United States District Court, E.D. California
DAMIAN E. GRIFFIN, Plaintiff,
DAVID LONG, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
Barbara A. McAuliffe UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Damian E. Griffin (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has
consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5.)
August 15, 2016, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's
complaint with leave to amend. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff's
first amended complaint, filed on August 25, 2016, is
currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 9.)
Screening Requirement and Standard
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against
an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion
thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or
malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),
(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a
plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts
“are not required to indulge unwarranted
inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive
screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible,
which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court
to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129
S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United
States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.
2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted
unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with
liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949
(quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
is currently incarcerated at the California City Correctional
Facility (“CCCF”), where the events in the
complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names the
following defendants, all employed at CCCF: (1) K.
Washington, Accounting Trainee; (2) Kristina Hill, Senior
Accounting Officer Supervisor; and (3) L. Hartin, Accounting
alleges as follows: On April 27, 2015, Plaintiff left his
former institution, the Tallahatchie County Correctional
Facility, in Tutwiler, Mississippi. On April 29, 2015,
Plaintiff was processed at CCCF.
9, 2015, funds in the amount of $205.66 were transferred from
Plaintiff's trust account in Mississippi to his trust
account in California. On the same date, a $102.83 direct
order fee was deducted by defendants. Plaintiff claims that
this deduction violated his rights and deprived him of his
liberty interest. Plaintiff asserts that funds already in his
prison account are not subject to any restitution or direct
order, and it is only funds that are sent from an outside
source that are subject to any deductions. Plaintiff used the
internal request and grievance procedure without recourse.
Plaintiff further claims that he was denied due process when
he was given no way to dispute the action taken by defendants
before the funds were deducted from money already deposited
in his account.
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs of suit.
amended complaint, Plaintiff is not challenging the propriety
of any restitution order or that he owes restitution.
Instead, Plaintiff claims that defendants improperly deducted
restitution amounts from funds not subject to such deduction.
Plaintiff asserts ...