United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING CASE AS FRIVOLOUS AND CLOSING MATTER
(DOC. NO. 1)
April 4, 2017, Plaintiff filed this matter that purports to
be a civil rights lawsuit. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and
is a prisoner at the California Substance Abuse Treatment
Facility in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff captions his
complaint as “MELVIN LOWELL HAWKINS JR, registered
trade name/business entity, and Hawkins, Melvin Lowell,
registered trade name holder and real party in
interest.” Plaintiff names as Defendants David Wesley,
David Wesley's husband, Jackie Lacey, and Jackie
Lacey's husband. An exhibit to the Complaint includes of
a certificate of service that names David Wesley as
“dba presiding judge, ” and names Jackie Lacey as
“dba prosecutor.” An address of 210 West Temple
St., Los Angeles, CA is listed. The address 210 West Temple
St. is the location of the Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal
Justice Center in Los Angeles County, CA. David Wesley is a
judge on the Los Angeles Superior Court. Jackie Lacey is
the District Attorney of Los Angeles County. For the reasons
that follow, Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed as
frivolous and this case will be closed.
Complaint is not a model of clarity. Plaintiff purports to
grant his name (Hawkins, Melvin Lowell) and his registered
trade name “MELVIN LOWELL HAWKINS JR” to the
court for the future return of this interest. Plaintiff also
makes claim to his free will and right of dominion over his
own body, blood, DNA, all properties, and all hereditaments.
Plaintiff states that he is a “private, non-statutory,
non-citizen, de jure American in the de jure original
jurisdiction, not a ‘person, ' not a
‘citizen, ' not named in an U.S. or state
‘code, ' and not a ‘person' as defined in
the Trading With The Enemy Act as modified by the Emergency
Banking Relief Act . . . .” Plaintiff states that David
Wesley is being sued in his personal capacity because he was
“operating in his ministerial capacity, enforcing
statutes . . . .” Plaintiff states that this case began
as an administrative remedy for civil rights violations, but
“has now been reduced to a breach of contract as all
defendants admitted, via their own willful and voluntary
default on the administrative process, that they are guilty
and they owe the amount requested by the plaintiffs, and they
failed to object or state any claim to immunity.”
Plaintiff states that Defendants refused to respond to
various documents that he served upon them, and that he has
“established ‘judicial estoppel' against
Defendants, as evidence by the Certificate of
Dishonor/Administrative Judgment Nihil Dicit, testified to by
Eileen Raye, a public minister . . . .” The documents
served on Defendants claim to be an “Affidavit of
Obligation [which] is a commercial instrument . . . .”
Plaintiff request $136, 840, 000.00 in damages.
order to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal v.
Aschcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint may be
dismissed for failure to state a claim where there is the
lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of
sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.
Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242
(9th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare
Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). In reviewing
a complaint, courts are not required “to accept as true
allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted
deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”
Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1145
n. 4 (9th Cir. 2012); Sprewell v. Golden State
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). An action
is “frivolous” if it has no arguable basis in
fact or law; the term embraces both inarguable legal
conclusions and fanciful factual allegations. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Barnard,
635 F. App'x at 389. A court may sua sponte
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, without
providing notice or an opportunity to respond, where the
plaintiff cannot possibly win relief. Barnard v. United
States Gov't, 635 F. App'x 389 (9th Cir. 2016);
Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638
(9th Cir. 1988); Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813
F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); Herrejon v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, 980 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1194 (E.D. Cal.
2013); Young v. Hawaii, 911 F.Supp.2d 972, 995 (D.
apparent that Plaintiff is attempting to use non-applicable
law to either obtain his release from custody, or obtain
money from the judge and prosecutor of his criminal
nature of the Complaint indicates that Judge Wesley would be
entitled to absolute judicial immunity against
Plaintiff's claims. See Moore v. Brewster, 96
F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996). Because of the nature of
judicial immunity, amendment with respect to Judges Wesley
would be futile. Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125
F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1997).
nature of the Complaint also indicates that District Attorney
Lacey is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342-43 (2009).
Because of the nature of prosecutorial immunity, amendment
with respect to District Attorney Lacey would be futile.
See Smith v. Delaware, 624 Fed.Appx. 788, 790-91 (3d
Cir. 2015); Lopez v. County of L.A., 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1339, *21 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016); Douglas v.
Miller, 864 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1221 (W.D. Ok. 2012).
no plausible cause of action is alleged in the
Complaint. The allegations and apparent theories for
Plaintiffs' claims are specious and fanciful. Plaintiff
attempted to create unilateral liability by sending what
purports to be a commercial paper, specifically an
“affidavit of obligation for claim upon public hazard
bonds demand for release, ” to a sitting superior court
judge and the district attorney of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs
complaint is reminiscent of the discredited theories of the
“sovereign citizen” movement. Cf Koshkaryan
v. Kuhl, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49711, *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
31, 2017); Leiter v. Kenney, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
172482 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2016); Smithson v. York Cnty.
Ct. of Common Pleas, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102674 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 3, 2016); Payne v. Kilda, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14968 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2016); Alexio v.
Obama, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168035 (D. Haw. Dec. 16,
2015); Nunez v. D.T.C., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
138514, *6 (D. S.C. Aug. 30, 2013). Because the allegations
and bases for the Complaint's theories are frivolous,
amendment would be futile.
claims are specious and frivolous, and no plausible claims
are alleged. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325;
Wilson, 668 F.3d 1136, 1145 n. 4. Because amendment
would be futile and Plaintiff cannot possibly win relief, the
Court will dismiss this case as frivolous and for failure to
state a claim. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325;
Barnard, 635 F. App'x at 389; Sparling,
864 F.2d at 638; Omar, 813 F.2d at 991;
Herrejon, 980 F.Supp.2d at 1194;
Koshkaryan, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49711 at *1-*5
(dismissing as frivolous a complaint that is essentially
identical to Plaintiffs complaint).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. This case is DISMISSED as frivolous and for failure to