United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ALLISON CLAIRE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
is a state prisoner incarcerated at the California
Institution for Men in Chino, under the authority of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR). Plaintiff proceeds pro se with this putative civil
rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
concerning matters of which plaintiff was informed while he
was incarcerated in the Sacramento County Jail. This action
is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule
302(c). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned
recommends that this action be dismissed for failure to state
a cognizable federal claim or otherwise establish federal
subject matter jurisdiction.
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF
No. 2. However, because this court recommends the summary
dismissal of this action, it also recommends that no fee be
STANDARDS FOR SCREENING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1), (2). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous
when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or
when the factual contentions are clearly baseless.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989);
Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir.
district court must liberally construe pro se pleadings. A
pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in
the complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the
deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Noll v.
Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). Although
detailed factual allegations are not required,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
sues the “California Correctional Health Care Services
(CCHCS) Chief Executive Office-Manager-Employee (Jane/Jon
Doe, 1-5).” See ECF No. 1. The complaint
alleges that plaintiff's personal identifying information
and private health information were improperly disclosed to
unknown third parties due to the theft of a laptop from an
unidentified CCHCS employee. Attachments to the complaint
demonstrate that, while incarcerated at the Sacramento County
Jail, plaintiff was informed by a May 31, 2016 letter from
CCHCS that his personal information may have been disclosed.
The letter, sent individually to all potentially impacted
prisoners, states that on April 25, 2016, CCHCS identified a
“potential breach” of inmates'
“Personally Identifiable Information and Protected
Health Information” due to the February 25, 2016 theft
of “[a]n unencrypted laptop . . . from a CCHCS
workforce member's personal vehicle, ” although
“[t]he laptop was password protected in accordance with
state protocol.” ECF No. 1 at 4. The letter states that
CCHCS does not know whether any sensitive information was
contained in the laptop and, even if it was, does not know
whose information may have been included. Id.
plaintiff's transfer to Deuel Vocational Institution, he
sought to determine, through that prison's administrative
grievance procedure, whether his personal information had
been compromised. Plaintiff was informed, inter alia, that
the results of the administration's internal review
“indicate that no information was likely to have been
compromised as the computer was password protected.”
Id. at 12. Plaintiff was provided contact
information for three credit bureaus to ascertain whether he
had in fact been subject to identity fraud. Id. at
complaint asserts claims under the Fourth Amendment and
“all federal laws” protecting personal privacy
and the patient-doctor relationship. Plaintiff seeks $100,
000 in compensatory damages “for negligence and
violating plaintiff's civil rights (state and federal),
” assistance in changing plaintiff's name,
driver's license, and social security number, and
transfer to another prison due to his previous association
with prison gangs. Id. at 3.
OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
there is no evidence that plaintiff's confidential
information was improperly obtained by a third party. Because
plaintiff's allegations are entirely speculative, they
fail to meet the “plausibility” requirement for
stating a cognizable federal claim. To survive dismissal for
failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).
importantly, because plaintiff is unable to demonstrate an
“injury in fact, ” this court is without
jurisdiction to consider his claims under the case or
controversy requirement of Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution. To meet this requirement, a plaintiff must show
“(1) [he] has suffered an ‘injury in fact'
that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable ...