United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER EXCLUDING TIME FROM THE SPEEDY TRIAL CLOCK FROM
MARCH 14, 2017 TO SEPTEMBER 22, 2017 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3161(H)(1)(D), (E), AND (H)(7)
JANIS L. SAMMARTINO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Court finds as follows:
March 21, 2017, the parties (save Defendants DeGuzman,
Loveless, and Shedd) appeared for arraignment on the
Indictment in this matter. Doc. No. 38. At the hearing, the
United States described a factual basis under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h), including the unusual and complex nature of
the case, the voluminous discovery produced to the
defendants, and defense counsel's need for time to review
the voluminous materials and to evaluate how to defend the
case, supporting the conclusion that the ends of justice are
best served by tolling the Speedy Trial clock and that such
tolling outweighs the interests of the public and the
defendants in a more expeditious trial.
status conference was held before this Court on April 14,
2017, at which time the United States reiterated its analysis
under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). All defense counsel
April 24, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion requesting
to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act from March 14,
2017, the date the Indictment was unsealed and the date that
defendants DeGuzman and Loveless first appeared before a
judicial officer of this District, until September 22, 2017,
the date set for the motion hearing and trial setting in this
the joint motion, the parties described a factual basis under
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), in that the ends of justice had
and continue to outweigh the interests of the public and the
defendants in a more expeditious trial, including the unusual
and complex nature of the case, the possibility of novel
issues of fact and law, the voluminous discovery produced to
the defendants, and defense counsel's need for additional
time to review the materials and to evaluate how to defend
Court hereby makes explicit findings supporting its
conclusion that the time between March 14, 2017 and September
22, 2017 shall be excluded from the Speedy Trial Act, as
Court finds, based on the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii), and (iv), as set forth below,
that the ends of justice are served by excluding time for
Speedy Trial Act purposes and outweigh the interest of the
public and the defendants in a more expeditious trial.
Discovery in this case is voluminous. The Court is familiar
with the nature of discovery in this investigation and the
related cases, such as United States v. Misiewicz,
15-CR-0033-JLS. As represented by the United States, the
discovery consists of terabytes of data, including documents
obtained from overseas, hundreds of interview reports,
contract documents, and correspondence. The United States has
produced voluminous discovery to the defense and is making
additional discovery collected as part of the broader
investigation available, as requested.
described in the joint motion, as a result of the volume of
discovery and the time needed to review and make effective
use of that discovery, the defense has required and continues
to require additional time to review the discovery and to
evaluate how to defend the case.
Court finds that this case is also complex due to the nature
of the crimes alleged, the extraterritorial nature of those
crimes, the potential for novel or complex factual and legal
issues, as well as the fact that many witnesses to these
crimes were and may continue to be located outside the United
States, among others. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).
recited by the parties in the joint motion and also in this
Order, the Court finds that the failure to grant such a
continuance would result in a miscarriage of justice; that
the case is so complex that it is unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings within the time
limits otherwise prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act; and that
failure to grant such a continuance would deny counsel the
reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking
into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii), (iv).
Court also finds that time shall be independently excluded
from March 14, 2017 to April 14, 2017, 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1)(E), based on the period of delay caused by and
resulting from out-of-district proceedings “relating to
the transfer of a case or the removal of [a] defendant from
another district under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(E).
Court further finds that time shall be independently excluded
from March 30, 2017 to September 22, 2017 under the Speedy
Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), based on the
pending defense motions pertaining to discovery, the first of
which was filed on March 30, 2017 (Doc. No. 78), and the need
to address the issues raised in those motions. Defense
discovery motions remain pending, and there have been since
filing and continue to be open ...