United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR
BARBARA A. MCAULIFFE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Travare Monroe Grant is a state prisoner proceeding pro se
and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 7.)
before the Court is Plaintiff's second amended complaint,
filed on August 24, 2016. (ECF No. 13.)
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .
. .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To
survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
“facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying
the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
SUMMARY OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
is an inmate in the custody of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) at
California State Prison (“CSP”), Sacramento.
Plaintiff brings this action against defendant correctional
officials employed by the CDCR at CSP Corcoran. Plaintiff
names the following individual defendants: Lieutenant F.
Montoya; Chief Deputy Warden M. Sexton; Chief of Appeals M.
Voong; Appeals Examination Warden R. Pimentel; Chief Deputy
Warden M. Cisneros; Lieutenant V. Marmolejo; Lt. R. Ruiz;
Correctional Officer O. Rubalcaba; and Correctional Officer
alleges as follows: In his Muslim faith, all Muslims pray
five times a day beginning from early morning hours. On March
2, 2015, Plaintiff was body washing in his cell to prepare
for morning prayer, and he was naked. Defendants Rubalcaba
and Scalia arrived to serve him breakfast and lunch and
noticed his window was covered. They ordered Plaintiff to
take off the cover that only blocked a small portion of the
window. Plaintiff told Defendants Rubalcaba and Scalia that
it was against his Islamic faith to appear naked in front of
men. Defendants Rubalcaba and Scalia replied by telling
Plaintiff that he was being refused his breakfast and lunch
meals, and that he would be receiving a disciplinary action.
April 7, 2015, Plaintiff was again body washing in his cell,
preparing for morning prayer with his window covered halfway
while he was naked. Defendants Rubalcaba and Scalia
approached to serve Plaintiff breakfast and lunch, and
ordered him to take down the window cover. Plaintiff again
told them it was against his Islamic faith to appear naked in
front of men. Defendants Rubalcaba and Scalia refused
Plaintiff his meals and told him that he would be receiving a
CDC 115 disciplinary action.
F. Montoya was the supervising sergeant of Plaintiff's
housing unit, and approved the denial of meals. Defendant R.
Ruiz interviewed Plaintiff, and Plaintiff told Defendant Ruiz
that when he is preparing for morning prayer by body washing,
he is refused his meals for window covers. Defendant Ruiz
approved the disciplinary charge, and told Plaintiff that
until he stopped his preparations, there will be refused
requested to receive privileged meal delivery allowance
during the morning hours in his grievance. Defendant M.
Sexton denied Plaintiff relief at the second level of review.
Plaintiff pleaded his grievance at the third level, and
Defendants M. Voong and R. Pimental denied Plaintiff relief.
Marmolejo was the hearing officer for Plaintiff's CDC 115
disciplinary action for the April 7, 2015 incident. Defendant
Marmolejo omitted consideration of Plaintiff's religious
rights defense. Defendant M. Cisneros approved the meal
alleges that his First Amendment right to freedom of
religion, his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection,
and his right to be free from ...