United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND INCENTIVE AWARDS; AND
ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST
DEFENDANT NEIL JONES FOOD COMPANY (ECF NOS. 79-82,
86-87)
On July
27, 2016, Plaintiffs Luis Valdez and Carolina Martinez, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
“Plaintiffs”), filed a motion for final approval
of a class action settlement and motion for attorney fees.
(ECF Nos. 79-83.) Plaintiffs’ motions are unopposed.
A final
fairness hearing was held on August 10, 2016. Dennis Wilson
appeared for the class and Michael Wilbur appeared
telephonically for Defendant. Having considered the moving
papers, the Court’s file, as well as the arguments made
at the August 10, 2016 hearing, the Court shall grant the
request for final approval of the class action settlement.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations in the First Amended Complaint
The
operative complaint in this action is the first amended
complaint filed on October 21, 2013. Plaintiffs filed the
first amended complaint against Defendant Neil Jones Food
Company (“Defendant Jones” or
“Defendant”) alleging failure to provide meal and
rest breaks, failure to pay overtime, failure to pay required
“reporting time”, failure to pay for all hours
worked, failure to pay wages due upon termination, failure to
provide itemized wage statements, unfair business practices,
conversion, and violation of the Private Attorneys General
Act. (ECF No. 31.)
Plaintiffs
reside in Fresno County and were employed as non-exempt
hourly employees by Defendant Jones. (First Am. Compl.
¶¶ 8, 28, ECF No. 31.) Defendant Jones operates San
Benito Foods which is a product line producing a wide variety
of products such as chopped and crushed tomatoes, pasta
sauces, diced and stewed tomatoes, purees, pizza sauces,
peeled tomatoes, and seafood cocktail sauces. (Id.
at ¶ 29.) Defendant Jones’ has canning and packing
facilities in Firebaugh and Hollister, California.
(Id. at ¶¶ 9, 29.)
At the
time the complaint was filed, Plaintiff Martinez was still
employed by Defendant Jones and worked in the unskilled
position of a hand processor or general laborer.
(Id. at ¶¶ 39, 63.) Plaintiff Valdez was
employed as a skilled mechanic who handled and worked with
machinery. (Id. at ¶¶ 39, 63.) He was
terminated on or about October 28, 2011. (Id. at
¶ 82.) Both Plaintiffs were laid off from the Firebaugh
facility. (Id. at ¶ 40.)
B.
Procedural History
Plaintiffs
Valdez and Martinez filed this employment action on behalf of
themselves and all others similar situated in the Superior
Court of the State of California for the County of Fresno on
January 11, 2013, alleging violations of California law.
(Compl. 9-33, [1] ECF No. 1.) Defendant Jones removed this
action to the Eastern District of California on April 9,
2013, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446 on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal 1-2,
ECF No. 1.)
On May
9, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. (ECF No. 8.)
Plaintiffs’ motion to remand was denied on September
11, 2013. (ECF No. 28.) On October 21, 2013, Plaintiffs filed
the first amended complaint. (ECF No. 31.) Defendant Jones
filed an answer to the complaint on November 27, 2013. (ECF
No. 37.)
On May
7, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a notice of class action
settlement. (ECF No. 40.) Plaintiffs filed a notice of joint
motion for preliminary approval of the class action
settlement on June 23, 2014. (ECF No. 42.) On June 24, 2014,
the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of
the class action settlement. (ECF No. 44.) A hearing on the
motion was held on July 30, 2014 and an order issued on
August 12, 2014, denying the motion for preliminary approval
of the class action settlement finding that Plaintiffs had
not met the requirements for class certification and that the
structure of the settlement agreement raised concerns about
the fairness of the agreement to the unnamed class members.
The Court cited several areas of concern: 1) the notice
provisions were inadequate to comply with due process and
inform the unnamed class members of the rights that are being
extinguished due to the settlement; 2) the agreement may have
provide preferential treatment to some class members; 3)
class counsel attorney fees raised at least an inference that
the settlement may improperly favor counsel; 4) the agreement
may result in over seventy-five percent of the net settlement
fund reverting to Defendant; and 5) the incentive payments to
the named Plaintiffs far exceeded the recovery of the
individual class members. (ECF No. 47.)
On
December 23, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a second motion for
preliminary approval of a class action settlement. (AR 48.) A
hearing on the motion was held on January 21, 2015, and
findings and recommendations issued recommending that
preliminary approval of the class action settlement be denied
as Plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the requirements of
Rule 23(b) had been met; and the Court found the settlement
was not fair, adequate, and reasonable. (ECF No. 51.) The
parties filed objections to the findings and recommendations
on February 9, 2015. (ECF Nos. 52, 53.) On March 27, 2015,
the district judge issued an order adopting the findings and
recommendations and denying the motion for preliminary
approval of the settlement. (ECF No. 54.)
