United States District Court, N.D. California
TAQUAN L. MALDONADO, Petitioner,
SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, Respondent.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
M. CHEN United States District Judge
L. Maldonado filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his state
court conviction for first degree murder. Respondent has
filed an answer to the petition and Mr. Maldonado has filed a
traverse. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies
California Court of Appeal described the evidence at trial:
[The decedent, Katrina] Moore began dating appellant in 2009.
Moore was 10 years younger than appellant and had been
previously married. Moore lived in a house on Eden Canyon
Road (the house) in Castro Valley with several people,
including Stephen Wilson, Japhy Frey, and Lacey Elletson.
Appellant did not live at the house, but he frequently spent
the night there with Moore. Everyone who lived or spent the
night at the house used methamphetamine.
When appellant and Moore began dating, they ''got
along'' and had a ''normal''
relationship. At some point, however, the relationship
changed and they began to argue frequently, sometimes once or
twice a day. Wilson, Frey, and Elletson heard appellant and
Moore arguing in Moore‘s bedroom; sometimes Frey heard
''stuff crashing ... loud bangs, doors slamming, that
kind of thing.'' Appellant also called Moore
constantly and left her threatening voicemails, sometimes
saying, ''' I know you‘re
there‘'' and ''' Pick up the
phone.‘'' Some messages were angry, others were
''whiny'' and ''[m]ushy.''
Appellant also came to the house uninvited, once stealing a
car to drive there.
In March 2010, Moore‘s father saw she had a black eye;
Moore said she ''got in a fight with''
appellant but claimed ''it was an accident, it was no
big deal ... really downplaying it.'' When
Moore‘s father confronted appellant and asked him,
'''What did you hit her for?‘''
appellant looked away and did not respond. When Moore‘s
father encouraged Moore to break up with appellant, she said
''they were breaking up, or they were broke[n]
up.'' In early April 2010, Elletson saw Moore with a
black eye. Moore told Elletson she had ''gotten into
a confrontation[.]'' Moore did not want to be seen at
work with a black eye, so she stopped going and was fired.
Later that month, Elletson heard appellant and Moore fighting
in Moore‘s bedroom. Elletson heard a smack and saw
Moore holding her face; Moore told Elletson appellant
''put [his] hands on her.'' In April 2010,
Moore complained to Frey that her back hurt: she said
appellant '''punched [her] in the
back‘'' and showed Frey a bruise the size of a
grapefruit on her back.
In late April or early May 2010, Moore told Frey she was
''trying to break up with'' appellant but she
continued to see him regularly. Elletson thought Moore was
confused about whether to continue dating appellant; as
Elletson explained, ''she was not wanting to be with
him but she didn‘t know how to tell him ... that she
was done [with the relationship], and he wasn‘t getting
the point.'' Around this same time, Moore spoke with
her ex-husband about ''getting back
together'' and moving to Sacramento. Moore and Wilson
had intimate relations ''a few times'' in
April or May 2010.
In May 2010-a few weeks before her death-Moore had a bloody
lip after dropping appellant off at his house. She was crying
and upset: she told Wilson appellant punched out the back
passenger window of her car and ''threw her phone at
her.'' The next day, Frey saw appellant with a
bandage over a cut on his hand. Appellant admitted he punched
the window because he was angry.
Around this time, Moore became pregnant. She told Elletson
she felt like she ''had this demon in her''
and wanted to terminate the pregnancy. On June 1, 2010,
[Moore] and Elletson went to a clinic to fill out paperwork
for Moore to get an abortion. Moore scheduled the abortion
for June 3, 2010. Appellant spent the night at Moore‘s
house on June 2, 2010. On the morning of June 3, 2010, the
two women drove to Moore‘s house to pick up appellant.
