmoving party to “identify with reasonable
particularity the evidence that precludes summary
judgment.” See id. However, when deciding a
summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all
justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
move for summary judgment on their rest break claim.
See P MSJ.Because there is at best a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether Autozone indeed had a uniform
policy in place throughout the class period, summary judgment
Order No. 7 provides in part that an “authorized rest
period time shall be based on the total hours worked daily at
the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours
or major fraction thereof.” 8 Cal. Code of Regs. §
11070, subd. 12(A). The Supreme Court of California clarified
in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53
Cal.4th 1004, 1029 (2012), that “[e]mployees are
entitled to 10 minutes’ rest for shifts from three and
one-half to six hours in length, 20 minutes for shifts of
more than six hours up to 10 hours, 30 minutes for shifts of
more than 10 hours up to 14 hours, and so on.” In
seeking certification of the rest break class here,
Plaintiffs identified an Autozone policy, which they
represented was in place throughout the class period. Order
on Order re Class Cert. at 6-7. That policy provided:
An AutoZoner who works 4 hours per day is provided 1 break
period of 10 consecutive minutes; an AutoZoner who works 8
hours per day is provided 2 break periods of not less than 10
Id. at 7. That policy is-on its face-inadequate
under Brinker. See id. at 11.
Court noted at the class certification stage that there were
“significant evidentiary disputes in connection with
[Autozone’s] interpretation and implementation of this
policy.” Id. at 7. The Court discussed the
conflicting evidence, but held that, because the
“claims are based entirely on the legality of
[Autozone’s] uniform written rest break policy, ”
common questions predominated. Id. at 13-14 (citing
Kurihara v. Best Buy Co., No. 06-01884 MHP, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64224, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2007);
Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1020, 1033; Vedachalam v.
Tata Consultancy Servs., Ltd., No. C 06-0963 CW, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46429, at *37-39 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012);
In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions, No.
1:07CV1314 LJO DLB, 2012 WL 5932833, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov.
motion now argues that the uniform policy “is
sufficient to establish liability, ” and that if
Autozone can demonstrate that some employees actually took
appropriate rest breaks, then such evidence is relevant to
assessing damages, not liability. P MSJ at 8 (citing
Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Assocs., Inc., 216
Cal.App.4th 220, 235 (2013); Benton v. Telecom Network
Specialists, Inc., 220 Cal.App.4th 701 (2013)). Even
Plaintiffs concede, however, that simply pointing to a
written policy does not entitle a plaintiff to summary
judgment. See Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1033
(emphasis added) (referring even in certification context to
“uniform policy consistently applied”);
Campbell v. Vitran Express, Inc., No. CV 11-05029
RGK (SSx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31360, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
2, 2016) (“logically absurd and legally
erroneous” to argue that liability attaches
“solely based on a facially defective policy.”);
Reply re P MSJ (dkt. 305) (“Campbell . . .
denied summary judgment where plaintiff argued that the
existence of facially defective policies warrants liability.
That is not Plaintiffs’ argument here. Rather, in
addition to the facial illegality . . . Defendant’s
corporate designee and other corporate witnesses confirmed
that Defendant actually used the unlawful policies
throughout the entire class period.”).
in opposing the motion, has successfully cast doubt on
whether the written policy Plaintiffs point to-the one that
was the basis of the Court’s certification order in
2012-was actually used throughout the class period.
it turns out that at the beginning of the class period, in
July 2005, Autozone’s 2004 California Store Handbook
was in effect, and it provided that “[rest] breaks are
scheduled in accordance with California law.”
See Opp’n to P MSJ at 2 (citing 2012 Jon Decl.
(dkt. 128) ¶ 8, Ex. A; 2016 Jon Decl. (dkt. 264-1)
¶ 3, Ex. A). In addition, Wage Order No. 7 was posted in
each store. Id. (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶¶
6-7; Stephens Decl. (dkt. 264-2) ¶¶ 3-4; Iskander
Decl. (dkt. 264-3) ¶ 3, Ex. 2. Autozone revised that
handbook in 2006, and it again provided that “[rest]
breaks are scheduled in accordance with California
law.” Id. (citing 2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 8, Ex.
