United States District Court, C.D. California
Ronaldus F.J. Evers
Losahn Robbins Staley Testamentary Trust Dated July 25, 1974
PRESENT THE HONORABLE DOLLY M. GEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
IN CHAMBERS-ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE
MOTION FOR PERMANENT AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER 
Ronaldus F.J. Evers filed the instant Motion for Permanent
and Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
(the “Motion”) against Defendant Losahn Robbins
Staley Testamentary Trust Dated July 25, 1974 (the
“Trust”). [Doc. # 1.] Evers alleges that he is
one of two owners of the property central to this action (the
“Property”), located at 1474 Old Woman Springs
Rd., Landers, CA 92285, and subject to an unlawful detainer
action and eviction order. Motion at 4, 5. A lock-out of the
Property is scheduled for May 18, 2017. Id. at 5.
Everts asserts that he will sustain irreparable damages
absent the issuance of a TRO. See Id. at 5-6.
reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES the action
without prejudice and DENIES the Motion as moot.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do
not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore
they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the
parties either overlook or elect not to press.”
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S.Ct.
1197, 1202 (2011) (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006)).
It is presumed that causes of action lie outside federal
courts' limited subject matter jurisdiction, and it is
the party asserting the court's subject matter
jurisdiction who bears the burden of establishing the
contrary. E.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
district court's subject matter jurisdiction may be based
on diversity of citizenship or federal question. District
courts have diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000” and
“is between citizens of different states.” 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The party asserting subject matter
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship must present
“summary-judgement-type evidence” relevant to the
amount in controversy and the citizenship of the parties.
Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117
(9th Cir. 2004); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265
F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] party seeking to
invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege
affirmatively the actual citizenship of the relevant
parties.”). Federal question jurisdiction occurs when
the action “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
“The presence or absence of federal-question
jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint
rule, ' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists
only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.”
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
did not submit a complaint. According to the civil cover
sheet in this action, he invokes this Court's subject
matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship.
See Doc. # 1-3. Evers is a California citizen.
See, e.g., Motion at 3. The Trust's citizenship
is unknown-neither the civil cover sheet, the Motion, nor the
80 pages attached thereto provide that information. In fact,
all events related to the Property and Evers' alleged
ownership interest in the Property appear to have occurred in
California. “Since the party asserting diversity
jurisdiction bears the burden of proof, [Evers'] failure
to specify [the Trust's] state citizenship [i]s fatal to
[his] assertion of diversity jurisdiction.”
Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857-58 (citation omitted).
Evers has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. The Motion states
that, at first, the unlawful detainer action indicated that
less than $10, 000 was at stake but was later changed to the
designation of an “unlimited” action with
“over $25, 000” at stake. Motion at 4. This is a
far cry from a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that more than $75, 000 is at issue.
extent Evers bases the action on a federal question, the
Motion-even when liberally construed as a complaint-raises
none. The Motion mentions two statutes in passing: 15 U.S.C.
section 1692 and 18 U.S.C. section 1623. See Motion
at 5. Section 1623 is a criminal statute that does not give
Evers a right of action. Section 1692 is a provision of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)
that, although appearing on the face of the Motion, does not
apply here. Specifically, Evers alleges that he paid $150
when he filed an unlawful detainer action. Id. When
his action never went to trial, “the courts . . .
violate[d] [his] rights under 15 U.S.C. [section] 1692 by
taking monies from [him] for something that was never
produced and/or delivered.” Id. These
allegations, even if true, do not give rise to a cause of
action under the FDCPA such that Evers' case arises under
Evers has failed to establish this Court's subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court therefore may not review the merits
of his claim for the issuance of a TRO.
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matter,
the action is DISMISSED without prejudice. Evers' ex