United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 
D. WRIGHT, II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
litigation has been a long exercise in whittling down
Plaintiff's claims, and now, Defendants make their case
for dismissing Plaintiff's remaining cause of action.
(ECF No. 68.) Plaintiffs have opposed Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 69), and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF
No. 71). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS
Defendants' Motion and dismisses what remains of
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
case is about the legality of the City of Santa Monica's
adoption of a 2015 ordinance banning certain types of
vacation rentals within the city. Santa Monica is a popular
tourist destination, and Plaintiff wishes to rent out her
home as a vacation rental to generate income. (See
First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 55-56.)
Since Defendants passed the Ordinance, she has not been able
to do so. (Id. ¶ 56.) Plaintiff also purports
to represent a class of all residential property owners in
the City of Santa Monica, as they are likewise kept from
renting their homes on sites like Airbnb, VRBO, and HomeAway.
(See Id. ¶ 57.) The ordinance at issue bans
“vacation rentals” of residential property
(leasing an entire property on a short-term basis) but allows
“home sharing” (renting a private room within a
host's home, with the host present in other portions of
the home during the stay). (Id. ¶¶
filed her putative class action Complaint on June 21, 2016,
and Defendants first moved to dismiss on September 18, 2016.
(ECF Nos. 1, 26.) The Court granted Defendants' first
motion in its entirety. (ECF No. 51.) The Court granted leave
to amend, and Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
alleging four causes of action: violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution;
declaratory relief; deprivation of constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and violation of the California
Coastal Act. (See generally FAC, ECF No. 52.) The
California Coastal Act claim was the only new cause of action
as compared with the original complaint. (See
Compl., ECF No. 3; FAC.)
Plaintiff's filing of her FAC, Defendants again moved to
dismiss. (ECF No. 56.) On March 30, 2017, the Court granted
in part and denied in part Defendants' motion: it
dismissed the constitutional causes of action but not the
claim for violation of the California Coastal Act. (ECF No.
67.) The Court found in its Order that Plaintiff had
adequately pleaded two separate bases for violations of the
Act. (Order 9-10.)
basis that Plaintiff's complaint now contains only state
law claims that should not properly remain in federal court,
Defendants request that the Court dismiss the remaining cause
complaint in federal court includes both federal claims and
state law claims, and the federal claims are dismissed before
trial, the district court has discretion regarding whether to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims or
dismiss them in favor of state court. Acri v. Varian
Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997);
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635,
640 (2009). However, where other factors do not support the
state law claims remaining in federal court, the general
preference is for the district court to dismiss those claims.
Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir.
1991); Wren v. Sletten Const. Co., 654 F.2d 529, 536
(9th Cir. 1981).
raises several points in opposing dismissal. First, Plaintiff
argues that Defendants' motion is an improper successive
motion to dismiss, given that the Court already ruled on a
motion to dismiss the same operative complaint. (Opp'n
4.) However, the Court agrees with Defendants that although
Plaintiff has not filed a second amended complaint, her
complaint is constructively different from the one the Court
addressed in its last Order. (See Reply 2.) This is
because new jurisdictional issues arose when the Court
dismissed all of Plaintiff's federal claims. Moreover,
Plaintiff fails to cite a rule stating that a Defendant
cannot bring more than one motion to dismiss on the same
complaint. Plaintiffs cite Rule 12(g)(2), which actually
states that “a party must not make [a second] motion .
. . raising a defense or objection that was
available to the party but omitted from its earlier
motion” (emphasis added). When Defendants submitted
their first motion to dismiss this version of the complaint,
the Court had not yet dismissed the federal claims, and so
arguments based on that dismissal were not available at that
Plaintiff cites several cases illustrating examples of
district courts retaining state law claims, including Coastal
Act claims, after dismissing federal causes of action.
(Opp'n 4-5); see, e.g., Headlands Reserve,
LLC v. Ctr. for Nat. Lands Mgmt., 523 F.Supp.2d 1113,
1120 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Spencer v. Lunada Bay Boys,
No. CV 16-02129 SJO (RAOx), 2016 WL 6818757, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
July 22, 2016). Plaintiff urges the Court to find similarly
to the above-cited cases and keep this case in federal court.
While the Court agrees that it has the discretion to
keep Plaintiff's state law claims in federal court, it is
simply not prudent to do so. Defendants have not yet filed an
Answer and discovery has not commenced. As such, other than
the case having been originally filed here, there do not
appear to be any factors supporting its retention in federal
court given that only state law claims remain. Plaintiff
selects district court cases, some of which are unpublished,
as examples of courts exercising their discretion to keep
purely state law cases, but she cannot overcome the Supreme
Court's overall rule that “if  federal claims are
dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be
dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Plaintiff argues that she could seek leave to amend in order
to add new federal claims to her complaint. (Opp'n 5.)
True, but she has not done so in the nearly two months since
all of her federal claims were dismissed. The Court can only
rule on the ...