Appellant told Moore he loved her. As the car drove away,
Wilson saw appellant throw a knife out the car window and
onto the driveway. Wilson picked up the knife-which he
thought was from Moore‘s kitchen- and put it in his
On Thursday, June 3, 2010, Moore went to the clinic to have
an abortion. Elletson accompanied her. On the way to the
clinic, they stopped at appellant‘s house; Elletson
waited in the car while Moore ''went up to the
door'' to talk to appellant. Elletson heard appellant
and Moore arguing about the abortion: appellant said
''he was going to support [Moore] and the baby
[.]'' Moore returned to the ''car crying and
jump[ed] in'' and appellant ''started chasing
the car'' as Moore drove away. As they drove,
appellant called Moore and yelled at her for
''murdering his kid[.]'' Moore had the
abortion that afternoon; appellant called and harassed her
On June 4, 2010, Moore drove appellant to jail, where he was
to serve time for a car theft conviction. Moore told Wilson
the jail was ''overbooked.'' She and
appellant returned to the house and appellant spent the
night. Wilson did not hear appellant and Moore arguing that
evening. The next morning, June 5, 2010, Wilson saw appellant
and Moore making breakfast. Moore ''seemed
fine.'' Wilson went outside to work in the yard. At
some point, Wilson heard appellant and Moore arguing inside
the house. Wilson heard a loud ''thud ... come from
the house[, ]'' like a body or something heavy
hitting the floor. He went to Moore‘s bedroom, where he
heard Moore and appellant talking in ''calm
voice[s].'' Wilson thought appellant was
''saying something about you always got to bring up
something old'' and that he wanted to ''start
fresh[.]'' Wilson went outside and resumed his yard
About 15 minutes later, appellant ran outside and said,
'''Help me help her.‘'' Appellant
had blood on his elbow. He said Moore fell through a window.
Wilson went into the house and saw blood on the archway
leading into the living room. Appellant went into
Moore‘s bedroom and shut the door. Wilson did not go
into the bedroom; instead, he looked for a phone to call 911.
As Wilson looked for a phone, he heard appellant say Moore
was ''swallowing her tongue, and something about the
broken window.'' Unable to find a working telephone,
Wilson went to a neighbor‘s house to borrow a phone.
Appellant called 911 from a phone in Moore‘s bedroom
and said he needed an ambulance for his girlfriend, who was
''stabbed right below her collar bone and her
shoulder.'' When asked, ''how did she stab
herself'' appellant said ''Oh my
God.'' He did not respond when asked ''who
stabbed her or how did she get stabbed?'' When asked
again who stabbed Moore, appellant said, ''We were
just playing around [in] the room ... and then ... I
don‘t know what happened. We were just playing around.
We‘re just, like, gonna have sex in the room and then
she ran into the-into the sliding glass closet.'' The
dispatcher asked appellant, ''Y‘all were just
playing around and she just ran into the knife or
something[?]'' and appellant said, ''No. No
knife, the closet.'' Law enforcement officers arrived
and found Moore on her bedroom floor, covered in blood. She
was ''wheezing and gurgling'' and appellant
was ''holding a rag to her shoulder.'' The
room was ''very disheveled'' and there were
''blood streaks on the bedroom door, on the walls,
carpets'' and on appellant‘s clothes. A
mirrored glass closet door in the bedroom was shattered and
there were glass fragments on the floor. Moore had a deep,
oozing wound near her neck. The officer felt a ''very
faint'' pulse in Moore‘s neck and prepared to
perform CPR. At that point, paramedics arrived and
unsuccessfully performed CPR for a lengthy period of time.
A law enforcement officer took appellant out of the bedroom.
His clothes were bloody and he had ''a laceration on
his left forearm'' and red marks on his arms, face,
chest and back. Appellant ''was very excited,
hysterical, concerned, distraught'' and
''kept trying to go back inside'' the house.
A law enforcement officer moved appellant to a patrol car and
Some time later, Moore‘s ex-husband cleaned
Moore‘s bedroom and found a 9-inch, single blade knife
hidden in a floor vent. The knife was usually in a kitchen
drawer, about 20 feet from Moore‘s bedroom. The knife
had Moore‘s blood on it and appellant could not be
excluded as the source of a minor DNA profile on the knife. A
forensic pathologist testified Moore‘s wound was
consistent with the use of the knife found in her bedroom,
not from broken glass. The knife traveled between two ribs,
through Moore‘s left lung, and close to her heart. The
pathologist testified people with this type of wound can
survive for up to 30 minutes, and opined Moore probably would
have survived had she received medical treatment earlier.
Moore had methamphetamine in her system when she died.
Appellant‘s friends and relatives testified appellant
loved Moore and was upset about her decision to have an
abortion. Witnesses testified Moore stalked appellant by
repeatedly calling him ''[a]ll day, all
night'' and by watching him when he was out in public
without her. Witnesses could hear Moore screaming at
appellant when she called and testified she sometimes slapped
him when she was angry. They also testified appellant
frequently tried to pacify Moore. Appellant‘s ex-wife
testified he was not violent during their marital fights, but
conceded she applied for a restraining order after he said he
had a gun in the garage. She also testified appellant
threatened ''people'' were ''going to
go down'' if she obtained a restraining order.
