United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER STRIKING UNSIGNED COMPLAINT (Doc. 1)
Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Lee Kinder, Jr., filed this civil action on November 14, 2016
but failed to sign the complaint. (Doc. 1.) The Court cannot
consider unsigned filings and the complaint shall be stricken
from the record for that reason. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11; L. R.
131. The Court grants Plaintiff thirty days to file a signed
complaint. Toward that end, the Court will supply him with
the pleading and legal standards which appear to apply to the
claims that he is attempting to assert in this action.
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally frivolous,
malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2);
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)-(iii). If an action is
dismissed on one of these three basis, a “strike”
is imposed per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has
had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed as
frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, and has not alleged imminent
danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed
in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil
actions, with limited exceptions, " none of which
applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .
. ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must
simply give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is
plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual
allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are
not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009);
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
"plaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings
facts . . ., " Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d
949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners
are still construed liberally and are afforded the benefit of
any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th
Cir. 2010). However, "the liberal pleading standard . .
. applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations,
" Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9
(1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights
complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that
were not initially pled, " Bruns v. Nat'l Credit
Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)
quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268
(9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge
unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The “sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is
not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely
consistent with' a defendant's liability” fall
short of satisfying the plausibility standard.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
state a claim using 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the complaint must
set forth an actual connection or link between the actions of
the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been
suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that
"[a] person 'subjects' another to the
deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in
another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act
which he is legally required to do that causes the
deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v.
Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to
state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must
link each named defendant with some affirmative act or
omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff's
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18(a) &
Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) allows a party asserting a
claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim to join, either as
independent or as alternate claims, as many claims as the
party has against an opposing party. However, Plaintiff may
not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a
single action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v.
Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George
v. Smith,507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). As an
initial matter, Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple
defendants so long as (1) the claim(s) arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and
occurrences, and (2) there are commons questions of law or
fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2); Coughlin v. Rogers, 130
F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 623 F.3d 1371, 1375 (9th