United States District Court, C.D. California
JUAN REAL, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
ST JUDE MEDICAL, INC. DBA ST. JUDE MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. a Minnesota Corporation; BOLT STAFFING SERVICE INC., an Idaho Corporation; and DOES 1-50 inclusive, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND 
AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Juan Real has filed this putative class action lawsuit
against Defendant St. Jude Medical, Inc. dba St. Jude Medical
Products, Inc. (“St. Jude Medical Products”) for
violating several provisions of the California Labor Code and
Unfair Competition Law. (Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1.) Before
the Court is Plaintiff's motion to remand. (ECF No. 14.)
For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS
filed suit in Los Angeles Superior Court against St. Jude
Medical Products, alleging: (1) failure to provide meal
periods, (2) failure to provide rest periods, (3) failure to
pay hourly and overtime wages, (4) failure to provide
accurate itemized wages statements, (5) failure to timely pay
all final wages, and (6) violation of the unfair competition
law. (Not. of Removal 2-3.) Plaintiff served CT Corporation
(“CT”), St. Jude Medical Products' registered
agent, with the Summons and Complaint on October 31, 2016.
(Segal Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 5, ECF No. 14-6.) CT subsequently
contacted Plaintiff via email, stating that St. Jude Medical
Products is an inactive corporation, that CT does not
maintain an active record for St. Jude Medical Products, and
that CT did not forward the Complaint to St. Jude Medical
Products. (Segal Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 6, ECF No. 14-7.) The
parties dispute whether service was proper on October 31,
2016, in light of St. Jude Medical Products' status as a
forfeited California corporation. (Mot. to Remand 5, ECF No.
14; Opp'n 2-3, ECF No. 17.)
November 29, 2016, twenty-nine days after Plaintiff served
St. Jude Medical Products, an attorney representing a related
entity-St. Jude Medical, Cardiology Division, Inc.
(“St. Jude Cardiology”)-contacted Plaintiff's
counsel regarding this action. (Segal Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 7,
ECF No. 14-8.) The attorney informed Plaintiff that he
erroneously sued St. Jude Medical Products, and that St. Jude
Cardiology is the “proper employer defendant” in
this action. (Id.) The parties do not dispute that
they conversed on November 29, 2016, to discuss the proper
defendant entity in this matter. (Id.; Segal Decl.
¶ 3, ECF No. 18-1.) However, the parties dispute whether
the conversation on November 29, 2016, changed the effective
date of service from October 31, 2016, to November 29, 2016.
(Segal Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 18-1; Beilke Decl. ¶ 6,
ECF No. 17-1.) Plaintiff's counsel argues that he did not
agree to amend the Complaint to change the defendant to St.
Jude Cardiology, and that he did not agree that the effective
date of service on Defendant was November 29, 2016. (Segal
Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 18-1.) The attorney representing St.
Jude Cardiology argues that Plaintiff's counsel agreed to
amend the Complaint to reflect the alleged proper
defendant-St. Jude Cardiology-and that service on St. Jude
Cardiology was effective on November 29, 2016. (Beilke Decl.
¶ 6, ECF No. 17-1.)
event, Plaintiff never filed an amended Complaint naming St.
Jude Cardiology. Nonetheless, St. Jude Cardiology removed
this action to federal court on December 29, 2016, and
purported to answer the Complaint a week later (noting in its
answer that it was “erroneously sued as” St. Jude
Medical Products). (ECF Nos. 1, 10.) Plaintiff then filed a
timely motion to remand. (ECF No. 14.) St. Jude Cardiology
filed a timely opposition, and Plaintiff filed a timely
reply. (ECF Nos. 17, 18.) That Motion is now before the Court for
courts have subject matter jurisdiction only as authorized by
the Constitution and by Congress. U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1; see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts
have original jurisdiction where an action arises under
federal law, or where each plaintiff's citizenship is
diverse from each defendant's citizenship and the amount
in controversy exceeds $75, 000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1332(a). A defendant may remove a case from state court to
federal court only if the federal court would have had
original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. §
is a “‘strong presumption' against removal
jurisdiction” when evaluating a motion to remand.
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach &
Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Accordingly, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected
if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first
instance.” Id. Further “[t]he burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction is upon the party seeking
removal, ” Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co.,
846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988), and “defendants .
. . bear the burden of showing that removal was
proper.” Fayard v. Northeast Vehicle Servs.,
LLC, 533 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2008).
on the strong presumption against removal and the Court's
conclusion that Plaintiff properly served St. Jude Medical
Products on October 31, 2016, the Court grants
Plaintiff's motion to remand.
Request for Judicial Notice
reaching the merits of Plaintiff's motion, the Court
turns first to Plaintiff's request for judicial notice.
(ECF No. 15.) Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a court
may take judicial notice of “a fact that is not subject
to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” A court may properly take
judicial notice of facts in the public record. See Lee v.
City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir.
2001). In deciding a motion to remand, “[a] court can