United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS RE:
DKT. NO. 8
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge
Aaron Brewer and Della Chambers Brewer
(“Plaintiffs”) have filed suit against Defendants
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) and The
Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”), in its capacity
as trustee for the World Savings Real Estate Mortgage
Investment Conduit (“REMIC”) Trust, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 29 (“REMIC
Trust”), regarding their home loan with Wells
Fargo's predecessor-in-interest, World Savings Bank, FSB
(“WSB”). See Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A
entered into a loan agreement with WSB on March 12, 2007.
Compl. ¶ 7. WSB sold Plaintiffs' loan to the REMIC
Trust-a mortgage-backed securities trust set up under New
York law-on April 27, 2007. Id. ¶ 8. BNYM
served as the trustee for the REMIC Trust. Id.
According to Plaintiffs, New York law required WSB to
transfer the loan documents to the REMIC Trust within 90 days
of the closing date, but no public records show that this
transfer occurred. Id. ¶ 9.
19, 2015, Plaintiffs sent Wells Fargo a Qualified Written
Request (“QWR”) and Debt Dispute Letter under the
Real Estate Settlement Practices Act, 12 U.S.C. §
2605(e) (“RESPA”), in an attempt to ascertain who
owned their loan. Id. ¶ 10. The QWR also
asserted Plaintiffs' rights under Regulation X of the
Mortgage Servicing Act (“Regulation X”), which is
a component of the Dodd-Frank Act under RESPA. Id.
Wells Fargo responded to the QWR on June 18, 2015. Compl.
¶ 12. It stated that it was searching for responsive
information and that the QWR was overbroad. Id.
Perceiving this to be a deficient response, on June 9, 2015,
Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau. Id. ¶ 13. Wells Fargo
acknowledged the inquiry. Id. On July 1, 2015, Wells
Fargo provided Plaintiffs with a copy of their promissory
note (the “Note”). Id. ¶ 14. The
copy of their Note contained a one-page addendum that was not
included in the note they originally executed. Id.
The addendum contained two different signatures: one from
Wells Fargo and one from WSB. Id. The WSB signature
was stamped “CANCELLED.” Id.
5, 2015, Plaintiffs sent Wells Fargo a second QWR, which
Wells Fargo acknowledged it received. Id. ¶ 15.
Wells Fargo responded on August 4, 2015, stating that it had
already provided Plaintiffs with a copy of the Note and
refusing to provide any additional information. Id.
filed this suit in state court on February 4, 2016.
See Dkt. No. 1. Defendants removed the action to
this Court on May 17, 2016. Id. Plaintiffs'
first claim seeks a declaratory judgment stating that: (1)
their deed of trust (“DOT”) became void when it
was transferred into the REMIC Trust after the trust's
closing date elapsed, Compl. ¶ 21; and (2) in the
alternative, their DOT became void under California Civil
Code § 1558 because the parties to the DOT are not
identifiable. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
Plaintiffs' second claim is for violation of RESPA.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated 12 U.S.C. §
2605(e), which governs QWRs, when they failed to timely
provide a satisfactory response to Plaintiffs' two QWRs.
Id. ¶¶ 26-27. Plaintiffs' third claim
for violation of Regulation X, as well as their fourth claim
for violation of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”), rely on the same factual basis as their
RESPA claim. Id. ¶¶ 31-33. For each of
these four claims, Plaintiffs also assert derivative
violations of California's Unfair Competition Law
(“UCL”) for unlawful and unfair practices. Compl.
basis of each of their claims, Plaintiffs request that the
Court enjoin Defendants from foreclosing on their property,
and seek compensatory and punitive damages.
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” A
defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a
cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a
cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 570 (2007). A claim is facially