California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
denied by, 07/19/2017
FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION[*]]
Court of Santa Barbara County, No. 1473654, Rick S. Brown,
Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Becerra and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Gerald A.
Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Assistant Attorney General, Paul R. Roadarmel and David F.
Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
by Perren, J., with Gilbert, P. J., and Yegan, J.,
Cal.Rptr.3d 691] PERREN, J.
defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself at
trial. ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806,
819 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525]; People v. Welch
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203');">85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d
754].) The trial court has a concomitant duty to ensure that
the proceedings are conducted in an orderly fashion and, upon
a proper showing, to physically restrain the defendant for
his own safety and that of others in the courtroom. (
People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 837-838 [22
Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007].)
Inevitably, use of physical restraints will impair the
self-represented defendant's ability to move around the
courtroom. It also is difficult to conceal the restraints
from the jury's view. Here the trial court
conscientiously sought to balance the defendant's right
to self-representation with its concern for the safety of the
defendant, deputies, jurors and others in the courtroom. We
believe the court properly struck that balance.
Robert Lee Billie was charged with attempted murder (Pen.
Code, § § 664, 187, subd. (a)), with special
allegations of personal infliction of great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and personal use of a deadly
weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1); count 1) and assault with
personal use of a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)),
with the special allegation of personal infliction of great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a); count 2). The
charges resulted from events occurring on May 16, 2013.
counts alleged that the offenses were second strikes (§
§ 667, subds. (d)(2) & (e)(1), 1192.7, subd.
(c)(8)), that appellant had suffered a prior conviction of a
serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that he had
served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). It also
was alleged that appellant was ineligible to serve a state
prison sentence in county jail ...