A; 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A). The Wage Order continued
to be posted in each store. Id. (citing 2016 Jon
Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Stephens Decl. ¶¶ 3-4;
Iskander Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2). The language Plaintiffs rely
on, from the 2008 “Store Handbook Exception,
California, ” was not implemented until 2008.
See Opp’n to P MSJ at 3 (citing 2016 Jon Decl.
¶ 4, Ex. B; 2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 8, Ex.
That is three years into the class period.
in 2011, and thus before the end of the class period, an
Autozone PowerPoint presentation explained that any employee
who worked between 3.5 and 6 hours was entitled to a rest
break, and that any employee who worked between 6 and 10
hours was entitled to two. Supplemental 2016 Jon Decl. (dkt.
298) ¶¶ 2-3; 2016 Jon Decl. Ex. C. This policy
complies with Brinker. See Brinker, 53
Cal.4th at 1029. As Plaintiffs point out, it is unclear
whether Autozone “actually gave the presentation to any
of its employees during, or after, the Rest Break Class
Period.” See Reply re P MSJ at 4. Nonetheless,
the Court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party-here, Autozone-which would support an
inference that Autozone did not create a PowerPoint and then
do nothing with it. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Autozone points to some evidence that the various policies in
place during the class period were implemented in a compliant
matter: Carlos Jon declares that there was a 2hour rule,
see 2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 9 (“it is the
expectation that at California stores, AutoZoners will take
rest breaks every two hours.”); various employee
deponents, including a named Plaintiff, testified that they
took rest breaks or told their subordinates to take rest
breaks every two hours, see Iskander Decl.
¶¶ 4, 6-7, Ex. 3, 5, 6; 117 class members declared
that they knew that they were entitled and permitted to take
rest breaks if they worked over 3.5 or 6 hours, see
Order re Class Cert. at 8-9; and Plaintiffs’ own survey
evidence (discussed below in the context of the motion to
decertify) reflected that “a majority of the survey
respondents stated that they were in fact authorized and
permitted to take all required rest breaks during shifts of
3.5-4 and 6-8 hours, ” Opp’n to P MSJ at 6
(citing Wazzan Report (dkt. 287); Saad Decl. (dkt. 300-1)
¶ 3, Ex. A).
move to strike the new evidence that Autozone did not
implement the unlawful policy language until 2008.
See P Mot. to Strike. Autozone clarified in its
opposition brief that, “Due to the ambiguous nature of
the copyright statement, Defendant’s 30(b)(6) deponent
Tim Young mistakenly testified that the 2010 Exception was in
effect from 2004 to 2010, when in fact the policy was not
even introduced until 2010.” See Opp’n
to P MSJ at 3 n.4 (citing Young Depo. (dkt. 289-1) Ex. E at
31). Plaintiffs argue that Autozone cannot rebut
Young’s 30(b)(6) deposition testimony, because
Plaintiffs relied on it and because Autozone has not provided
an adequate explanation for Young’s change of course. P
Mot. to Strike at 3. But Autozone does offer an adequate
explanation. The policies that Young was given during his
30(b)(6) deposition had copyright statements in the corner
that state a range of dates. See 2016 Young Decl.
(dkt. 300-2) ¶ 4. Young mistakenly agreed with
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s questions that the date
range represented the entire time the policy was in effect.
Id. (“For example, Plaintiffs’ counsel
asked if Exhibit 3 was ‘in effect for Autozone’s
California employees from the period that is stated at the
bottom, which is 2004 to 2010?’ However, I also
testified that I did not know when Exhibits 4 and 5 came into
effect, and I stated that my testimony with respect to
Exhibit 3 was ‘based off [the]
document.’”). Young explains:
Looking back at the documents now, it is clear that the
copyright information in the lower left corner, to which
Plaintiffs’ counsel referred, does not represent the
period during which the documents were in effect. If that
were true, then as of 2008 all four of the handbooks
identified above would have simultaneously been in
effect. Instead, as Exhibit 9 makes clear, the
last date in the copyright notice represents the
year in which the particular handbook or exception first
Id. ¶ 5.