On
October 9, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a third motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement. (ECF
Nos. 58-60.) On October 27, 2015, Defendant filed a
declaration in support of the motion for approval of the
class action settlement. On November 2, 2015, findings and
recommendations issued recommending that preliminary approval
of the class action settlement be granted, however concerns
were raised regarding the enhancement payment to the class
representatives, the attorney fees sought by class counsel,
and the reversion to Defendant. (ECF No. 63.) On December 3,
2015, the district judge ordered additional briefing to
address three areas of concern: the reversion, the claims
process, and the attorney fee request. (ECF No. 64.) On
December 17, 2015, the parties each filed briefing in support
of the preliminary settlement agreement. (ECF Nos. 65, 66.)
On December 24, 2015, the district court issued an order
denying preliminary approval of the class action settlement.
(ECF No. 67.)
On
February 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a fourth motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement. (ECF No.
70.) The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the
magistrate judge for all purposes and this action was
reassigned to the undersigned on April 8, 2016. (ECF Nos. 73,
74, 75.) On this same date, an order issued granting
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of the
class action settlement. (ECF No. 79.) The Court noted that
at final approval the plaintiffs would need to provide
evidence to support their request for an enhancement payment
and expressed concern about the appropriateness of the
cypress beneficiary which would need to be addressed in the
motion for final approval of the class action settlement.
(Id.)
On July
27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for final approval of the
class action settlement and a motion for attorney fees. (ECF
Nos. 79-82, 83.) At the direction of the Court, supplemental
briefing was filed on August 5, 2016. (ECF Nos. 86, 87.) No
objections to the settlement or opposition to the motion for
final approval of the class action settlement have been
filed.
C.
Terms of the Proposed Settlement Agreement
Two
classes have sought certification in this action. Subclass A
is composed of any and all persons who were employed by Neil
Jones in an hourly union-represented position at Neil
Jones’ “Toma-Tek” facility located in
Firebaugh, California at any time from January 11, 2009
through May 10, 2014. (ECF No. 71-3 at 14.) Subclass B is
composed of all any and all persons who were employed by Neil
Jones in an hourly union-represented position or hourly
non-union position at Neil Jones’
“Toma-Tek” facility located in Firebaugh,
California at any time from January 11, 2009 through December
31, 2014, but excluding anyone whose employment never ended
during the class period by reason of a layoff. (Id.)
Under
the terms of the proposed settlement, Defendant agrees to pay
$850, 000.00 in cash (“gross settlement amount”)
to resolve the claims of any class members who do not timely
and validly opt out. (Id. at 22.) Of the gross
settlement amount, $650, 000.00 is allocated to the released
claims of settlement class A and $200, 000.00 is allocated to
the released claims of settlement Class B. (Id.) The
following deductions are to be taken from the gross
settlement amount:
• Up to $5, 000.00 each to Plaintiffs Martinez and
Valdez for their services and participation as class
representatives;
• Up to $212, 500.00 (25 percent of the gross settlement
fund) to class counsel for attorney fees;
• Up to $30, 000.00 in legal costs and expenses;
• $40, 215.64 in claims administrator costs;
• $15, 000.00 for civil penalties under the California
Private Attorney General Act; and
• Defendant’s portion of FICA, FUTA, and all other
state and federal payroll taxes on the individual settlement
payments.
(Id. at 18, 25-27.)
The
individual settlement payments to each class member in
subclass A will be based on their “workweek
equivalents” during the class period. (Id. at
22.) Each class member’s “workweek
equivalents” will be calculated by dividing the class
member’s total straight time work hours during the
class period by forty hours for the class period of January
11, 2009 through May 10, 2014. (Id. at 23.) Each
class member will be entitled to a proportionate share of the
net settlement amount that is the same as that class
member’s proportionate share of the total workweek
equivalents for the entire class. (Id.)
The
individual settlement payments to each class member in
subclass B will be calculated using a formula based on the
number of years during the class period that the employee was
laid off. (Id. at 23.) Each employee in settlement
class B will receive a payment of $50 if laid off for one
year during the class period; $75 if laid off for two years
during the class period; $100 if laid off for three years
during the class period; $125 if laid off for four years
during the class period; $150 if laid off for five years
during the class period; or $175 if laid off for six years
during the class period. (Id.)
Notices
in English and Spanish were mailed to all class members at
the last known address provided by Defendant Jones.
(Id. at 18.) The settlement administrator was to
resend notices returned by the United States Postal Service
with a forwarding address. (Id. at 19.) If no
forwarding address was provided, the claims administrator was
to skip trace the individual names to obtain additional
addresses and mail a second notice to any new or different
address obtained. (Id.)
The
settlement provides that if the net settlement amount exceeds
the sum of the individual payments, twenty-five percent of
the difference will be allocated to the class members and
seventy-five percent of the difference will be donated to the
Firebaugh-Las Deltas Unified School District. (Id.
at 22.) All funds from individual settlement payment checks
that are uncashed 90 days after they are mailed by the
settlement administrator shall be donated to Firebaugh-Las
Deltas Unified School District. (Id. at 25.)
