United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER STRIKING UNSIGNED COMPLAINT (DOC. 1)
K. OBERTO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Mack A. West, Jr., is a state prisoner proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis in this civil action
which he filed on April 14, 2014. (Doc. 1.) However, the
Complaint is not signed. (Id.) The Court cannot
consider unsigned filings and the Complaint shall be stricken
from the record for that reason. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11; L. R.
131. Plaintiff has thirty days to file a signed complaint and
is hereby given both the pleading and legal standards which
appear to apply to the claim(s) he is attempting to assert in
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally frivolous,
malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2);
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is
dismissed on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed
per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or
more prior actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous,
malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, and has not alleged imminent danger of
serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in
forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);
Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil
actions, with limited exceptions, " none of which
applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .
. ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must
simply give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.''
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). Plaintiff must set forth ''sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is
plausible on its face.''' Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal
conclusions are not. Iqbal, at 678; see also
Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.
2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
''plaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings
facts . . ., '' Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580
F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro
se prisoners are still construed liberally and are
afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, "the liberal
pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's
factual allegations, " Neitze v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a
civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of
the claim that were not initially pled, " Bruns v.
Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th
Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d
266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to
indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The “sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is
not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely
consistent with' a defendant's liability” fall
short of satisfying the plausibility standard.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States .
. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there
be an actual connection or link between the actions of the
defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered
by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a]
person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a
constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if
he does an affirmative act, participates in another's
affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is
legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
complaint is made.'' Johnson v. Duffy, 588
F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for
relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named
defendant with some affirmative act or omission that
demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ...