United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
Anthony J. Battaglia United States District Judge.
instant matter comes before the Court on Defendant
International Dessert and Coffee, LLC's
(“Defendant”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Ronald
Schoors's (“Plaintiff”) Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 6.) Pursuant to Civil Local Rule
7.1.d.1, the Court finds this motion suitable for
determination on the papers and without oral argument. With
the issuance of this Order, Defendant's motion is
FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT
is a California resident who suffers from a range of physical
disabilities that include congestive heart failure,
cardiomyopathy, recurring transient ischemic attacks, and
left-side weakness from two strokes, one of which has left
him with brain damage. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 2.) Due to
his health issues, Plaintiff is significantly limited in his
mobility and must use a cane to help him walk as he is
unsteady on his feet, and is subject to black outs and falls.
(Id. ¶ 3.)
November of 2016, Plaintiff went to Defendant's brick and
mortar store located at 835 W. Harbor Drive, San Diego,
California (the “Store”). (Id.
¶¶ 6, 12.) Plaintiff alleges that due to the way
the shelves and merchandise were configured in the Store, the
paths of travel throughout the aisles were not accessible to
Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 15.) Specifically, Plaintiff
contends that the route of travel in some parts of the store
were less than thirty-six inches in width, with some paths of
travel as narrow as twelve inches in width. (Id.
on the Store's practice of placing merchandise in the
walkway, Plaintiff argues that he was denied full and equal
access to the Store, and that Defendant has failed to
maintain in working and usable conditions features required
to provide access to persons with disabilities. (Id.
¶¶ 17, 21.) Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that the
failure to remove the barriers was intentional because: (1)
the particular barriers are intuitive and obvious; and (2)
Defendant exercised control and dominion over the conditions
at this location and the lack of accessible facilities was
not an “accident.” (Id. ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff brings his Complaint alleging a violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),
and violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh
Act”). (Id. ¶¶ 26-35.)
Plaintiff requests injunctive relief, damages under the Unruh
Act, reasonable attorneys fees, and costs of suit.
(Id. at 7-8.)
instituted this action on December 25, 2016. (Doc. No. 1.) On
March 20, 2017, Defendant filed the present motion, its
motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state-law causes of action
for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 6.)
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375,
377 (1994). Accordingly, “[a] federal court is presumed
to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary
affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v.
Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.
1989). In civil cases, federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over only those cases where either diversity
jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction exist. See
Peralta v. Hispanic Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1068- 69
(9th Cir. 2005).
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
grants federal courts supplemental jurisdiction over claims
over which no original jurisdiction exists. Specifically,
§ 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claims “that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution.” Id. The Supreme Court
has illustrated that federal courts have supplemental
jurisdiction over a state law claim where the state claim and
the federal claim “derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact, ” such that “the relationship
between [the federal] claim and the state claim permits the
conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises
but one constitutional ‘case.'” See
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966); see also City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1997).
Ninth Circuit mandates the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction unless it is prohibited by section 1367(b), or
unless one of the exceptions in section 1367(c) applies.
See Irwin v. Mascott, 96 F.Supp.2d 968, 974-75 (N.D.
Cal. 1999). Thus, “unless a court properly invokes a
§ 1367(c) category in exercising its discretion to
decline to entertain pendent claims, supplemental
jurisdiction must be asserted.” Id. at 975.
argues that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(c), there exists
several reasons for this Court to decline to take
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Unruh Act
claim. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 6.) Plaintiff argues that as both of
his causes of action involve identical facts, witnesses,
evidence, and discovery, that there is no basis for ...