The
class A settlement resolves claims from January 11, 2009
through the preliminary approval date based on (1)
Defendant’s alleged failure to provide meal periods or
failure to comply with any provision of California law
relating to the provision of meal periods; (2)
Defendant’s alleged failure to provide rest breaks or
failure to comply with any provision of California law
relating to the provision of rest breaks; (3)
Defendant’s alleged failure to pay regular wages or
overtime premiums for all hours worked as a result of its
practices of rounding employees’ clock times, requiring
employees to submit to bag checks and other security checks,
and the donning and doffing of protective clothing and
equipment, as well as the time spent by employees walking
between their work area and the employee parking lot at the
beginning and end of each shift and the time spent by
employees waiting to pick up paychecks; and (4)
Defendant’s alleged failure to provide itemized wage
statements in compliance with Labor Code section 226, as well
as claims for violations of California Business and
Professions Code section 17200, conversion and for penalties
under the Private Attorney General Act arising out of the
claims. (Id. at 12.) The class B settlement resolves
claims arising out of Defendant’s alleged failure at
any time from January 11, 2009 through December 31, 2014 to
pay any member of the class all wages due within the
appropriate time after layoff in violation of Labor Code
section 201, 202, or 203, and any claims during the same
period for alleged violation of Labor Code section 226 based
on or arising out of the itemized wage statements that Neil
Jones provided to laid off employees. (Id. at
12-13.) To achieve a full and complete release, each class
member releases all released claims, either known or unknown,
that exist at the time the Court enters a final order
approving the settlement. (Id. at 30.) Plaintiffs
and the class will seek dismissal of all claims against
Defendant and will provide Defendant with a full release of
the settled claims. (Id. at 30.) The class members
will release all claims asserted in this action with
prejudice. (Id.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENTS
The
Ninth Circuit has declared that a strong judicial policy
favors settlement of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v.
City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992).
Nevertheless, courts have long recognized that the settlement
of class actions presents unique due process concerns for the
absent class members. In re Bluetooth Headset Products
Liability Litigation (“In re Bluetooth”),
654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). To guard against the
potential for abuse, “Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires court approval of all class
action settlements, which may be granted only after a
fairness hearing and a determination that the settlement
taken as a whole is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 946. Since a settlement
agreement negotiated prior to formal class certification
creates a greater potential for a breach of the fiduciary
duty owed to the class, “such agreements must withstand
an even higher level of scrutiny for evidence of collusion or
other conflicts of interest than is ordinarily required under
Rule 23(e) before securing the court's approval as
fair.” Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions
Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 946).
Review
of the proposed settlement of the parties proceeds in two
phases. True v. American Honda Motor Co., 749
F.Supp.2d 1052, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2010). At the preliminary
approval stage, the court determines whether the proposed
agreement is within the range of possible approval and
whether or not notice should be sent to class members.
True, 749 F.Supp.2d at 1063. “If the proposed
settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed,
non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does
not improperly grant preferential treatment to class
representatives or segments of the class, and falls within
the range of possible approval, then the court should direct
that the notice be given to the class members of a formal
fairness hearing.” In re Tableware Antitrust
Litigation, 484 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(quoting Manual for Complex Litigation, Second § 30.44
(1985)). At the final approval stage, the court takes a
closer look at the settlement, taking into consideration
objections and other further developments in order to make
the final fairness determination. True, 749
F.Supp.2d at 1063.
III.
DISCUSSION
When
the settlement takes place before formal class certification,
as it has in this instance, settlement approval requires a
“higher standard of fairness.” Lane v.
Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012)
reh’g denied 709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013).
(quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011,
1026 (9th Cir. 1998)). This more exacting review of class
settlements reached before formal class certification is
required to ensure that the class representatives and their
counsel do not receive a disproportionate benefit “at
the expense of the unnamed plaintiffs who class counsel had a
duty to represent.” Lane, 696 F.3d at 819.
A.
Final Certification of Class
To
certify a class, a plaintiff must demonstrate that all of the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a), and at least one of the
requirements of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have been met. Wang v. Chinese Daily News,
Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2013). This requires
the court to “conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’
to determine whether the party seeking class certification
has met the prerequisites of Rule 23.” Wright v.
Linkus Enterprises, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D. Cal.
2009).
The
Court has previously found that the class meets the
prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. (Order Granting Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement
9-12, ECF No. 76.) Further, the Court found that common
questions predominate and allowing this action to proceed as
a class action is the superior method of adjudicating the
controversy of these employment related claims. (Id.
at 12-13.)
No
class member has objected to the settlement of this action
and the Court is unaware of any changes that would affect the
class certification findings. For the reasons set forth in
the April 8, 2016 order on Plaintiffs’ motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement, the
Court finds that the settlement classes ...