Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Porteous v. Fisher

United States District Court, E.D. California

August 10, 2016

LARRY BRIAN PORTEOUS, Petitioner,
v.
RAYTHEL FISHER, JR., Warden, Respondent.

          ORDER AND FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

          KENDALL J. NEWMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         I. Introduction

         Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Petitioner filed an application for petition of writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to dismiss the habeas petition as barred by the statute of limitations, as well as petitioner’s motion to compel discovery of certain mental health records. For the reasons set forth below, petitioner’s motion to compel is denied, and respondent’s motion to dismiss should be granted.

         II. Chronology

         The relevant chronology of this case is as follows:

         1. On April 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted of forcible rape, residential burglary, and false imprisonment by violence. (Respondent’s Lodged Document (“LD”) 1.) A number of enhancement allegations were found true. (LD 1.)

         2. Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of twenty-nine years to life. (LD 1-2.)

         3. Petitioner filed an appeal. On February 27, 1997, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed the conviction. (LD 2.)

         4. Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court.

         5. On October 4, 2014, [1] petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Joaquin County Superior Court. (LD 3.) On December 17, 2014, the superior court denied the petition in a reasoned decision. (LD 4.)

         6. On January 11, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. (LD 5.) The appellate court denied the petition on February 26, 2015. (LD 6.)

         7. On March 6, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (LD 7.) On May 20, 2015, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment. (LD 8.)

         8. On June 16, 2015, petitioner constructively filed the instant federal petition. (ECF No. 1.) See Rule 3(d) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

         9. Respondent filed the motion to dismiss on October 29, 2015. (ECF No. 11.) Petitioner filed an opposition. (ECF No. 17.) Respondent filed a reply. (ECF No. 21.) On February 16, 2016, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 22.)

         On March 1, 2016, petitioner was granted leave, nunc pro tunc, to file his supplemental opposition, and respondent was granted leave to file a supplemental response. (ECF No. 25.) On March 4, 2016, petitioner filed a motion to compel respondent to produce petitioner’s mental health records. (ECF No. 27.) On March 17, 2016, respondent filed a supplemental reply and opposition to petitioner’s motion to compel. (ECF No. 29.) On March 24, 2016, petitioner filed a supplemental declaration providing the correct address for obtaining petitioner’s mental health records. (ECF No. 30.)

         III. Legal Standards - Motion to Dismiss

         Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court. . . .” Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss as a request for the court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (1991). Accordingly, the court will review respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

         On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) was enacted. Section 2244(d)(1) of Title 8 of the United States Code provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

         Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Generally, this means that the statute of limitations is tolled during the time after a state habeas petition has been filed, but before a decision has been rendered. Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012). However, “a California habeas petitioner who unreasonably delays in filing a state habeas petition is not entitled to the benefit of statutory tolling during the gap or interval preceding the filing.” Id. at 781 (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-27 (2002)). Furthermore, the AEDPA “statute of limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Carey, 536 U.S. at 214. In Carey, the United States Supreme Court held that the limitation period is statutorily tolled during one complete round of state post-conviction review, as long as such review is sought within the state’s time frame for seeking such review. Id., 536 U.S. at 220, 222-23. State habeas petitions filed after the one-year statute of limitations has expired do not revive the statute of limitations and have no tolling effect. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed”); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

         IV. Statutory Tolling

         Petitioner does not dispute that the statute of limitations expired long before the instant petition was filed. However, to assist the court in evaluating petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to equitable tolling, the court first addresses the issue of statutory tolling.

         On February 27, 1997, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed the conviction. Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme Court. Thus, the state appeal process became final within the meaning of section 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for filing a petition for review expired on April 8, 1997, forty days after the California Court of Appeal filed its decision. See Cal. Ct. R. 8.264(b)(1), 8.500(e); Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 735 (9th Cir. 2008). The one-year limitations period commenced running the following day, April 9, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, petitioner had until April 8, 1998, to file his federal habeas petition. However, he did not file the instant petition until June 16, 2015. Absent tolling, the federal petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

         Petitioner filed no post-conviction challenges in state court, so he is not entitled to additional tolling of the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

         Because the limitations period expired on April 8, 1998, and petitioner filed the instant petition on June 16, 2015, over 17 years too late, the instant petition is time-barred unless he can demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

         V. Equitable Tolling

         “Equitable tolling may be available ‘[w]hen external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim.’” McMonagle v. Meyer, 802 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline must show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and (2) he has diligently pursued his rights.” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). A petitioner must provide specific facts regarding what was done to pursue the petitioner’s claims to demonstrate that equitable tolling is warranted. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006).

