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In re AutoZone, Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. California

August 10, 2016

In re: AutoZone, Inc., Wage and Hour Employment Practices Litigation

         ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE; GRANTING MOTION TO DECERTIFY; GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

          HON. CHARLES R. BREYER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This is a wage and hour case involving California Autozone stores. In December 2012, this Court certified a Rest Break class, defined as: “All non-exempt or hourly paid employees who have been employed at Defendant’s retail stores in the State of California at any time on or after July 29, 2005 until the date of certification.” See Order re Class Cert. (dkt. 174). The Court denied certification “as to all other subclasses.” Id. at 1. Three and a half years and much discovery later, Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment, see P MSJ (dkt. 289), Autozone has moved for partial summary judgment, see D MSJ (dkt. 282), the parties have each filed motions to strike in connection with the summary judgment motions, see P Mot. to Strike (dkt. 306); D Mot. to Strike (dkt. 312), Autozone has moved to decertify the rest break class, see Mot. to Decertify (dkt. 264), and Plaintiff Jesus Lozacruz has moved to remand his case only, see Mot. to Remand (dkt. 309). The Court found this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and ruled from the bench at the motion hearing, see Minutes (dkt. 324). The Court promised the parties that it would set forth its reasoning in a written order. Id.

         I. DISCUSSION

         This order will address (A) the cross-motions for partial summary judgment, along with the related motions to strike, followed by (B) the motion to decertify and (C) the motion to remand.

         A. Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

         The parties each move for partial summary judgment: Plaintiffs move as to the certified rest break claim, while Autozone moves as to the remainder of the claims, which are uncertified.

         1. Legal Standard

         Courts “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute with respect to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 323. A genuine issue of fact is one that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248-49.

         If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything and summary judgment must be denied. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). If, on the other hand, the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, then the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but instead must produce admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 1103. The nonmoving party must “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 323.

         It is not a court’s task “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). Rather, a court is entitled to rely on the nonmoving party to “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” See id. However, when deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

         2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

         Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on their rest break claim. See P MSJ.[1]Because there is at best a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Autozone indeed had a uniform policy in place throughout the class period, summary judgment is inappropriate.

         Wage Order No. 7 provides in part that an “authorized rest period time shall be based on the total hours worked daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours or major fraction thereof.” 8 Cal. Code of Regs. § 11070, subd. 12(A). The Supreme Court of California clarified in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1029 (2012), that “[e]mployees are entitled to 10 minutes’ rest for shifts from three and one-half to six hours in length, 20 minutes for shifts of more than six hours up to 10 hours, 30 minutes for shifts of more than 10 hours up to 14 hours, and so on.” In seeking certification of the rest break class here, Plaintiffs identified an Autozone policy, which they represented was in place throughout the class period. Order on Order re Class Cert. at 6-7. That policy provided:

An AutoZoner who works 4 hours per day is provided 1 break period of 10 consecutive minutes; an AutoZoner who works 8 hours per day is provided 2 break periods of not less than 10 consecutive minutes.

Id. at 7. That policy is-on its face-inadequate under Brinker. See id. at 11.

         The Court noted at the class certification stage that there were “significant evidentiary disputes in connection with [Autozone’s] interpretation and implementation of this policy.” Id. at 7. The Court discussed the conflicting evidence, but held that, because the “claims are based entirely on the legality of [Autozone’s] uniform written rest break policy, ” common questions predominated. Id. at 13-14 (citing Kurihara v. Best Buy Co., No. 06-01884 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64224, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2007); Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1020, 1033; Vedachalam v. Tata Consultancy Servs., Ltd., No. C 06-0963 CW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46429, at *37-39 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012); In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions, No. 1:07CV1314 LJO DLB, 2012 WL 5932833, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2012)).

