United States District Court, S.D. California
ANTOINE L. ARDDS, CDCR No. P-59915, Plaintiff,
D. HODGE; L. ROMERO; D. PARAMO; P. BARAMONTE; G. VALDOVINOS; RENTERIA; C. GARDINEZ; McGEE; SMITH, Defendants.
ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
SUPPLMENTAL COMPLAINT AS MOOT; (2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO
EFFECT SERVICE OF FAC; AND (3) DENYING MOTION TO NOTIFY
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE [ECF DOC. NOS. 20, 21, 23]
William Q. Hayes United States District Court
L. Ardds (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at
the California Health Care Facility, located in Stockton,
California, and proceeding pro se, initially filed a document
entitled “Coloring Agreement” which the Court
liberally construed to be an attempt to file a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive
Relief (ECF No. 6), as well as certified copies of his inmate
trust account statement, which the Court liberally construed
as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF Nos. 2, 15). In
addition, Plaintiff filed a “Supplemental Complaint,
” along with a “Motion to Dismiss Improperly
Named Defendant” and a Motion for Leave to File a
Supplemental Complaint. (ECF Nos. 8, 10, 14.)
February 28, 2017, this Court granted Plaintiff's Motion
to Proceed IFP, denied his Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
granted his Motion to Dismiss improperly named defendant and
dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. (ECF No. 18.) On March 1,
2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting leave to file a
supplemental complaint. (ECF No. 20). However, on March 27,
2017, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”). (ECF No. 21.) Therefore, his need to
file a supplemental pleading is now moot.
Plaintiff has filed a document entitled “Ex Parte
Motion” in which he is requesting that this Court
“notify the Director's officer” regarding an
alleged excessive force incident which occurred at his
current place of confinement. (ECF No. 23.) The Court
construes this as a request for injunctive relief.
Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
Standard of Review
Court previously informed Plaintiff, because Plaintiff is a
prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-answer
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and §
1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte
dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of it,
which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or
seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.
Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of
[screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous
or malicious suits need not bear the expense of
responding.'” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d
903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir.
standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a
claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112
(9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680
F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening
pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar
standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule
12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct”
or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me
accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility
August 19, 2016, Plaintiff was housed at the Richard J.
Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”).
(See FAC at 7.) At the time Plaintiff arrived at
RJD, he had “pending disciplinary actions and
appeals” from his previous place of incarceration,
Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”).
(Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff was suing a
correctional officer at SVSP, D. Lopez, who is not a
defendant in this action. (Id.) Plaintiff claims D.
Lopez sent emails and made phone calls to RJD prison
officials which he claims “prompt[ed] sudden harassment
from RJD officials in such a short period of time.”
was given priority to visit the prison law library on October
24, 2016. (Id.) Plaintiff went to the designated
waiting area to be escorted to the law library. (Id.
at 8.) Plaintiff showed Defendant Hodge his pass for the law
library. (Id.) However, as Plaintiff began to walk
to the law library, he alleges Correction Officer D.
Jones “began to make threats of sending
killas” to Plaintiff's cell. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Jones “kept dashing out
insults” which caused Plaintiff to walk back to his
unit instead of attending the law library. (Id.)
alleges that Defendant D. Hodge used the information on his
Plaintiff's to “go into the computer and look up
Plaintiff's conviction.” (Id.) Plaintiff
further alleges that Hodge informed other correctional
officers about the nature of Plaintiff's conviction which
caused “intentional harassments.” (Id.)
After Plaintiff returned to his cell, he informed
Correctional Officer Rucker “about the incidents with
Defendant D. Hodge and Officer D. Jones.”
(Id.) Plaintiff asked to speak with his psychologist
due to “feeling depressed and paranoid.”
(Id. at 9.) Correctional Officer Rucker reissued a
pass for Plaintiff to return to the law library.
then approached Defendant Romero to give him his pass for the
law library. (Id.) Plaintiff claims Romero took
Plaintiff's pass and “tore it up.”
(Id.) Romero told Plaintiff to return to his unit.
(Id.) Plaintiff did return to his unit and informed
Correctional Officer Rucker of what had transpired with
Romero. (Id.) Plaintiff again sought leave to meet
with his psychologist. (Id.) However, Correctional
Officer Rucker informed Plaintiff that he would have to wait
until his scheduled time later that day because there was
insufficient staff to escort him to his psychologist.
that afternoon, Plaintiff was again released to go to the
prison law library. (Id.) He was being
“searched by officers in the search line” when he
claims that Hodge began to “yell out bits and pieces of
commitment offense and prior convictions.”
(Id. at 9-10.) Hodge allegedly said in the presence
of other inmates and staff, “you're in here for
‘rape' now, but what about 20 years ago?.”
(Id. at 10.) Plaintiff claims that Hodge and Romero
“once again refused to let Plaintiff walk through the
yard gate for the law library” and instead, Plaintiff
walked to the ...