         “The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

To apply the doctrine in “extraordinary circumstances” necessarily suggests the doctrine’s rarity, and the requirement that extraordinary circumstances “stood in his way” suggests that an external force must cause the untimeliness, rather than, as we have said, merely “oversight, miscalculation or negligence on [the petitioner’s] part, all of which would preclude the application of equitable tolling.

Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir.) (internal citation omitted), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 244 (2009); see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003) (petitioner must show that the external force caused the untimeliness). It is petitioner’s burden to demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Espinoza-Matthews v. People of the State of California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005).

         In opposition, petitioner contends that he suffers from an extensive mental illness and is currently housed in an Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP)[2] within the CDCR. (ECF No. 17 at 1.) In his supplemental opposition to the pending motion, petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because “district court errors affirmatively misled petitioner into believing he had no deadline to exhaust state court remedies and return to federal court, ” and because of his severe mental illness, he was “unable personally to understand the need to prepare his petitions to file in a timely manner.” (ECF No. 22 at 2; 9-12; 21-29.) Petitioner claims that under the totality of circumstances it was impossible for him to meet the filing deadline despite his diligence. (ECF No. 22 at 2-3; 13-18.) In addition to his mental health records, petitioner provided his own declaration, the declaration of Stephen Snow, the jail house lawyer who prepared petitioner’s supplemental opposition, a list of side effects of psychotropic medications, and a description of Post Incarceration Syndrome and Relapse. Petitioner also claims that prison officials failed to provide adequate mental health care for petitioner in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that such failure prevented him from filing a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 22 at 6-8.) Petitioner argues that he should be entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he has made a non-frivolous showing that he had a severe mental impairment during the filing period. (ECF No. 22 at 13-19.)

         Further, petitioner argues that the combination of solitary confinement in administrative segregation (“ad seg”), admission to the Department of Mental Health (“DMH”) at Vacaville Psychiatric Program (“VPP”), prison lockdowns, lost legal papers, the unavailability of AEDPA in the Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) law library, and petitioner’s mental disorders and side effects from the psychotropic medications, prevented petitioner from understanding the need to prepare his petition for writ of habeas corpus in a timely manner, and under the totality of circumstances, it was impossible for him to meet the filing deadline, despite his diligence. (ECF No. 22 at 12; 33.) Petitioner contends that the failure to consider his claims on the merits would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (ECF No. 22 at 19-21.)

         A. Court Allegedly Misled Petitioner

         Petitioner argues, inter alia, that in addressing his prior federal petition, the district court misled him into believing that he had no deadline to exhaust his state court remedies because the dismissal was “without prejudice, ” failed to allow him to amend to cure the deficiencies, and failed to advise him of stay-and abeyance procedures

         On February 29, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. Porteous v. People of the State of California, Case No. 2:00-cv-0431 GEB DAD (E.D. Cal.). On July 20, 2000, the petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. Petitioner’s argument that the court misled petitioner into believing he had no deadline is belied by the express terms of the court’s June 7, 2000 findings and recommendations:

Petitioner is cautioned that the habeas corpus statute imposes a one year statute of limitations for filing non-capital habeas corpus petitions in federal court. In most cases, the one year period will start to run on the date on which the state court judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking direct review, although the statute of limitations is tolled while a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Case No. 2:00-cv-0431 GEB DAD (ECF No. 2 at 2, n.2). Because the district court specifically informed petitioner about the statute of limitations period, directing him to the governing statute, petitioner could not have believed that there was no deadline to challenge his conviction.

         Moreover, on this record, stay and abeyance was not available to petitioner. Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Petitioner concedes that he does not recall the claims raised in Case No. 2:00-cv-0431 GEB DAD, and no longer has a copy of the petition filed in that case. (ECF No. 22 at 34.) But in any event, the court found that petitioner failed to allege that he had presented any of his claims to the California Supreme Court, or to allege that state court remedies were no longer available to him. Id. (ECF No. 2 at 2). Petitioner did not file objections to the findings and recommendations, and they were adopted, in toto, by the district court because petitioner failed to exhaust all of his claims. Id. (ECF No. 4). The district court had no authority to stay a wholly unexhausted federal habeas petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (“This Court has long held that a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition should be dismissed if the prisoner has not exhausted state remedies as to any of his federal claims”); see Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) (authorizing stay and abeyance of a mixed federal habeas corpus petition); King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (after Rhines, district court may still stay a petition that has been amended to state only exhausted claims, pursuant to Kelly v. Small, 35 F.3d 1063 (2003)); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (declining to extend the Rhines stay and abeyance procedure to wholly unexhausted petitions). It was only recently that the Ninth Circuit held that a district court may stay and hold in abeyance, rather than dismiss, a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition that raises only unexhausted claims. Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2016).