On cross-examination, appellant‘s witnesses admitted
that when they spoke to appellant while he was in jail, he
said the incident was an accident. In one conversation,
appellant‘s aunt advised him to tell the prosecutor
Moore got him hooked on methamphetamine, and it ''f-
- -ed [his] head up'' and ''the next thing
you know she‘s dying, and you didn‘t even know
what happened[.]'' In response, appellant said,
'''Yeah, but I don‘t know if that s- - -
will hold in court.‘''
People v. Maldonado, California Court of Appeal No.
A134796, opinion filed April 28, 2014 (''Cal.Ct.App.
Opinion'') at 2-6.
the jury trial in Alameda County Superior Court, Mr.
Maldonado was convicted of first degree murder and found to
have personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the
commission of the offense. He was sentenced to 26 years to
life in prison on February 24, 2012.
Maldonado appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed
his conviction in April 2014, and the California Supreme
Court denied his petition for review in August 2014. Mr.
Maldonado also filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus in
the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court,
which were summarily denied. Docket No. 13-21; Docket No.
13-22 at 72. Mr. Maldonado later filed another pro
se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California
Supreme Court, which was summarily denied. See
Docket No. 13-22 at 158.
Maldonado then filed his federal petition for writ of habeas
corpus. The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the
petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed an
answer to the petition, and Mr. Maldonado has filed a
traverse. The matter is now ready for decision.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the
petition concerns the conviction and sentence of a person
convicted in Alameda County, California, which is within this
judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus
''in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.'' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(''AEDPA'') amended § 2254 to impose new
restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in state court unless the state court‘s
adjudication of the claim: ''(1) resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.'' 28 U.S.C. §
the 'contrary to‘ clause, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case differently than
[the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts.'' Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
the 'unreasonable application‘ clause, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]
Court‘s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner‘s
case.'' Id. at 413. ''[A] federal
habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must
also be unreasonable.'' Id. at 411.
''A federal habeas court making the 'unreasonable
application‘ inquiry should ask whether the state
court‘s application of clearly established federal law
was 'objectively unreasonable.‘''
Id. at 409.
state-court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the
''last reasoned decision'' of the state
court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04
(1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92
(9th Cir. 2005). ''When there has been one reasoned
state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained
orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim
rest upon the same ground.'' Ylst, 501 U.S.
at 803. The presumption that a later summary denial rests on
the same reasoning as the earlier reasoned decision is a
rebuttable presumption and can be overcome by strong
evidence. Kernan v. Hinojosa, 136 S.Ct. 1603,
1605-06 (2016). Although Ylst was a procedural
default case, the ''look through'' rule
announced there has been extended beyond the context of
procedural default and applies to decisions on the merits.
Barker, 423 F.3d at 1092 n.3. In other words, when
the last reasoned decision is a decision on the merits, the
habeas court can look through later summary denials to apply
§ 2254(d) to the last reasoned decision.
2254(d) generally applies to unexplained as well as reasoned
decisions. ''When a federal claim has been presented
to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it
may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on
the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law
procedural principles to the contrary.''
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). When
the state court has denied a federal constitutional claim on
the merits without explanation, the federal habeas court
''must determine what arguments or theories supported
or . . . could have supported, the state court‘s
decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior
decision of [the U.S. Supreme] Court.'' Id.
of the habeas claims in this action involve the differences
between first degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. In
California, the crime of voluntary manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of the crime of murder. People v.
Beltran, 56 Cal.4th 935, 942 (2013).
is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought.'' Cal. Penal Code § 187(a). Malice
aforethought may be express or implied. Id. at
§ 188. Express malice is ''an intent to
kill'' and implied malice exists '''when
a person willfully does an act, the natural and probable
consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the
person knowingly acts with conscious disregard for the danger
to life that the act poses.‘ A killing with express
malice formed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation
constitutes first degree murder.'' Beltran,
56 Cal.4th at 941-42 (citation omitted).
is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice.'' Cal. Penal Code § 192. If the killing
without malice is done ''upon a sudden quarrel or
heat of passion, '' it is voluntary manslaughter.
Id. at § 192(a). ''Heat of passion is a
mental state that precludes the formation of malice and
reduces an unlawful killing from murder to
manslaughter.'' Beltran, 56 Cal.4th at 942.