         Plaintiffs’ motion now argues that the uniform policy “is sufficient to establish liability, ” and that if Autozone can demonstrate that some employees actually took appropriate rest breaks, then such evidence is relevant to assessing damages, not liability. P MSJ at 8 (citing Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Assocs., Inc., 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 235 (2013); Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc., 220 Cal.App.4th 701 (2013)). Even Plaintiffs concede, however, that simply pointing to a written policy does not entitle a plaintiff to summary judgment.[2] See Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1033 (emphasis added) (referring even in certification context to “uniform policy consistently applied”); Campbell v. Vitran Express, Inc., No. CV 11-05029 RGK (SSx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31360, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2016) (“logically absurd and legally erroneous” to argue that liability attaches “solely based on a facially defective policy.”); Reply re P MSJ (dkt. 305) (“Campbell . . . denied summary judgment where plaintiff argued that the existence of facially defective policies warrants liability. That is not Plaintiffs’ argument here. Rather, in addition to the facial illegality . . . Defendant’s corporate designee and other corporate witnesses confirmed that Defendant actually used the unlawful policies throughout the entire class period.”).

         Autozone, in opposing the motion, has successfully cast doubt on whether the written policy Plaintiffs point to-the one that was the basis of the Court’s certification order in 2012-was actually used throughout the class period.

         First, it turns out that at the beginning of the class period, in July 2005, Autozone’s 2004 California Store Handbook was in effect, and it provided that “[rest] breaks are scheduled in accordance with California law.” See Opp’n to P MSJ at 2 (citing 2012 Jon Decl. (dkt. 128) ¶ 8, Ex. A; 2016 Jon Decl. (dkt. 264-1) ¶ 3, Ex. A). In addition, Wage Order No. 7 was posted in each store. Id. (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Stephens Decl. (dkt. 264-2) ¶¶ 3-4; Iskander Decl. (dkt. 264-3) ¶ 3, Ex. 2. Autozone revised that handbook in 2006, and it again provided that “[rest] breaks are scheduled in accordance with California law.” Id. (citing 2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A; 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A). The Wage Order continued to be posted in each store. Id. (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Stephens Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Iskander Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2). The language Plaintiffs rely on, from the 2008 “Store Handbook Exception, California, ” was not implemented until 2008. See Opp’n to P MSJ at 3 (citing 2016 Jon Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B; 2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A).[3] That is three years into the class period.

         Second, in 2011, and thus before the end of the class period, an Autozone PowerPoint presentation explained that any employee who worked between 3.5 and 6 hours was entitled to a rest break, and that any employee who worked between 6 and 10 hours was entitled to two. Supplemental 2016 Jon Decl. (dkt. 298) ¶¶ 2-3[4]; 2016 Jon Decl. Ex. C. This policy complies with Brinker. See Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1029. As Plaintiffs point out, it is unclear whether Autozone “actually gave the presentation to any of its employees during, or after, the Rest Break Class Period.” See Reply re P MSJ at 4. Nonetheless, the Court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party-here, Autozone-which would support an inference that Autozone did not create a PowerPoint and then do nothing with it. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

         Third, Autozone points to some evidence that the various policies in place during the class period were implemented in a compliant matter: Carlos Jon declares that there was a 2hour rule, see 2012 Jon Decl. ¶ 9 (“it is the expectation that at California stores, AutoZoners will take rest breaks every two hours.”); various employee deponents, including a named Plaintiff, testified that they took rest breaks or told their subordinates to take rest breaks every two hours, see Iskander Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6-7, Ex. 3, 5, 6; 117 class members declared that they knew that they were entitled and permitted to take rest breaks if they worked over 3.5 or 6 hours, see Order re Class Cert. at 8-9; and Plaintiffs’ own survey evidence (discussed below in the context of the motion to decertify) reflected that “a majority of the survey respondents stated that they were in fact authorized and permitted to take all required rest breaks during shifts of 3.5-4 and 6-8 hours, ” Opp’n to P MSJ at 6 (citing Wazzan Report (dkt. 287); Saad Decl. (dkt. 300-1) ¶ 3, Ex. A).[5]