         Because petitioner’s prior habeas case was properly dismissed, the claims raised in the instant petition cannot relate back to claims raised in his prior petition. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1155 (“we hold that a habeas petition filed after the district court dismisses a previous petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies cannot relate back to the original habeas petition.”)

         But even assuming, arguendo, that petitioner had included exhausted claims in his previous habeas petition, the court was not required to notify him about the stay and abeyance procedure. It was not until September 6, 2002, that the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by failing to inform the prisoner “(1) that it could consider his stay motions only if he opted to amend the petitions and dismiss the then-unexhausted claims, and (2) that his federal claims would be time-barred, absent cause for equitable tolling, upon his return to federal court if he opted to dismiss the petitions ‘without prejudice’ and return to state court to exhaust all of his claims.” Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated sub nom. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004). Petitioner’s prior case was dismissed in 2000, before Ford issued in late 2002. Subsequently, the Supreme Court disagreed with and vacated Ford, holding that the advisements were not required. Pliler, 542 U.S. at 231 (“district courts are not required to give the particular advisements required by the Ninth Circuit before dismissing a pro se petitioner’s mixed habeas petition under Rose [v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509].”)

         For all of the above reasons, petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling on the basis of rulings issued in Case No. 2:00-cv-0431 GEB DAD.

         B. Mental Illness

         The Ninth Circuit has articulated a specific, two-part test for an equitable tolling claim based on a petitioner’s mental impairment:

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an “extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control by demonstrating the impairment was so severe that either
(a) petitioner was unable to rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely file, or
(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.
(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance.

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (italics in original); see also Orthel v. Yates, 795 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A petitioner seeking equitable tolling on the grounds of mental incompetence must show extraordinary circumstances, such as an inability to rationally or factually personally understand the need to timely file, or a mental state rendering an inability personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.”).

         Bills provides guidance for applying its two-part test:

[T]o evaluate whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the district court must: (1) find the petitioner has made a non-frivolous showing that he had a severe mental impairment during the filing period that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing; (2) determine, after considering the record, whether the petitioner satisfied his burden that he was in fact mentally impaired; (3) determine whether the petitioner’s mental impairment made it impossible to timely file on his own; and (4) consider whether the circumstances demonstrate the petitioner was otherwise diligent in attempting to comply with the filing requirements.

Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100-01. “This reiterates the stringency of the overall equitable tolling test: the mental impairment must be so debilitating that it is the but-for cause of the delay, and even in cases of debilitating impairment the petitioner must still demonstrate diligence.” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Yow Ming Yeh v. Biter, 135 S.Ct. 486 (2014), citing Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100.

         A petitioner alleging a severe mental impairment during the filing period is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless he or she makes “a good faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for consideration of whether the petitioner’s delayed filing was “attributable to psychiatric medication which deprived Petitioner of any kind of consciousness” where the petitioner had demonstrated “evidence of serious mental illness” by attaching prison psychiatric and medical records); see Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100 (remanding where the petitioner was in the lowest percentile for verbal IQ, verbal comprehension and working memory, and, according to clinical psychologists, was incapable of inferential thinking necessary to complete a federal habeas form); see also Orthel, 795 F.3d at 939-40 (“Where the record is amply developed, and where it indicates that the petitioner’s mental incompetence was not so severe as to cause the untimely filing of his habeas petition, a district court is not obligated to hold evidentiary hearings to further develop the factual record, notwithstanding a petitioner’s allegations of mental incompetence.”) (quoting Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010).)

         i. Petitioner’s Medical Records

         The medical records provided reflect the following. Petitioner arrived in CDCR custody in June of 1996, and was housed at DVI. (ECF No. 22 at 48 (June 7, 1996); ECF No. 22 at 42 (June 21, 1996).) On June 21, 1996, a “Brief Screening Report”[3] was prepared, stating that there were “indications that this offender is experiencing a major depression, ” and referral to a mental health professional was indicated. (ECF No. 22 at 45.) On October 1, 1996, S. Ross, MTA, filed a request for priority psychiatric/psychological services, noting petitioner had a history of psychiatric care that needed re-assessment, medications were ordered, and requested that petitioner be seen within 24 hours. (ECF No. 22 at 49.) On October 11, 1996, Dr. Kotila, Ph.D., staff psychologist, found petitioner was depressed and reported that the Doxepin[4] medication was inadequate. (ECF No. 22 at 50.) Dr. Kotila referred petitioner to a psychiatrist for medications, noting petitioner “seem[ed] rational, nonpsychotic.” (ECF No. 22 at 50.)