Voluntary manslaughter based on a heat-of-passion theory has
both a subjective and an objective component. See People
v. Moye, 47 Cal.4th 537, 549 (Cal. 2009). For the
subjective component, the defendant must actually,
subjectively, kill the victim in the heat of passion, that
is, anger, rage, or any violent, intense, high-wrought or
enthusiastic emotion, except revenge. See People v.
Breverman, 19 Cal.4th 142, 163 (Cal. 1998). The
objective component requires that the defendant‘s
passion have an objectively reasonable basis. That is, there
must be evidence that the victim provoked the defendant, and
that conduct was ''sufficiently provocative that it
would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act
rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.''
Moye, 47 Cal.4th at 550. The provocation need not be
such that it would prompt an ordinary person of average
disposition to kill someone, but only that it ''would
render an ordinary person of average disposition 'liable
to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and
from this passion rather than from judgment.‘''
Beltran, 56 Cal.4th at 957 (quoting People v.
Logan, 175 Cal. 45, 49 (1917)).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Maldonado argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support the first degree murder conviction. He contends that
he was guilty of, at most, voluntary manslaughter. Among
other things, he argues that he was ''too drugged on
methamphetamine'' to form the mental state necessary
for first degree murder. Docket No. 6 at 10.
claim was not presented on direct appeal and was instead
presented only in Mr. Maldonado‘ s pro se
petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme
Court. Because the California Supreme Court summarily
rejected the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
the federal habeas court ''must determine what
arguments or theories supported or . . . could have
supported, the state court‘s decision; and then it must
ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree
that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the
holding in a prior decision of [the U.S. Supreme]
Court.'' Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
Process Clause ''protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.'' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). A court reviewing a conviction does not determine
whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather determines whether,
''after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Only if no rational
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt may a court conclude that the evidence is
insufficient. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. The
''prosecution need not affirmatively 'rule out
every hypothesis except that of guilt, ‘'' and
the reviewing federal court '''faced with a
record of historical facts that supports conflicting
inferences must presume - even if it does not affirmatively
appear in the record - that the trier of fact resolved any
such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to
that resolution.‘'' Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992) (quoting Jackson, 443
U.S. at 326).
leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to
draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring only
that jurors 'draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts.‘'' Coleman v.
Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, __, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012)
(per curiam) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
''[O]n habeas review, a federal court may not
overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of
the evidence challenge'' unless ''the state
court decision was objectively unreasonable.''
Id. at 2062 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Jackson standard is applied to a crime as that crime
is defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.
16. Under California law, murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought. Cal. Penal Code §
187(a). A murder that is ''willful, deliberate, and
premeditated'' is first degree murder. Id.
at § 189. California courts have identified three common
indicators that a killing was deliberate and premeditated:
(1) planning activity, (2) motive, and (3) a particular or
exacting manner of killing. People v. Anderson, 70
Cal. 2d 15, 27 (Cal. 1968). The Anderson factors are
not elements of the crime, and not all three factors need to
be present to sustain a finding of premeditation and
deliberation. People v. Garcia, 78 Cal.App.4th 1422,
1427 (2000). Instead, the Anderson factors are
guidelines to aid a reviewing court in determining whether
the elements of premeditation and deliberation are present,
i.e., ''whether the evidence is supportive of an
inference that the killing was the result of preexisting
reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere
unconsidered or rash impulse.'' People v.
Perez, 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 (1992).
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury‘s
verdict that Mr. Maldonado committed first degree murder. The
identity of the killer was not seriously disputed at trial,
and the focus was instead on Mr. Maldonado‘s mental
state at the time Ms. Moore was killed.
three Anderson factors -- planning activity, manner
of killing, and motive -- that tend to show deliberation and
premeditation were present. Evidence was presented that Mr.
Maldonado had to walk at least 20 feet to the kitchen to
retrieve the knife, and walk another 20 feet back to the
bedroom, where he stabbed Ms. Moore. RT 830. This evidence
supported a finding of premeditation and deliberation as it
tended to show some planning and time for reflection before
the fatal wound was inflicted. There also was evidence that
two days before he killed her, Mr. Maldonado threw a kitchen
knife out of the car as he left her home, which supported an
inference that he had been thinking about killing her then.
Mr. Maldonado stabbed Ms. Moore with a 9-inch knife that he
plunged into her chest, near her heart, to a depth of about 8
inches. The pathologist testified that a person can survive
for up to 30 minutes after being wounded in the manner Ms.