Court agrees that this is the appropriate interpretation of
the copyright statements. Moreover, although Plaintiffs are
frustrated by Young’s late clarification, see
P Mot. to Strike, it is nonetheless adequate, see
AngioScore, Inc. v. TriReme Med., Inc., No.
12-cv-03393-YGR, 2015 WL 4040388, at *24 (N.D. Cal. July 1,
2015) (collecting cases in support of rule that defendant
cannot rebut 30(b)(6) testimony without an “adequate
explanation”). Accordingly, the Court DENIES
Plaintiffs’ motion to strike and permits Young’s
clarifying testimony about the dates during which various
policies were in effect.
there is at least a dispute of fact as to whether the rest
break policy upon which this Court granted class
certification was in effect throughout the class period, the
Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
judgment as to the rest break claim.
Autozone’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
moves for partial summary judgment on the remaining,
uncertified claims. See D MSJ. This order addresses:
(a) Plaintiffs’ class-wide claims, and Ellison’s
individual claims, under the Private Attorneys General Act of
2004, Labor Code § 2699 et seq.
(“PAGA”); (b) Plaintiffs’ class-wide
claims, and Ellison’s individual claims, under Labor
Code section 558; (c) the portion of Plaintiffs’
individual waiting time penalties under Labor Code section
203 that is based on an alleged failure to pay rest break
premiums, and the class-wide claim for waiting time penalties
under Labor Code section 203; and (d) the portion of
Plaintiffs’ individual claims, and the class-wide
claim, for prejudgment interest under Labor Code section
218.6 based on rest break premiums and waiting time
argues that Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims fail because (1)
there is no certified PAGA class and (2) there is no
representative PAGA claim in the operative complaint. D MSJ
at 1. This is correct. Plaintiffs cannot continue to seek
recovery on a class-wide basis for penalties under PAGA.
Court denied certification “as to all other
subclasses” but the rest break class, and so there is
no PAGA class in the case. See Order re Class Cert.
at 1. Nor is there a PAGA claim in the complaint. In February
2007, Ellison filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint
to add a separate PAGA claim. Iskander Decl. Ex. B. Autozone
did not oppose the amendment and Plaintiffs filed the First
Amended Complaint in April 2007. Iskander Decl. ¶ 3;
Iskander Decl. Ex. C. In May 2007, Ellison filed another
motion to amend, seeking to remove the separate cause of
action under PAGA. Iskander Decl. Ex. D. Autozone did not
oppose amendment and the Court granted the motion in July
2007. Iskander Decl. ¶ 5; Iskander Decl. Ex. E.
Subsequently a dispute arose about whether any PAGA claims
remained at issue following the Court’s denial of a
PAGA subclass. Iskander Decl. Ex. H. In May 2015, Plaintiffs
filed a motion to amend to add a representative PAGA claim.
Iskander Decl. Ex. J. This Court denied that request,
explaining that the Second Amended Complaint had
“removed the separate cause of action under PAGA,
” and that permitting Plaintiffs to add a
representative PAGA claim eight years after the original
complaint had been filed constituted “undue
delay” and would prejudice Autozone. See Order
Denying Mot. For Leave to Amend (dkt. 231) (adding,
“Defendant and the Court have operated on the
understanding that the Second Amended Complaint is the
operative complaint in this case . . . and that, following
the Court’s order on class certification, this case is
primarily about rest breaks.”). As there is no PAGA claim
left in the case, the Court GRANTS summary judgment to
Autozone as to representative PAGA penalties.
Labor Code section 558
next asserts that “only ‘the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency [LWDA] . . . and its constituent
departments and divisions-are authorized to assess and
collect civil penalties for specified violations of the Labor
Code committed by the employer, ’” and that
“PAGA is the only exception to this rule.”
See D MSJ at 8 (citing Caliber Bodyworks, Inc.
v. Super. Ct., 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 370 (2005);
Arias v. Super. Ct., 46 Cal.4th 969, 986 (2009)).