         Plaintiffs move to strike the new evidence that Autozone did not implement the unlawful policy language until 2008. See P Mot. to Strike. Autozone clarified in its opposition brief that, “Due to the ambiguous nature of the copyright statement, Defendant’s 30(b)(6) deponent Tim Young mistakenly testified that the 2010 Exception was in effect from 2004 to 2010, when in fact the policy was not even introduced until 2010.” See Opp’n to P MSJ at 3 n.4 (citing Young Depo. (dkt. 289-1) Ex. E at 31). Plaintiffs argue that Autozone cannot rebut Young’s 30(b)(6) deposition testimony, because Plaintiffs relied on it and because Autozone has not provided an adequate explanation for Young’s change of course. P Mot. to Strike at 3. But Autozone does offer an adequate explanation. The policies that Young was given during his 30(b)(6) deposition had copyright statements in the corner that state a range of dates. See 2016 Young Decl. (dkt. 300-2) ¶ 4. Young mistakenly agreed with Plaintiffs’ counsel’s questions that the date range represented the entire time the policy was in effect. Id. (“For example, Plaintiffs’ counsel asked if Exhibit 3 was ‘in effect for Autozone’s California employees from the period that is stated at the bottom, which is 2004 to 2010?’ However, I also testified that I did not know when Exhibits 4 and 5 came into effect, and I stated that my testimony with respect to Exhibit 3 was ‘based off [the] document.’”). Young explains:

Looking back at the documents now, it is clear that the copyright information in the lower left corner, to which Plaintiffs’ counsel referred, does not represent the period during which the documents were in effect. If that were true, then as of 2008 all four of the handbooks identified above would have simultaneously been in effect.[6] Instead, as Exhibit 9 makes clear, the last date in the copyright notice represents the year in which the particular handbook or exception first became effective.

Id. ¶ 5.

         The Court agrees that this is the appropriate interpretation of the copyright statements. Moreover, although Plaintiffs are frustrated by Young’s late clarification, see P Mot. to Strike, it is nonetheless adequate, see AngioScore, Inc. v. TriReme Med., Inc., No. 12-cv-03393-YGR, 2015 WL 4040388, at *24 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2015) (collecting cases in support of rule that defendant cannot rebut 30(b)(6) testimony without an “adequate explanation”). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to strike and permits Young’s clarifying testimony about the dates during which various policies were in effect.[7]

         Because there is at least a dispute of fact as to whether the rest break policy upon which this Court granted class certification was in effect throughout the class period, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to the rest break claim.[8]

         3. Autozone’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

         Autozone moves for partial summary judgment on the remaining, uncertified claims. See D MSJ. This order addresses: (a) Plaintiffs’ class-wide claims, and Ellison’s individual claims, under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor Code § 2699 et seq. (“PAGA”); (b) Plaintiffs’ class-wide claims, and Ellison’s individual claims, under Labor Code section 558; (c) the portion of Plaintiffs’ individual waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203 that is based on an alleged failure to pay rest break premiums, and the class-wide claim for waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203; and (d) the portion of Plaintiffs’ individual claims, and the class-wide claim, for prejudgment interest under Labor Code section 218.6 based on rest break premiums and waiting time penalties.

         a. PAGA claims

         Autozone argues that Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims fail because (1) there is no certified PAGA class and (2) there is no representative PAGA claim in the operative complaint. D MSJ at 1. This is correct. Plaintiffs cannot continue to seek recovery on a class-wide basis for penalties under PAGA.

         The Court denied certification “as to all other subclasses” but the rest break class, and so there is no PAGA class in the case. See Order re Class Cert. at 1. Nor is there a PAGA claim in the complaint. In February 2007, Ellison filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a separate PAGA claim. Iskander Decl. Ex. B. Autozone did not oppose the amendment and Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint in April 2007. Iskander Decl. ¶ 3; Iskander Decl. Ex. C. In May 2007, Ellison filed another motion to amend, seeking to remove the separate cause of action under PAGA. Iskander Decl. Ex. D. Autozone did not oppose amendment and the Court granted the motion in July 2007. Iskander Decl. ¶ 5; Iskander Decl. Ex. E. Subsequently a dispute arose about whether any PAGA claims remained at issue following the Court’s denial of a PAGA subclass. Iskander Decl. Ex. H. In May 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend to add a representative PAGA claim. Iskander Decl. Ex. J. This Court denied that request, explaining that the Second Amended Complaint had “removed the separate cause of action under PAGA, ” and that permitting Plaintiffs to add a representative PAGA claim eight years after the original complaint had been filed constituted “undue delay” and would prejudice Autozone. See Order Denying Mot. For Leave to Amend (dkt. 231) (adding, “Defendant and the Court have operated on the understanding that the Second Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in this case . . . and that, following the Court’s order on class certification, this case is primarily about rest breaks.”).[9] As there is no PAGA claim left in the case, the Court GRANTS summary judgment to Autozone as to representative PAGA penalties.

