United States District Court, C.D. California
Present: Honorable MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. District Judge
(In Chambers): ORDER RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS ; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND CASE 
the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed on
March 14, 2017. (“Motion to Dismiss, ” Docket No.
13). Plaintiff filed an Opposition on March 27, 2017. (Docket
No. 15). Defendant filed a Reply on April 3, 2017. (Docket
addition, on April 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion to
Remand. (“Motion to Remand, ” Docket No. 23).
Defendant filed an Opposition. (Docket No. 24).
Court has read and considered the filings and held a hearing
on June 5, 2017. For the reasons stated below the Motion to
Remand is DENIED and the Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED in its entirety with
leave to amend.
Adolfo Estrada was employed by Defendant as a Human Resources
Generalist from September 2014 to August 2015, when he was
terminated. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”),
Docket No. 11, ¶¶ 9-10). Plaintiff asserts he was
never provided training or guidance with regard to
Defendant's policies and procedures. (Id. ¶
11). Plaintiff's supervisor told him in a meeting in
December 2014 that he had been hired because he was a man and
the supervisor wanted to reduce the “cattiness”
of the office. (Id. ¶ 12). That particular
supervisor resigned a few weeks later. After that Plaintiff
began noticing his new supervisor, a female, was
“acting biased towards him compared to his female
co-workers.” (Id. ¶ 15). When Plaintiff
asked this supervisor with help completing his large amount
of work she refused.
alleges that the supervisor began increasingly assigning him
work as a result of his gender, and that he was the only male
in the entire human resources department. (Id.
¶ 17). As a result of being the only male he was given
more work than his female coworkers.
Plaintiff suffered an injury at work in February 2015, and
subsequently filed a workers' compensation claim, the
discrimination against him increased. In March 2015 his
supervisor told him that he needed to look for other
positions within the company or else resign within 90 days.
(Id. ¶ 20). Plaintiff filed a formal complaint
concerning his supervisor's discriminatory conduct.
(Id. ¶ 22). He never received a response.
was placed on a 60-day performance improvement plan
(“PIP”) on April 21, 2015. (Id. ¶
23). A few weeks later Plaintiff's father died and he
submitted a request to use his forty hours of accrued
vacation time. Upon his return, however, he discovered his
supervisor had given him credit for only two days of paid
leave, instead of the five he had requested.
met with his supervisor every two weeks to discuss his PIP,
but he refused to sign the PIP because he disagreed with his
supervisor's comments regarding his performance.
(Id. ¶ 28). In June 2015 Plaintiff was told he
was required to work the graveyard shift or else resign.
(Id. ¶ 30).
2, 2015, Plaintiff felt face and arm numbness while at work.
He feared he was experiencing a heart attack or stroke and
asked a manager if he could go to the hospital immediately.
The manager denied the request and told Plaintiff to write a
report. Plaintiff then asked Defendant's Finance Manager
and Safety Director if he could go to the hospital and his
request was granted. He was informed at the hospital that he
had suffered a mild stroke. (Id. ¶ 32).
his hospital visit Plaintiff learned that he was suspended
for job abandonment and he should not return to work.
(Id. ¶ 33). He filed another workers'
compensation claim. Plaintiff was allowed to return to the
office to work the graveyard shift. (Id. ¶ 35).
On August 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed another workers'
compensation claim. (Id. ¶ 37). On that same
day he was terminated by Defendant due to a lack of
improvement during his PIP.
and his wife filed the operative FAC on February 28, 2017,
alleging claims of wrongful termination, gender
discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation,
failure to prevent discrimination, and loss of consortium.
Motion to Remand
threshold requirement for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441
is a “finding that the complaint . . . is within the
original jurisdiction of the district court.”
Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 340 F.3d 858, 861
(9th Cir. 2003). In most circumstances, “federal
district courts have jurisdiction over suits for more than
$75, 000 where the citizenship of each plaintiff is different
from that of each defendant.” Hunter v. Philip
Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). “The strong presumption
against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always
has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.
Motion to Remand argues that Defendant Gate Gourmet is
actually a citizen of California, and accordingly diversity
jurisdiction does not exist here.
points to a printout from Defendant's website showing
offices in California (as well as Georgia, Massachusetts,
Canada, Illinois, Ohio, Texas, Michigan, Florida, Hawaii,
Indiana, Nevada, Tennessee, New Jersey, Louisiana, Missouri,
Washington, and Virginia). (Ex. 3 to Motion to Remand).
Plaintiff also notes that Defendant has been named a
defendant in at least eight employment suits in California