Plaintiffs seek to recover penalties under Labor Code section
558 as part of their PAGA claim. See Iskander Decl.
Ex. E (SAC ¶¶ 51, 57, 78, 87). Autozone argues that
because Plaintiffs cannot maintain a PAGA claim, they are
also not entitled to penalties under section 558. D MSJ at 8.
Plaintiffs argue simply: “Because PAGA claims remain
available in this case, Section 558 penalties survive.”
Opp’n to D MSJ at 9. Because the Court concludes that
the PAGA claims are no longer available, the Court GRANTS
summary judgment to Autozone as to the section 558 penalties.
Individual and Class-Wide Waiting Time Penalties under Labor
Code section 203
next argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to waiting time
penalties under Labor Code section 203 because section 203
provides for such penalties where an employer willfully
failed to pay “any wages of an employee . . .”
and unpaid rest breaks are not “wages.”
See D MSJ at 9. Despite Autozone’s assertion
that the law is “well established” in its favor,
this is in fact an area in which courts are sharply divided.
See Brewer v. General Nutrition Corp., No.
11-cv-3587 YGR, 2015 WL 5072039, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27,
2015) (collecting cases re split). This Court joins the
majority of judges in this district and concludes that unpaid
rest breaks are “wages” entitling Plaintiffs to
waiting time penalties under section 203.
California Supreme Court in Murphy v. Kenneth Cole
Prods., Inc., 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1114 (2007), considered
the appropriate statute of limitations for a claim under the
rest break statute, Labor Code section 226.7. It held that
“[t]he statute’s plain language, the
administrative and legislative history, and the compensatory
purpose of the remedy compel the conclusion that the
‘additional hour of pay’ . . . is a premium wage
intended to compensate employees, not a penalty.”
Id. That same court then muddied the waters when,
five years later, it again spoke about the rest break
statute. In Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection,
Inc., 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1248 (2012), the court was
applying Labor Code section 218.5, which requires the
awarding of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in
“any action brought for the nonpayment of wages. . .
.” The court had to determine “whether a section
226.7 claim, which concerns an employer’s alleged
failure to provide statutorily mandated meal and rest
periods, constitutes an ‘action brought for the
nonpayment of wages’ within the meaning of section
218.5.” Id. at 1255. It held that “a
section 226.7 claim is not an action brought for nonpayment
of wages; it is an action brought for nonprovision of meal or
rest breaks.” Id. at 1256-57. The court
explained that this was “not at odds with” the
We said that the “additional hour of pay” remedy
in section 226.7 is a “‘liability created by
statute’” and that the liability is properly
characterized as a wage, not a penalty. . . . To say that a
section 226.7 remedy is a wage, however, is not to say that
the legal violation triggering the remedy is
nonpayment of wages. As explained above, the legal violation
is nonprovision of meal or rest breaks, and the object that
follows the phrase “action brought for” in
section 218.5 is the alleged legal violation, not the desired
Id. at 1257.
post-Kirby have struggled to decide whether
penalties for violating section 226.7 are still properly
considered “wages, ” under Murphy, or
whether Kirby’s holding that a claim for
violation of section 226.7 is not an action for nonpayment of
wages means that the relief under section 226.7 is something
other than wages. See, e.g., Brewer, 2015
WL 5072039, at *18. Although some courts have concluded that
payments under section 226.7 should not be considered wages,
see, e.g., Singletary v. Teavana Corp., No.
5:13-cv-01163- PSG, 2014 WL 1760884, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2,
2014) (concluding that “Section 203, like the attorney
fee provision in Kirby, is concerned with a
particular type of wrong, not a particular type of
remedy”); Jones v. Spherion Staffing LLC, No.