         b. Labor Code section 558

         Autozone next asserts that “only ‘the Labor and Workforce Development Agency [LWDA] . . . and its constituent departments and divisions-are authorized to assess and collect civil penalties for specified violations of the Labor Code committed by the employer, ’” and that “PAGA is the only exception to this rule.” See D MSJ at 8 (citing Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 370 (2005); Arias v. Super. Ct., 46 Cal.4th 969, 986 (2009)). Plaintiffs seek to recover penalties under Labor Code section 558 as part of their PAGA claim. See Iskander Decl. Ex. E (SAC ¶¶ 51, 57, 78, 87). Autozone argues that because Plaintiffs cannot maintain a PAGA claim, they are also not entitled to penalties under section 558. D MSJ at 8. Plaintiffs argue simply: “Because PAGA claims remain available in this case, Section 558 penalties survive.” Opp’n to D MSJ at 9. Because the Court concludes that the PAGA claims are no longer available, the Court GRANTS summary judgment to Autozone as to the section 558 penalties.

         c. Individual and Class-Wide Waiting Time Penalties under Labor Code section 203

         Autozone next argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203 because section 203 provides for such penalties where an employer willfully failed to pay “any wages of an employee . . .” and unpaid rest breaks are not “wages.” See D MSJ at 9. Despite Autozone’s assertion that the law is “well established” in its favor, this is in fact an area in which courts are sharply divided. See Brewer v. General Nutrition Corp., No. 11-cv-3587 YGR, 2015 WL 5072039, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2015) (collecting cases re split). This Court joins the majority of judges in this district and concludes that unpaid rest breaks are “wages” entitling Plaintiffs to waiting time penalties under section 203.

         The California Supreme Court in Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1114 (2007), considered the appropriate statute of limitations for a claim under the rest break statute, Labor Code section 226.7. It held that “[t]he statute’s plain language, the administrative and legislative history, and the compensatory purpose of the remedy compel the conclusion that the ‘additional hour of pay’ . . . is a premium wage intended to compensate employees, not a penalty.” Id. That same court then muddied the waters when, five years later, it again spoke about the rest break statute. In Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc., 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1248 (2012), the court was applying Labor Code section 218.5, which requires the awarding of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in “any action brought for the nonpayment of wages. . . .” The court had to determine “whether a section 226.7 claim, which concerns an employer’s alleged failure to provide statutorily mandated meal and rest periods, constitutes an ‘action brought for the nonpayment of wages’ within the meaning of section 218.5.” Id. at 1255. It held that “a section 226.7 claim is not an action brought for nonpayment of wages; it is an action brought for nonprovision of meal or rest breaks.” Id. at 1256-57. The court explained that this was “not at odds with” the Murphy decision:

We said that the “additional hour of pay” remedy in section 226.7 is a “‘liability created by statute’” and that the liability is properly characterized as a wage, not a penalty. . . . To say that a section 226.7 remedy is a wage, however, is not to say that the legal violation triggering the remedy is nonpayment of wages. As explained above, the legal violation is nonprovision of meal or rest breaks, and the object that follows the phrase “action brought for” in section 218.5 is the alleged legal violation, not the desired remedy.

Id. at 1257.

