California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION[*]
Court County of Santa Barbara No. 1473654 Rick S. Brown,
Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Becerra and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Gerald A.
Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul R. Roadarmel,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and David F. Glassman,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself at
trial. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806,
819; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729.)
The trial court has a concomitant duty to ensure that the
proceedings are conducted in an orderly fashion and, upon a
proper showing, to physically restrain the defendant for his
own safety and that of others in the courtroom. (People
v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 837-838.) Inevitably,
use of physical restraints will impair the self-represented
defendant's ability to move around the courtroom. It also
is difficult to conceal the restraints from the jury's
view. Here the trial court conscientiously sought to balance
the defendant's right to self-representation with its
concern for the safety of the defendant, deputies, jurors and
others in the courtroom. We believe the court properly struck
Robert Lee Billie was charged with attempted murder (Pen.
Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)),  with special
allegations of personal infliction of great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and personal use of a deadly
weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1); count 1); and assault
with personal use of a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd.
(a)(1)), with the special allegation of personal infliction
of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a); count 2).
The charges resulted from events occurring on May 16, 2013.
counts alleged that the offenses were second strikes
(§§ 667, subds. (d)(2) & (e)(1), 1192.7, subd.
(c)(8)), that appellant had suffered a prior conviction of a
serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that he had
served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). It also
was alleged that appellant was ineligible to serve a state
prison sentence in county jail because the alleged offenses
were serious or violent felonies (§§ 1192.7, subd.
represented himself at trial, assisted by advisory counsel.
He elected to bifurcate trial on the current alleged offenses
from the trial on an alleged prior strike conviction and to
waive jury trial on the alleged prior conviction.
jury deadlocked on count 1 and the trial court declared a
mistrial on that count. The jury found appellant guilty of
count 2 and found true the special allegation. The
prosecution dismissed count 1.
trial court found the prior conviction true as alleged. It
sentenced appellant to the upper term of four years in state
prison on count 2, doubled to eight years as a second strike
under section 667, subdivision (e)(1). The court sentenced
appellant to a consecutive three-year term for the
enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and a
five-year consecutive term pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (a)(1), for a total term of 16 years. Appellant
was awarded 531 days of presentence custody credit.
contends the trial court erred by requiring him to wear
restraints during trial and by admitting evidence of his
prior assault conviction. We affirm.
and the victim, William Littrice, had known each other for
years. They met while working for Second Chance, an
organization that takes employees by van to different cities
to sell candy door-to-door. A crew of 10 to 14 people,
working on commission, go out for approximately two weeks at
a time. Appellant and Littrice ...