United States District Court, E.D. California
JOSEPH CABARDO, DONNABEL SUYAT, MACTABE BIBAT, MARISSA BIBAT, ALICIA BOLLING, RENATO MANIPON, CARLINA CABACONGAN, and JOHN DAVE CABACONGAN, on behalf of all current and former employees and the State of California Plaintiffs,
MARILYN PATACSIL and ERNESTO PATACSIL, Defendants.
L. NunJey United States District Judge.
a lawsuit asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et
seq., and several California wage-and-hour laws. The
matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 44.) Defendants Marilyn
Patacsil (“Marilyn”) and Ernesto Patacsil
(collectively “Defendants”) oppose the motion.
(ECF No. 49.) For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED in part.
are former employees of Patacsil Care Homes, a group of
residential care homes owned and operated by Defendants.
Plaintiffs were “live-in” caregivers at the
homes, which, as the name suggests, means they lived and
gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is straightforward:
they contend that Defendants misclassified them as exempt
from minimum wage and overtime requirements under both
federal and California law. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 26-28.)
Plaintiffs brought a suite of claims in this lawsuit-alleging
that Defendants violated several federal and state
wage-and-hour laws for conduct like not paying Plaintiffs
minimum wage or overtime, not providing meal periods or rest
periods, not providing accurate and itemized wage statements,
and not maintaining time records showing when Plaintiffs
began and ended work or meal periods. (ECF No. 21 at ¶
instant motion concerns only Plaintiffs' sixth and tenth
claims. In their sixth claim, Plaintiffs contend that
Defendants violated § 226 of the California Labor Code
because Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs with wage
statements accurately reflecting the number of hours
Plaintiffs worked. (ECF No. 44-1 at 1:12-15.) In their tenth
claim, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' violation of
§ 226 is also a predicate that allows them to recover
civil penalties pursuant to the Labor Code Private Attorneys
General Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Lab. Code §§
2698 et seq. (ECF No. 44-1 at 1:26-28.) Plaintiffs
argue they are entitled to summary judgment on both claims.
relevant facts are not in dispute. Prior to 2012, Defendants
paid Plaintiffs a salary rather than an hourly wage. (Sutton
Decl., Ex. 1 (“Patacsil Dep. 1”), ECF No. 44-4 at
55:13-15.) Consequently, Defendants did not provide
Plaintiffs with wage statements that recounted the hours
Plaintiffs worked in any given pay period. (Sutton Decl., Ex.
2 (“Patacsil Dep. 2”), ECF No. 44-5 at
28:24-29:1.) Marilyn conceded the point in her depositions:
Q: Okay. And so [the] wage statements that [Plaintiffs] got
didn't contain any reference to hours worked?
(Patacsil Dep. 1, ECF No. 44-4 at 55:16-18.)
Q: Okay. So the wage statements that you gave [Plaintiffs],
did they record the hours?
A: No, it's because it's salary.
Q: So there was no recounting of hours on the wage
(Patacsil Dep. 2, ECF No. 44-5 at 28:24-29:4.) Most of the
wage statements Plaintiffs received simply had no reference
to hours worked. (ECF No. 44-2 at No. 5.) Others listed
“86.67” hours regardless of the Plaintiff or pay
period. (ECF No. 44-2 at No. 5.) Defendants do not contend
that any of these were accurate. Instead, they attribute the
“86.67” hour entries to a bank error. (ECF No. 49
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The
“threshold inquiry” is whether “there are
any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only
by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved
in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). When the Court
looks at the evidence presented by the parties, it must
credit the non-moving party's evidence and draw all
justifiable inferences in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. But inferences are not drawn out of the
air. It is the non-moving party's obligation to produce a
factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn.
Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1092-93
(E.D. Cal. 2004).
the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at
trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable
trier of fact could do anything but find in its favor.
Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978,
984 (9th Cir. 2007). If the moving party carries its initial
burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who
“must establish that there is a genuine issue of
material fact.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). The
non-moving party cannot merely rely upon the pleadings.
Estate of Tucker ex rel. Tucker v. Interscope
Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead,
it must produce evidence setting forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.
resolving the merits of a party's motion for summary
judgment, the Court's role is not to evaluate the
evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for
trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (internal
move for summary judgment on their sixth claim (for violating
Labor Code § 226) and tenth claim (for civil penalties