United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING PETITION WITHOUT
J. CARNEY United States District Judge.
about January 18, 2017, petitioner Chad Tadao Stukey
(“petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (the “petition”) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. The petition appears to raise four claims
related to petitioner's convictions for insurance fraud
and other seemingly related crimes.
initial matter, the Court may not consider the petition
because petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies
with respect to any of his claims. As a matter of comity, a
federal court may not entertain a habeas petition unless the
petitioner has exhausted the available state court remedies
with respect to all the claims in the petition. See Rose
v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982); 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1). A petitioner exhausts all available state court
remedies by presenting his claims to the highest court of the
state in which he was convicted. O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-43 (1999).
while the petition shows that petitioner has filed numerous
habeas petitions in the Superior Court of Ventura County, it
does not indicate that he has sought any relief from the
California Supreme Court. California court records confirm
that plaintiff has not sought relief from the California
Supreme Court.Accordingly, none of petitioner's
claims is exhausted. Because petitioner's claims are
unexhausted and no exception to the exhaustion requirement is
present, his claims must be dismissed. See Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (“[A] state
prisoner's federal habeas petition should be dismissed if
the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies as to
any of his federal claims.” (citations omitted))
the petition should be dismissed because petitioner's
claims, even if they are construed extremely loosely, are
patently without merit. Claims one, three, and four of the
petition are seemingly premised on petitioner's
allegation that the entity he defrauded was not a licensed
insurance provider. Construed loosely, these claims appear to
assert that petitioner's conviction is invalid because he
could not have been guilty of defrauding an unlicensed
insurer. However, California law does not require prosecutors
to prove that an insurer is “licensed” in order
to obtain a conviction for insurance fraud. See Cal.
Penal Code § 550 (West 2011). Accordingly, petitioner
cannot obtain relief on claims one, three, and four. Claim
two is likewise meritless. At most, claim two asserts that
the prosecution in petitioner's case mistakenly or
maliciously put before the sentencing court evidence of an
unrelated vehicle insurance claim. However, even this
strained interpretation of the claim does not show that
petitioner is entitled to relief. Indeed, the facts of claim
two do not suggest the prosecution or the court violated the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. As a
result, claim two is without merit.
the petition should be dismissed because it does not contain
a single exhausted claim and the claims therein are plainly
meritless. Thus, it is apparent from the face of the petition
that petitioner is not entitled to relief. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases
in the U.S. District Courts, the petition is DISMISSED
JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
 While the petition was filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“section 2241”), it
appears that it should have been filed under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (“section 2254”). For petitioners in state
custody, section 2241 is reserved for challenges to
pre-conviction incarceration. Conversely, all challenges to a
judgment or sentence must be made under section 2254.
Accordingly, the Court construes the petition as a section
2254 habeas petition.
 The Court takes judicial notice of
California's court records, located on the California
Court of Appeal case information website,
Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2010)
 While the Ninth Circuit has held that
Courts may stay a petition that consists entirely of
unexhausted claims, Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907 (9th
Cir. 2016), the Court declines to do so in this instance. As
presented, petitioner's claims are patently without
merit. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that petitioner
has not met the threshold for showing that he is entitled to
a stay. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277
(2005) (holding that a petitioner is not entitled to a stay
where claims are “plainly meritless”). Thus, it
is appropriate to dismiss petitioner's claims without
providing him an opportunity to stay the petition.
 Courts may deny relief on the merits
of unexhausted claims where “it is perfectly clear that
the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal
claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 ...