LA CV 11-06462 JAK (JCx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112396, at
*21-22 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012) (reading Murphy
narrowly and applying Kirby), this Court is
persuaded that the courts reaching the opposite conclusion
employ better reasoning. Judge Gonzales Rogers examined
Murphy and Kirby at length and concluded
that the payments are wages, stating: “Kirby
did not abrogate Murphy.” See Brewer,
2015 WL 5072039, at *18-19. Judge Tigar discussed the
relevant case law in Parson v. Golden State FC, LLC,
No. 16-cv-00405-JST, 2016 WL 1734010, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. May
2, 2016), distinguished Singletary and
Jones as making distinctions that have no legal
bearing,  and concluded that payments under
section 226.7 are wages, as “[n]othing in
Murphy or Kirby suggests that wages awarded
under section 226.7 be treated any differently than other
wages earned by the employee.” Judge Corley, too, was
“not persuaded” by the defendant’s argument
that Kirby precludes a finding that section 226.7
payments are wages, stating “while Kirby is
helpful in determining the contours of a Section 226.7 claim,
it says nothing particular to the question of whether a
Section 226.7 premium wage is a wage under Section 203. . .
.” See Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co.,
No. C-13-02377 JSC, 2014 WL 465907, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
relies on the opinion in Ling v. P.F. Chang’s China
Bistro, Inc., 245 Cal.App.4th 1242 (2016). See
D MSJ at 9; Reply re D MSJ (dkt. 304) at 7 n.5. Although that
case included broad language about section 203, see
Ling, 245 Cal.App.4th at 1261 (“Following
Kirby, section 226.7 cannot support a section 203
penalty because section 203, subdivision (b) tethers the
waiting time penalty to a separate action for wages.”),
that language is dicta. The Ling case concerned only
whether “a section 203 waiting time claim based on
section 226.7 premium pay is an ‘action  brought for
the non-payment of wages’ under section
218.5”-the attorneys’ fees provision at issue in
Kirby. See id. Its assertion that
“the fact that the remedy [under section 226.7] is
measured by an employee’s hourly wage does not
transmute the remedy into a wage as that term is used in
section 203, ” is neither central to its holding nor,
if read as Autozone urges, consistent with Murphy.
the Court is persuaded by the numerous Northern District
courts recognizing that section 203 penalties are available
for wage payments under section 226.7, the Court DENIES
summary judgment to Autozone on Section 203.
Individual and Class-Wide Prejudgment Interest under Labor
Code section 218.6
Autozone argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ claims for prejudgment interest under Labor
Code section 218.6 based on either (1) unpaid rest break
premiums or (2) waiting time penalties. D MSJ at 11. Section
218.6 provides that “In any action brought for the
nonpayment of wages, the court shall award interest on all
due and unpaid wages at the rate of interest specified in
subdivision (b) of Section 3289 of the Civil Code. . .
.” Cal. Lab. Code § 218.6. Autozone is
prerequisite for prejudgment interest under Section 218.6 is
that the action be one “for the nonpayment of
wages”-and Kirby explicitly held that a rest
break claim is not an “action brought for the
nonpayment of wages, ” see Cal. Lab. Code
§ 218.6; Kirby, 53 Cal.4th at 1255. Waiting
time penalties also cannot form the basis for prejudgment
interest because such penalties are not wages. In Drumm
v. Morningstar, Inc., Judge Henderson explained that
“[t]he purpose of prejudgment interest ‘is . . .
to make the plaintiff whole as of the date of the
injury.’” 695 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1022 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (quoting Lakin v. Watkins Assoc. Indus., 6
Cal.4th 644, 663 (1993)). He explained that “The
waiting time penalty, like a punitive damage award, is
designed not to make employees whole, but to act ‘as a
disincentive to employers who are reluctant to pay wages in a
timely manner.’” Id. at 1019 (quoting
Mamika v. Barca, 68 Cal.App.4th 487, 493
the Court GRANTS Autozone’s motion as to prejudgment
interest under Labor Code section 218.6.
Conclusion as to Cross-Motions for Partial Summary
the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summery
Judgment, DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike, DENIES
AS MOOT Autozone’s Motion to Strike, GRANTS
Autozone’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to
the PAGA claims, the section 558 penalties, and the
prejudgment interest under section 218.6; and DENIES
Autozone’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Motion to Decertify Rest Break Claim
next moves to decertify the rest break claim, arguing based
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) that there is a
lack of predominance and that the case is unmanageable.
See Mot. to Decertify. The Court agrees on both