United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF [ECF No.
William Anthony Santos, Sr. is appearing pro se and in forma
pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Plaintiff
consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate
Judge on February 10, 2017. Local Rule 302.
before the Court is Plaintiff's complaint, filed January
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of his rights.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo
County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010).
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled
to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is
now higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121
(9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive
screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible,
which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court
to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79;
Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th
Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts
that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's
liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572
F.3d at 969.
contends that Fresno County Sheriff Margaret Mims is allowing
“modern day slavery” to take place against
parties in two separate criminal actions. Plaintiff's
sister, children, and mother of his children have been the
victim of human trafficking throughout the city and county of
seeks an order to stop the human trafficking, compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and trial by jury.
Section 1983 Liability
Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “is
not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely
provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations
[Section 1983] creates a cause of action against a person
who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of
rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Section 1983 does
not create any substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle
whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by governmental
officials. To prove a case under section 1983, the plaintiff
must first demonstrate that (1) the action occurred
“under color of state law” and (2) the ...