United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: DKT.
William H. Orrick United States District Judge
International Longshore and Warehouse Union
(“ILWU”) moves for summary judgment on plaintiff
Antonio Del Castillo's claims for breach of the duty of
fair representation and breach of the collective bargaining
agreement on the ground that plaintiff's claims are not
properly alleged against ILWU or are barred as a matter of
law. Although Del Castillo opposes the motion, he offers no
evidence establishing that there are material questions of
fact in dispute. The ILWU's motion is GRANTED.
12, 2016, plaintiff (proceeding pro se) filed this
case against ILWU and the Pacific Maritime Association
(“PMA”) alleging that defendants breached their
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) and the
union violated its duty of fair representation
(“DFR”) based upon the handling of his grievance
by the local affiliate of ILWU, Local 34. Dkt. No. 1. The
grievance and plaintiff's Complaint here center around
Del Castillo's assertions that the “request”
system for assigning work used by Local 34 and PMA had a
discriminatory effect and impact on Del Castillo and other
older workers and that Local 34 and PMA breached the CBA by
failing to implement a new system. Complaint at 3-4. He also
argues in this case that his grievance raising these issues
was “not processed” fairly.
parties stipulated to the dismissal of PMA. Dkt. No. 21. ILWU
filed a motion for summary judgment on March 15, 2017. Dkt.
No. 22. Plaintiff secured counsel and opposes that motion,
arguing that his claims for breach of contract and violation
of the duty of fair representation should proceed to trial.
Dkt. Nos. 29, 31.
is a marine clerk with multiple decades of experience who has
not been promoted beyond his original position as
“clerk, ” allegedly due to the job assignment
system used by ILWU and PMA that is not based on merit but is
based on “connections.” Declaration of Jonathan
Matthews [Dkt. No. 32] ¶ 2.
relies on the Declaration of Allen Fung [Dkt. No. 24], the
Secretary-Treasurer of ILWU Local 34 (“Local
34”), to explain the relationship between clerks like
Del Castillo, ILWU, Local 34, and employers like PMA. The
majority of Local 34's members are marine clerks who
track the movement of cargo into, around, and out of maritime
facilities. Fung Decl. ¶ 5. The workers in Local 34 are
employed by PMA at ports along the West Coast. Id.
covering Local 34 and PMA is the Pacific Coast Longshore and
Clerks' Agreement (“PCL&CA” or
“CBA”) which itself is made up of two contracts;
the Pacific Coast Longshore Contract Document
(“PCLCD”) and the Pacific Coast Clerks'
Contract Document (“PCCCD”). Id. ¶
6. The relevant PCCCD at issue was effective from 2008-2014.
It was amended by a July 2014 MOU and re-executed.
Id. ¶ 7, & Exs. B & C. Section 17 of
the PCCCD establishes “an exclusive” grievance
and arbitration process for resolving disputes arising under
the PCL&CA. Id.
to Fung, the PCCCD governs clerk work with PMA and is
administered at the local level by Local 34 and PMA, who act
jointly through the “Joint Port Labor Relations
Committee” (JPLRC). Id.¶ 8. The JPLRC
maintains and operates the dispatch hall, decides questions
regarding dispatch, and investigates and adjudicates contract
grievances. Id. ¶ 9. ILWU does not play any
role in operating the Local 34 dispatch hall and it does not
play any role in “establishing or enforcing the means
and methods of dispatching jobs to Local 34 members.”
Id. ¶ 10.
the prior “request system, ” in operation through
February 24, 2017, PMA could request individual clerks by
name to work with them on a daily or weekly basis. The
remaining slots were assigned to clerks on the basis of who
was available and who had worked the least in a given month.
Fung Decl. ¶ 10. The system gave individuals who were
“requested” better access to jobs with better
hours or working conditions. Id. In 2014, Local 34
“advocated” with PMA to establish a new
“steady” system, eliminating the request system
and resulting in the 2014 Letter of Understanding
(“2014 LOU”). Id. ¶ 11. The 2014
LOU, however, was not implemented by PMA. After a series of
disputes were arbitrated through the grievance mechanism
during three separate arbitration proceedings, the
“steady” system became operational as of February
25, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
only grievance filed by Del Castillo related to the hiring
system was handed to Fung by Del Castillo on February 11,
2016. Id. ¶ 14. That grievance - dated February
10, 2016 and attached to Del Castillo's Complaint -
complains that PMA and Local 34 had yet to implement the new
steady system and were still relying on the old,
discriminatory request system. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Del Castillo
also accused PMA and Local 34 of discrimination based on age
and seniority, presumably under the “request
system” that was still operating at that time.
Id. Finally, Del Castillo complained that the old
system violated the Clerk Work Opportunity Guarantee.
Castillo's grievance was considered by the Local 34
Executive Committee on April 12, 2016. Fung Decl., ¶ 14.
Despite having notice, Del Castillo did not attend that
meeting. The Executive Committee directed that his grievance
would not be moved forward “because Local 34 was
already prosecuting PMA for noncompliance with the 2014 LOU
in order to eliminate the request system, and there was no
evidence to support Plaintiff's other allegations.”
Id. ¶ 14.
Del Castillo filed a charge with the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB”) on March 29, 2016, alleging that
Local 34 and PMA violated the National Labor Relations Act by
failing to eliminate the request system and continuing to
dispatch employees based on favoritism. Fung Decl., Ex. J.
After conducting an investigation, the NLRB dismissed the
charge based on insufficient evidence. Endo Decl. ¶ 2,
judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In order to
prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
an essential element of the non-moving party's claim, or
to a defense on which the non-moving party will bear the
burden of persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has
made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party
opposing summary judgment to identify “specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. The party opposing summary judgment must then
present affirmative evidence from which a jury could return a
verdict in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the non-movant. Id. at 255.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
“[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”
Id. However, conclusory and speculative testimony
does not raise genuine issues of fact and is insufficient to
defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill Publ'g Co.,
Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir.1979).
moves for summary judgment arguing that: (i) ILWU cannot be
liable for the complained-of actions that were taken by Local
34; (ii) Del Castillo failed to exhaust his DFR claim as to
race discrimination under the prior request system, and that
claim as well as any age discrimination claims are
time-barred; (iii) plaintiff has failed to exhaust any claims
regarding the new steady system; and (iv) no reasonable ...