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Barron v. Berryhill

United States District Court, C.D. California, Eastern Division

March 20, 2017

GLYNDA MAE BARRON, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          PAUL L ABRAMS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         I.

         PROCEEDINGS

         Plaintiff filed this action on June 30, 2016, seeking review of the Commissioner's[1] denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) payments. The parties filed Consents to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge on July 26, 2016, and August 23, 2016. Pursuant to the Court's Order, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation (alternatively “JS”) on February 28, 2017, that addresses their positions concerning the disputed issues in the case. The Court has taken the Joint Stipulation under submission without oral argument.

         II.

         BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff was born on October 8, 1968. [Administrative Record (“AR”) at 77, 218.] She has past relevant work experience as a certified nurse assistant, care companion, and cashier. [AR at 77, 116.]

         On March 26, 2012, plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI payments, alleging that she has been unable to work since January 1, 1998. [AR at 67, 218-24.] After her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, plaintiff timely filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). [AR at 67, 177.] A hearing was held on September 5, 2014, at which time plaintiff appeared represented by an attorney, and testified on her own behalf. [AR at 84-122.] A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. [AR at 225-20.] On November 18, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that plaintiff was not under a disability since March 26, 2012, the date the application was filed. [AR at 67-79.] Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. [AR at 62-63.] When the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on April 22, 2016 [AR at 6-11], the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See Sam v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citations omitted). This action followed.

         III.

         STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has authority to review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based upon the application of improper legal standards. Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

         “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998) (same). When determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner's decision, the Court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision should be upheld.” Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ's conclusion, [the reviewing court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.”) (citation omitted).

         IV.

         THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY

         Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992).

         A. THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS

         The Commissioner (or ALJ) follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended April 9, 1996. In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting her ability to do basic work activities; if not, a finding of nondisability is made and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”) set forth at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. Id. If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient “residual functional capacity” to perform her past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. Id. The claimant has the burden of proving that she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id. The Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is not disabled, because she can perform other substantial gainful work available in the national economy. Id. The determination of this issue comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

         B. THE ALJ'S APPLICATION OF THE FIVE-STEP PROCESS

         At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 26, 2012, the application date. [AR at 69.] At step two, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has the severe impairments of morbid obesity; sleep apnea; bilateral ankle impairments; back pain; and mood disorder. [Id.] At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff does not have an impairment or a combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any of the impairments in the Listing. [Id.] The ALJ further found that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)[2] to perform less than a full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b), [3] as follows:

[C]an lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; she can stand and/or walk for two hours out of an eight-hour workday with regular breaks; she can sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday with regular breaks; she is unlimited with respect to pushing and/or pulling, other than as indicated for lifting and/or carrying; she is limited to occasional postural activities, but is precluded f[ro]m climbing ladders, scaffolds or ropes and is unable to work at unprotected heights or around dangerous machinery. [Plaintiff] is limited to non-complex routine tasks, and is unable to perform tasks requiring hypervigilence or responsibility for the safety of others. [Plaintiff] is unable to perform jobs requiring public contact.

[AR at 70.] At step four, based on plaintiff's RFC and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is unable to perform any of her past relevant work as a certified nurse assistant, care companion, or cashier. [AR at 77, 116.] At step five, based on plaintiff's RFC, vocational factors, and the VE's testimony, the ALJ found that there are jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff can perform, including work as a “mail clerk” (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) No. 209.687-026), “general office clerk” (DOT No. 209.562-010), and “agricultural sorter” (DOT No. 521.687-086). [AR at 31, 76-79.] Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled at any time since March 26, 2012, the date the application was filed. [AR at 78.]

         V.

         THE ALJ'S DECISION

         Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred when he: (1) rejected the opinions of Robert H. Kounang, M.D., who examined plaintiff for purposes of determining whether she qualifies for a power wheelchair; and (2) discounted plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. [JS at 4.] As set forth below, the Court agrees with plaintiff, in part, and remands for further proceedings.

         A. MEDICAL OPINIONS

         1. ...


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