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Mood v. County of Orange

United States District Court, C.D. California

May 18, 2017

IVIN MOOD, Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF ORANGE, Defendants.

          ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

          HONORABLE KENLY KIYA KATO United States Magistrate Judge

         I.

         INTRODUCTION

         Plaintiff Ivin Mood (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint (“Complaint”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). While not entirely clear, it appears Plaintiff is suing defendants County of Orange and Orange County Jail Deputy D. Lopes in his official capacity (“Defendants”) for violations of Section 1983 as well as state law claims[1] arising out of an incident on April 30, 2016 at Santa Ana Central Jail. As discussed below, the Court dismisses the Complaint with leave to amend.

         II.

         ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

         On April 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to Section 1983. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the Orange County Sheriffs have a “customary practice of unnecessary misuse of force carried out for thrills alone.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges, on April 30, 2016, after being falsely arrested and brought to Santa Ana Central Jail, two deputies, including D. Lopes, “abused” Plaintiff and then placed him in a cell. Id. Plaintiff alleges the abuse he suffered was the same as the abuse described in a Los Angeles Times article whereby inmates are lifted by both arms, slammed “face first into a wall, they then bend the arm behind the persons back, and then they place the inmate in a separate cell.” Id. A few minutes later, the deputies “purposely” placed another inmate “who was acting wild from the drugs he was high on” in Plaintiff's cell “so that he would begin to fight with” Plaintiff, but Plaintiff “was able to ignore him.” Id. Plaintiff alleges he “did absolutely nothing to cause these deputies to cause me bodily injury.” Id.

         In addition, Plaintiff alleges one of the deputies “was trying to cover for what he did” by asking Plaintiff what he was charged with, where the arrest occurred, and whether Plaintiff was drunk. Id. Plaintiff also alleges he asked to speak to a civil rights representative because he felt he was falsely arrested and the jail clerks were not permitted to accept civil rights complaints at the booking window. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges his “constitutional injury” was the result of the “unlawful pattern or practice and falsified reports of alleged resisting arrest claims.” Id. at 6.

         As a result of these claims, Plaintiff seeks $100, 000 in compensatory and punitive damages as well as an injunction “warning the defendants that repeated actions of this kind will cause an additional claim for Constitutional claims award relating to contempt and conspiracy to cause intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id.

         III.

         STANDARD OF REVIEW

         As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the Complaint and is required to dismiss the case at any time if it concludes the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).

         In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for screening purposes, the Court applies the same pleading standard from Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 8”) as it would when evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).

         A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim “where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all of the material factual allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the court need not accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Although a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 ...


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