United States District Court, S.D. California
GREYSTONE HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC., a California Non-Profit 501(c)(3) Corporation, Plaintiff,
FANTASY HOLDINGS, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; NARONGYOS SANTADSIN, an Individual; DOES 1 THROUGH 10, inclusive, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DISMISSING ACTION WITH
PREJUDICE (DOC. NO. 28)
ANTHONY J. BATTAGLIA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is Defendants Fantasy Holdings, LLC's
(“Fantasy”) and Narongyos Santadsin's
“Defendants”) motion to dismiss the amended
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue,
and insufficient service of process and, alternatively, to
transfer venue. (Doc. No. 28.) Plaintiff Greystone Housing
Foundation, Inc. (“Greystone”) opposes the
motion. (Doc. No. 46.) Having reviewed the parties' legal
arguments in light of controlling legal authority, and
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the
matter suitable for decision on the papers, without oral
argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS
Defendants' motion and DISMISSES this case WITH
dispute arises from Defendants' alleged failure to repay
monies borrowed pursuant to a promissory note
(“note”) that named Greystone as the payee.
Greystone is a California non-profit corporation with its
principal place of business in San Diego, California. (Doc.
No. 26 ¶ 1.) Fantasy is an Arizona limited liability
company with its principal place of business in Phoenix,
Arizona. (Id. ¶ 2.) Santadsin is an individual
domiciled in Arizona. (Id. ¶ 3.) He is
Fantasy's manager and sole member. (Id. ¶
30, 2009, Defendants signed the note, through which they
borrowed $500, 000 from Greystone. (Id. ¶ 10;
Doc. No. 26-1 at 2.) Fantasy signed the note (through
Santadsin) as borrower; Santadsin signed the note as
guarantor. (Doc. No. 26 ¶ 10; Doc. No. 26-1 at 2.)
Fantasy agreed to make interest-only payments to non-party
Kent Casady (“Casady”) for five years, after
which the principal would become due and payable to
Greystone. (Doc. No. 26 ¶ 11; Doc. No. 26-1 at 2.)
Pursuant to the note, Greystone financed and disbursed the
funds to Defendants. (Doc. No. 26 ¶ 10.)
30, 2014, the note matured, and the entire $500, 000 became
due and payable. (Id. ¶ 12.) Defendants failed
to make this payment. (Id.; Doc. No. 28-2 ¶
14.) Because of this default, Greystone instituted this
lawsuit by filing the original complaint on February 5, 2016,
alleging contract-related claims. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendants
successfully moved to dismiss the original complaint for lack
of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. Nos. 5, 15.) On December 5,
2016, Greystone filed an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 26.)
Defendants move to dismiss this complaint, again asserting
lack of personal jurisdiction, as well as arguing improper
venue and insufficient service of process. (Doc. No. 28.) The
Court granted Greystone limited jurisdictional discovery to
assess the existence of personal jurisdiction over Defendants
in this case. (Doc. No. 32.) Following such discovery,
Greystone filed an opposition, and Defendants replied. (Doc.
Nos. 46, 47.) This order follows.
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is tested by a
two-part analysis.” Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions,
Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). The exercise
of jurisdiction must satisfy the requirements of both the
applicable state long-arm statute and federal due process.
Id. at 1404-05. California's long-arm statute is
coextensive with the limits of due process. Cal. Civ. Proc.
§ 410.10; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915,
923 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds as
recognized in Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d
1015 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the Court need only
consider the requirements of due process. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Co. v. British-Am. Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1441
(9th Cir. 1987).
process requires that a nonresident defendant have certain
minimum contacts with the forum state such that the exercise
of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This test may be
satisfied in one of two ways. Decker Coal Co. v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir.
1986). If the defendant's contacts with the forum state
are substantial or “continuous and systematic, ”
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984), the court may properly exercise
general jurisdiction over the defendant “even if the
cause of action is unrelated to the defendant's forum
activities, ” Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech.
Assocs., Inc.,, 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).
Where the defendant's contacts with the forum state will
not support the court's exercise of general jurisdiction,
“jurisdiction may nonetheless be proper as an assertion
of limited [i.e., specific] jurisdiction if there is
a strong relationship between the quality of the
defendant's forum contacts and the cause of
action.” Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 839
(citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Unocal
Corp., 248 F.3d at 922. On a motion to dismiss, the
Court may decide the issue of personal jurisdiction on the
basis of affidavits and documentary evidence by the parties,
or hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the matter. See
Data Disc, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1285. If the motion is
based on the former, the plaintiff need only make a prima
facie showing of facts establishing personal jurisdiction.
Id. Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are
accepted as true, and conflicts between parties over
statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the
plaintiff's favor. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at
seek dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), (3), and (5) for
lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and
insufficient service of process, respectively. (Doc. No. 28.)
Alternatively, Defendants ask the Court to transfer this case
to the District of Arizona under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to
cure venue or 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for the convenience of
the parties. (Id.) As explained below, the Court
finds it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants;
accordingly, the Court does not reach Defendants'
remaining arguments. Cf. Julio v. Wells Fargo Bank,
No. 11-CV-00696-LHK, 2011 WL 11048327, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July
21, 2011) (declining to reach defendant's personal
jurisdiction argument after dismissing action for improper
first argue that there is no general jurisdiction over them
because they are both domiciled in Arizona and otherwise do
not have the requisite contacts with California. (Doc. No.
28-1 at 8-9; Doc. No. 47 at 8-17.) Greystone responds that
Defendants do significant business in California through Kodi
Distributing, LLC (“Kodi”) and the operation of
the leluv.com website. (Doc. No. 46 at 11-16.)
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign
(sister-state or foreign-country) [defendants] to hear any
and all claims against them when their affiliations with the
State are so ‘continuous and systematic' as to
render them essentially at home in the forum State.”
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326
U.S. at 317). “This is an exacting standard, as it
should be, because a finding of general jurisdiction permits
a defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to
answer for any of its activities anywhere in the
world.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor
Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004).
jurisdiction over an individual is permissible only where he
has been served with process while voluntarily in the forum,
is domiciled in the forum, or consents to the court's
jurisdiction. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
564 U.S. 873, 880-81 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality); see
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). “With
respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and
principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases
for general jurisdiction.'” Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (citation omitted).
Outside of these paradigm bases, only “in an
exceptional case” should a ...