         On October 18, 1996, petitioner was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar. (ECF No. 22 at 44) His GAF[5] score was 58, based on voices, depression, paranoia. (ECF No. 22 at 44, 51.) Dr. Salz assigned petitioner to the Clinical Case Management (“CCCMS”) level of care. (ECF No. 22 at 51.) On October 21, 1996, petitioner was prescribed Doxepin by Jamie Norum, M.D. (ECF No. 22 at 52.)

         On October 24, 1996, Dr. Norum wrote that petitioner was seen by Dr. Welk on October 21, 1996, and given a prescription for Sinequan, 100 mg. (ECF No. 22 at 50.) Dr. Norum found petitioner stable with no complaints; principal diagnosis was amphetamine abuse and depressive disorder NOS [not otherwise specified] (in view of 29 year to life sentence); mental health placement: CCCMS by Dr. Salz, Ph.D., on October 18, 1996. (ECF No. 22 at 50.) Petitioner was scheduled to return to clinic on November 17, 1996, for follow up medication review. (ECF No. 22 at 50.)

         On October 30, 1996, psychiatrist C. Martin saw petitioner and noted that petitioner was “still crying, ” and assessed that petitioner was polysubstance dependent in [illegible] with mood disorder. (ECF No. 22 at 54.) Dr. Martin prescribed Amitriptyline, a different antidepressant, also sold under the name Elavil. (ECF No. 22 at 53.)

         On January 25, 1997, written on the same progress note page as the October 30, 1996 notes, a medical doctor (signature illegible), wrote that petitioner was not suicidal, his speech was coherent and logical, and assessed petitioner with depressive disorder, NOS, and prescribed him Elavil, 100 mg for 90 days. (ECF No. 22 at 54.)

         On February 15, 1997, a “Brief Screening Report” was completed, noting that there were “indications that this offender has a possible mood disorder, ” was “experiencing a major depression, ” “is suffering from a mental illness, ” and should be referred to a mental health professional. (ECF No. 22 at 55.) On February 17, 1997, petitioner was seen by D. Salz, Ed.D, who referred petitioner for further evaluation. (ECF No. 22 at 58.)

         On February 22, 1997, petitioner was still housed at DVI, and Dr. Norum found petitioner alert, nondepressed, and nonpsychotic, and he denied suicide attempts or suicidal ideation. (ECF No. 22 at 54.) A history of amphetamine dependence was noted. Dr. Norum discontinued the CCCMS level of care and the Elavil, prescribed Benadryl, 100 mg, and Vistaril, 25 mg, ordered petitioner returned to the general population, and a return to clinic in 90 days. (ECF No. 22 at 54.) On February 22, 1997, Dr. Norum also completed the form “Reception Center Psychiatric Medication Evaluation, ” noting his assessment, and checked the box “no medication was required.” (ECF No. 22 at 59.) For behavior alerts, Dr. Norum wrote that petitioner: “Has 25 yr [to] life sentence -- Prefers Mule Creek SP, Level IV, if possible.” (ECF No. 22 at 60.) On February 22, 1997, Dr. Norum also completed the “Mental Health Placement” form, marking “does not meet criteria for inclusion in the [mental health] treatment population, ” GAF 85, and “not on psychotropic medication.” (ECF No. 21-10 at 2; 22 at 60.) However, on February 22, 1997, Dr. Norum also completed a “Medical Necessity Review for CCCMS” form, checking the box, “This inmate does MEET criteria for inclusion in the [mental health] treatment population --CCCMS, ” and checking the box “NOT currently taking psychotropic meds.” (ECF No. 22 at 61.) On the CDC 128 C form referred to in the “Medical Necessity Review for CCCMS” form, Dr. Norum checked the box “does not meet criteria for inclusion in the [mental health] treatment population.” (ECF No. 22 at 60.) But petitioner’s “Inmate Health Assessments” form reflects that petitioner was in the CCCMS level of care on February 22, 1997, and didn’t return to general population until February 24, 1998. (ECF No. 21-9 at 4-5.)

         At some point, petitioner was transferred to SVSP. On March 5, 1997, MTA Kell completed an “Informational Chrono Referral for Psychiatric/Psychological Services” form, noting that petitioner’s history of psychiatric care needed reassessment, and recommended psychiatric medication review, writing “CCCMS Suicide attempt in ’90 or ’91.” (ECF No. 22 at 62.) At the bottom, a handwritten notation (in different handwriting), states: “3/6/97 No meds -Refer IDTT.”[6] (ECF No. 22 at 62.) On March 6, 1997, petitioner was seen by a medical doctor, whose name is illegible, and who noted “No meds, ” and “Refer IDTT.” (ECF No. 22 at 61.) On April 4, 1997, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.