United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
HONORABLE KENLY KIYA KATO United States Magistrate Judge.
Vicki Corona (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint
(“Complaint”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“Section 1983”) alleging defendants City of Los
Angeles, Eric Garcetti, and Does 1 through 10
(“Defendants”) violated her Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also raises state law
claims, as well as violations of Sections 80.07 and 80.10 of
the Los Angeles Municipal Code. As discussed below, the Court
dismisses the Complaint with leave to amend.
IN THE COMPLAINT
April 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to
Section 1983 against Defendants. ECF Docket No.
(“Dkt.”) 1. According to the Complaint, in
January 2017, defendant Garcetti issued Ordinance # 184590
(“Ordinance”), which Plaintiff alleges is
“discriminatory” and “wages war against the
homeless through widespread deceit, fraud, misconduct,
extortion, and misrepresentations of the Supreme Law of the
Land.” Id. at 1, 3. Plaintiff alleges that
because of the “national economic downturn during the
last few years, ” many individuals have been forced
“to make their car their home.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges the Ordinance targets this “specific
group of vulnerable people, forbidding them to park within
500 feet of a park, school, or daycare center at all times,
as well as residential streets between 9 PM and 8 AM.”
Id. at 3. Plaintiff further alleges those targeted
by the Ordinance “were promised safe, parking spots,
yet no such designated lots or space exist.”
Id. Plaintiff claims, as a result of the Ordinance,
people “are being criminalized, bullied, discriminated
against, harassed, displaced, threatened, and thrown into
isolated, obscure, unfamiliar, outlying areas of the
CITY.” Id. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the
Ordinance places her, as a single female, “into
unimaginable danger and severely limits or denies her access
to places essential to her work and well-being.”
alleges the Ordinance violates her due process right under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it deprives her
of her “right to be secure in her property” by
“destroy[ing] its value” and “restrict[ing]
or interrup[ing] its common, necessary or profitable
use.” Id. at 5. Additionally, Plaintiff
alleges the Ordinance infringes upon her right “to
travel and park without licensing, registration, etc.”
Id. at 6. Plaintiff also claims the Ordinance
violates her Fourth Amendment right because it “allows
government employees to peer through car windows to determine
if someone is living therein.” Id. Plaintiff
additionally alleges the Ordinances impairs her
“freedom to travel and park without licensing,
registration, etc.” Id. at 6. Lastly,
Plaintiff appears to allege a violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because the Ordinance
specifically targets homeless individuals living in their
car. Id. at 3, 6.
additionally raises state law claims for (1) fraud because
her car does not fall under the definition of “motor
vehicle” and thus is not subject to the Ordinance; and
(2) extortion because the Ordinance threatens fines and force
for “infractions which are not crime and are not
arrestable offenses.” Id. at 8, 10. Lastly,
Plaintiff claims the Ordinance violates Sections 80.07 and
80.10 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, which require sign
postings to inform Los Angeles residents of the Ordinance.
Id. at 7-11.
result of these claims, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and
$500, 000 in punitive damages. Id. at 13.
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court
must screen the Complaint and is required to dismiss the case
at any time if it concludes the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th
determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for
screening purposes, the Court applies the same pleading
standard from Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Rule 8”) as it would when evaluating a motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
2012). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim
“where there is no cognizable legal theory or an
absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable
legal theory.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990,
996 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering
whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as
true all of the material factual allegations in it.
Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir.
2011). However, the court need not accept as true
“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted
deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In
re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Although a complaint need not
include detailed factual allegations, it “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). A claim is facially
plausible when it “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Cook, 637 F.3d at 1004
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,
and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Woods v. Carey,
525 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
“[W]e have an obligation where the p[laintiff] is pro
se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the
pleadings liberally and to afford ...