United States District Court, C.D. California
Present: Honorable JOSEPHINE L. STATON, UNITED STATES
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
(IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (Doc. 51)
the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Bich An
Thi Nguyen, Ngoc Bich Thi Nguyen, Van Anh Thi Nguyen, Hoang
Huy Tu, and Walter Emil Teague III. (Mot., Doc. 51.)
Plaintiff Tuan Nguyen opposed, and Defendants replied. (Opp.,
Doc. 57; Reply, Doc. 59.) The Court finds this matter
appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed.R.Civ.P.
78; C.D. Cal. R. 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing set for March
17, 2017, at 2:30 p.m., is VACATED. Having read and
considered the parties' briefs, the Court GRANTS
Defendants' Motion for the following reasons.
the Court can discern from the Complaint, Plaintiff's
claims against Defendants arise out of his dissatisfaction
with Judge Marc Kelly's decisions and rulings in a
proceeding involving competing requests for domestic violence
restraining orders in Orange County Superior Court.
(See Compl. at 10-16.) Ultimately, the proceedings
terminated against Plaintiff. (Id. at 15-16.)
Afterwards, Plaintiff filed the instant action against the
moving Defendants as well as Judge Kelly, Commissioner Renee
Wilson, and the Orange County Superior Court. (Compl.)
Plaintiff's claims against the latter three Defendants
were dismissed on January 19, 2017. (MTD Order, Doc. 45.) The
remaining Defendants now move to have the claims against them
dismissed as well (Mot.)
extent Plaintiff attempts to overturn what occurred in the
state court proceedings, the claims are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (See MTD Order at
2.) Regardless, Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed
because Plaintiff fails to adequately plead any federal
claim, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Plaintiff
asserts five federal claims in his Complaint: (1) violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 3771; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. §
10606(b); (3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants Tu and Teague; (4) violation of the Federal
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; and (5) violation of the
RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962. (See Compl. at
first federal claim fails because 18 U.S.C. § 3771 does
not provide a cause of action for damages. Moreover, the
statute does not apply in any way to Defendants here. Section
3771 affords certain rights to “crime victim[s]”
in court proceedings involving an offense against those crime
victims. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771(a)-(b). A “crime
victim” means “a person directly and proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or
an offense in the District of Columbia.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771(e)(2)(A). These rights are asserted by filing an
appropriate motion in a federal district court. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771(d)(3). The statute puts the burden on the court
and the officers and employees of the Department of Justice
and “other departments and agencies of the United
States” to preserve these rights for crime victims. 18
U.S.C. §§ 3771(b)(1), (c)(1). Because Defendants
are private individuals, Section 3771 has no relevance to
second federal claim fails because 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)
was repealed on October 30, 2004.
third federal claim fails because neither Tu nor Teague have
acted under color of state law such that they can be deemed
state actors. See Bain v. California Teachers
Ass'n, 156 F.Supp.3d 1142, 1149 (citing Caviness
v. Horizon Cmty, Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812
(9th Cir. 2010) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show that the allegedly unconstitutional
conduct is fairly attributable to the State.”).
According to Plaintiff, Tu and Teague are attorneys for the
other private individual Defendants in this case.
(See Compl. at 14.) The Court finds no allegation
that can be plausibly construed as state action. Therefore,
Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against Tu and Teague
fourth federal claim fails because 5 U.S.C. § 552
applies to federal agencies, not to private individuals such
Plaintiff's fifth federal claim fails because a civil
RICO claim requires a defendant's conduct to have some
nexus to interstate commerce, and nothing Plaintiff alleges
plausibly pleads such a nexus here. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1962(a)-(c); see also Agency Holding Corp.
v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 153-54
(“[S]ome nexus to interstate or foreign commerce is
required as a jurisdictional element of a civil RICO claim .
. . .”). Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
engage in money laundering and arrange sham marriages on
behalf of an international Vietnamese Communist spy network,
(Compl. at 7-9), the Court finds these accusations
insufficiently pleaded to be plausible. What the Court
discerns from Plaintiffs' various accusations is a
dissatisfaction with the outcome of his domestic violence
restraining order proceedings in state court and the fact
that his ex-girlfriend initiated these proceedings against
him. Such dissatisfaction is not the basis for a RICO claim.
remaining claims against Defendants are state-law claims, and
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot
cure his deficiencies by amendment, the Court DISMISSES
Plaintiff's claims WITH PREJUDICE.