United States District Court, S.D. California
REPORT AND RECOMMENDTION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. 2]
Peter C. Lewis United States Magistrate Judge
William Nible (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner,
has filed a civil rights complaint alleging both federal and
state law claims arising from his incarceration at the
Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego. (Doc.
1.) Presently before this Court is Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint. (Doc. 2.)
Honorable Cynthia Bashant has referred the matter to the
undersigned Judge for Report and Recommendation pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 63(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule
72.1(c)(1)(d). After a thorough review of the pleadings and
supporting documents, this Court recommends the Motion to
Dismiss be GRANTED.
statement of facts is based entirely upon the allegations in
Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. 1.)
is an inmate currently housed at the Sierra Conservation
Center. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that on July 13,
2015, while incarcerated at R.J. Donovan Correctional
Facility, Plaintiff purchased approved religious artifacts,
runes, which were confiscated by prison guard Defendant Fink.
(Doc. 1 at 10-11.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Fink
told Plaintiff he was only allowed to possess five stones and
that they must be made of either tile, wood, or plastic.
(Doc. 1 at 11.) According to the Complaint, Plaintiff's
rune purchase was within the matrix of allowable property and
Defendant Fink unreasonably told Plaintiff that his runes
were not permitted. (Id.)
together the allegations scattered throughout the Complaint,
one or more of the Defendants improperly returned some, but
not all of the runes to the vendor. (Doc. 1 at 11-13, 24.)
Plaintiff alleges that under fear of retaliation, he
surrendered his runes to Defendant Fink, who then
misappropriated state funds to return the runes to the vendor
by a method other than that prescribed by law. (Id.
at 12-13.) The Compliant is silent as to how the runes'
return ran afoul of the law.
the Complaint does not include any prison grievance
documentation or specific reference to Plaintiff's
administrative remedies, causes of action 5 through 14 allude
to various defendants denying Plaintiff “his right to
petition for redress of a grievance” on August 18,
2015, September 12, 2015, November 5, 2015, February 2, 2016,
and April 6, 2016. (Doc. 1 at 17-25.)
sued in San Diego County Superior Court on August 3, 2016 and
Defendants removed the case to federal court on November 21,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency
of a Plaintiff's claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6);
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
Because Rule 12 focuses on the sufficiency of a claim rather
than the claim's substantive merits, “a court may
[ordinarily] look only at the face of the complaint to decide
a motion to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News
Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).
motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff fails to
proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In order to overcome
a motion to dismiss request, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter such that it states a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 548.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Cahil v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38
(9th Cir. 1996). The court is not required to accept legal
conclusions in the form of factual allegations if the
conclusions detailed cannot be reasonably drawn from the
facts put forth. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18
F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on motion to dismiss,
court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 does not require