United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE
KENLY KIYA KATO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin Taylor (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis, filed a First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (“Section 1983”). In the FAC, Plaintiff
claims defendants Kelly Boyd and RMI International
(“Defendants”) violated his First, Eighth,
Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As discussed
below, the Court dismisses the FAC with leave to amend for
failure to state a claim.
January 26, 2017, Plaintiff, who is in the custody of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at
the Wasco State Prison, constructively filed1 a Complaint
pursuant to Section 1983, against Defendants. ECF Docket No.
(“Dkt.”) 1, Compl. Plaintiff appeared to sue two
private-party defendants for violations of his First, Eighth,
Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights based upon an
alleged incident that occurred at Watts Towers on October 7,
2016. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff raised claims
against (1) defendant RMI International, a private security
company responsible for security at Watts Towers in Watts,
California; and (2) defendant Boyd, an employee of RMI
International who was responsible for security at Watts
Towers on the day of the alleged incident. Id. at 1.
February 22, 2017, the Court dismissed the Complaint with
leave to amend for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 8, Order. The Court
found Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against Defendants
failed because he did not allege any facts that Defendants
were acting under color of state law. Id. at 5.
March 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant FAC. Dkt. 10.
ALLEGATIONS IN FAC
FAC, Plaintiff again attempts to raise a Section 1983 claim
against a private person, defendant Boyd, and a private
party, RMI International, based upon the same October 7, 2016
incident referenced in the Complaint. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff alleges defendant Boyd used excessive force and
misused his authority, causing Plaintiff constant pain and
anxiety. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff claims
defendant Boyd “threw [Plaintiff] to the ground”;
“jump[ed] on [his] back, making [him] cough up
blood”; and “socked [him] in [the] mouth breaking
[his] front tooth and back teeth.” Id. at 5.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges defendant RMI International 1
Under the “mailbox rule, ” when a pro se
inmate gives prison authorities a pleading to mail to court,
the court deems the pleading constructively
“filed” on the date it is signed. Roberts v.
Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d
1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating the “mailbox rule
applies to § 1983 suits filed by pro se
prisoners”). should be held liable because it is
“responsible for its employee's actions while on
seeks $100, 000 from each defendant, an order to have
defendant Boyd “relieved from his job at RMI
International, ” and an order requiring Defendants to
write an apology to Plaintiff. Id. at 6.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court
must screen the FAC and is required to dismiss the case at
any time if it concludes the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see Barren v. Harrington,
152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for
screening purposes, the Court applies the same pleading
standard from Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Rule 8”) as it would when evaluating a motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
2012). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim
“where there is no cognizable legal theory or an
absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable
legal theory.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990,
996 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering
whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as
true all of the material factual allegations in it.
Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir.
2011). However, the court need not accept as true
“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted
deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In
re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Although a complaint need not
include detailed factual allegations, it “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011)
(citing Ashcr ...