Moore was, and that she probably would have survived if she
had received medical treatment sooner. Stabbing her in the
general area of her heart and then delaying in seeking help
for her --while also taking the time to hide the murder
weapon in the floor vent -- supported an inference that Mr.
Maldonado acted with a plan and intent that Ms. Moore die.
There was evidence showing a motive for Mr. Maldonado to kill
Ms. Moore: Ms. Moore recently had an abortion and was going
to leave Mr. Maldonado, RT 519, 572, 616-17, and he was upset
by these events.
evidence of prior domestic violence by Mr. Maldonado toward
Ms. Moore permitted the jury to conclude that Mr. Maldonado
''was disposed or inclined to commit domestic
violence and, based on that decision, also conclude that the
defendant was likely to commit murder.'' CT 471
(CALCRIM 852). That domestic violence evidence included
evidence that Mr. Maldonado threw a cell phone at her face,
RT 184; gave her a black eye, RT 401-02; punched her in the
back, leaving a grapefruit-sized bruise, RT 555-56; and
slapped her in the face, RT 642-43.
items tended to show consciousness of guilt. Mr. Maldonado hid
the knife he used to stab the victim. And Mr. Maldonado
fabricated a story that Ms. Moore was injured by a shard from
a mirror she fell into. Mr. Maldonado offered that version of
events to the 9-1-1 operator, the police, and his relatives.
It was not until the knife was found two months later that he
changed his story.
Maldonado urges that the evidence was insufficient because he
''was too drugged on methamphetamine to
form'' the mental state required for first degree
murder. Docket No. 6 at 10. The evidence of his drug use on
the day of the killing was very weak, as Mr. Maldonado did
not testify and no physical or medical evidence showed that
he had methamphetamine in his system.
Maldonado nonetheless urges that there was some
support for intoxication, as his drug use was
''corroborated'' by police officer Gary
Rodgers‘ testimony that, upon arriving at the scene of
the killing, he (officer Rodgers) found Mr. Maldonado to be
very excited, hysterical and distraught. Mr. Maldonado also
notes that officer Rodgers observed some marks on Mr.
Maldonado‘s body (but does not explain how those showed
methamphetamine use) and notes that the police found other
illegal drugs when they searched Mr. Maldonado. This evidence
does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the first degree murder conviction. Mr. Maldonado‘s
symptoms, which he contends were consistent with him being
''too drugged on methamphetamine, '' Docket
No. 6 at 10, also were consistent with him being upset about
having just killed his girlfriend, having delayed in
summoning help, and having hidden the knife he used to stab
her. Because the record supports conflicting inferences, the
federal habeas court must presume ''that the trier of
fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution,
and must defer to that resolution.''
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Even if some evidence --
i.e., the marks on Mr. Maldonado‘s body, Mr.
Maldonado‘s agitated state, and Mr. Maldonado‘s
possession of other drugs -- suggested that he had consumed
drugs, the jury implicitly rejected the inference that he was
''too drugged on methamphetamine'' to form
the mental state necessary for first degree murder. Cf.
People v. Barnett, 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1156 (Cal. 1998)
(''By finding defendant guilty of first degree
murder, . . . the jury reached the factual conclusion that
defendant acted with malice aforethought, deliberation, and
premeditation, and necessarily rejected the argument that . .
. taking of methamphetamine interfered with his ability to
form these requisite mental states.''); People v.
Castillo, 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1018 (Cal. 1997) (upholding
first degree murder conviction where ''the evidence
of defendant‘s intoxication was equivocal at
best'' and defendant ''did not claim PCP use
until after he first denied any involvement in the
Maldonado also argues that he ''had like a dream that
Katrina [Moore] was arguing'' with him, then chased
him with a knife, then they struggled ''and during
the struggling, Ms. Moore was stabbed.'' Docket No. 6
at 10. But Mr. Maldonado does not dispute that there was
absolutely no evidence of this dream presented at trial.
Evidence not presented at trial does not factor into the
California Supreme Court‘s rejection of Mr.
Maldonado‘s due process challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence was not an unreasonable application of, or
contrary to, any holding of the U.S. Supreme Court. Mr.
Maldonado is not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus on
Refusal To Instruct On Voluntary Intoxication
the discussions of jury instructions, defense counsel
requested an instruction on intoxication. The trial judge
determined that there was no evidence that Mr. Maldonado was
actually intoxicated on the day of the killing and refused to
give the instruction. RT 1200-01. Mr. Maldonado contends that
his right to due process was ...