         Courts post-Kirby have struggled to decide whether penalties for violating section 226.7 are still properly considered “wages, ” under Murphy, or whether Kirby’s holding that a claim for violation of section 226.7 is not an action for nonpayment of wages means that the relief under section 226.7 is something other than wages. See, e.g., Brewer, 2015 WL 5072039, at *18. Although some courts have concluded that payments under section 226.7 should not be considered wages, see, e.g., Singletary v. Teavana Corp., No. 5:13-cv-01163- PSG, 2014 WL 1760884, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014) (concluding that “Section 203, like the attorney fee provision in Kirby, is concerned with a particular type of wrong, not a particular type of remedy”); Jones v. Spherion Staffing LLC, No. LA CV 11-06462 JAK (JCx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112396, at *21-22 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012) (reading Murphy narrowly and applying Kirby), this Court is persuaded that the courts reaching the opposite conclusion employ better reasoning. Judge Gonzales Rogers examined Murphy and Kirby at length and concluded that the payments are wages, stating: “Kirby did not abrogate Murphy.” See Brewer, 2015 WL 5072039, at *18-19.[10] Judge Tigar discussed the relevant case law in Parson v. Golden State FC, LLC, No. 16-cv-00405-JST, 2016 WL 1734010, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2016), distinguished Singletary and Jones as making distinctions that have no legal bearing, [11] and concluded that payments under section 226.7 are wages, as “[n]othing in Murphy or Kirby suggests that wages awarded under section 226.7 be treated any differently than other wages earned by the employee.” Judge Corley, too, was “not persuaded” by the defendant’s argument that Kirby precludes a finding that section 226.7 payments are wages, stating “while Kirby is helpful in determining the contours of a Section 226.7 claim, it says nothing particular to the question of whether a Section 226.7 premium wage is a wage under Section[] 203. . . .” See Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co., No. C-13-02377 JSC, 2014 WL 465907, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014).[12]

         Autozone relies on the opinion in Ling v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 245 Cal.App.4th 1242 (2016). See D MSJ at 9; Reply re D MSJ (dkt. 304) at 7 n.5. Although that case included broad language about section 203, see Ling, 245 Cal.App.4th at 1261 (“Following Kirby, section 226.7 cannot support a section 203 penalty because section 203, subdivision (b) tethers the waiting time penalty to a separate action for wages.”), that language is dicta. The Ling case concerned only whether “a section 203 waiting time claim based on section 226.7 premium pay is an ‘action [] brought for the non-payment of wages’ under section 218.5”-the attorneys’ fees provision at issue in Kirby. See id. Its assertion that “the fact that the remedy [under section 226.7] is measured by an employee’s hourly wage does not transmute the remedy into a wage as that term is used in section 203, ” is neither central to its holding nor, if read as Autozone urges, consistent with Murphy. See id.

         Because the Court is persuaded by the numerous Northern District courts recognizing that section 203 penalties are available for wage payments under section 226.7, the Court DENIES summary judgment to Autozone on Section 203.[13]

         d. Individual and Class-Wide Prejudgment Interest under Labor Code section 218.6

         Finally, Autozone argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for prejudgment interest under Labor Code section 218.6 based on either (1) unpaid rest break premiums or (2) waiting time penalties. D MSJ at 11. Section 218.6 provides that “In any action brought for the nonpayment of wages, the court shall award interest on all due and unpaid wages at the rate of interest specified in subdivision (b) of Section 3289 of the Civil Code. . . .” Cal. Lab. Code § 218.6. Autozone is correct.[14]

         A prerequisite for prejudgment interest under Section 218.6 is that the action be one “for the nonpayment of wages”-and Kirby explicitly held that a rest break claim is not an “action brought for the nonpayment of wages, ” see Cal. Lab. Code § 218.6; Kirby, 53 Cal.4th at 1255. Waiting time penalties also cannot form the basis for prejudgment interest because such penalties are not wages. In Drumm v. Morningstar, Inc., Judge Henderson explained that “[t]he purpose of prejudgment interest ‘is . . . to make the plaintiff whole as of the date of the injury.’” 695 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Lakin v. Watkins Assoc. Indus., 6 Cal.4th 644, 663 (1993)). He explained that “The waiting time penalty, like a punitive damage award, is designed not to make employees whole, but to act ‘as a disincentive to employers who are reluctant to pay wages in a timely manner.’” Id. at 1019 (quoting Mamika v. Barca, 68 Cal.App.4th 487, 493 (Cal.Ct.App. 1998)).

         Accordingly the Court GRANTS Autozone’s motion as to prejudgment interest under Labor Code section 218.6.

         4. Conclusion as to Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

         Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summery Judgment, DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike, DENIES AS MOOT Autozone’s Motion to Strike, GRANTS Autozone’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to the PAGA claims, the section 558 penalties, and the prejudgment interest under section 218.6; and DENIES Autozone’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to section 203.

         B. Motion to Decertify Rest Break Claim

         Autozone next moves to decertify the rest break claim, arguing based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) that there is a lack of predominance and that the case is unmanageable. See Mot. to Decertify. The Court agrees on both points.

         1. ...


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