United States District Court, C.D. California
Present: The Honorable MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. District
(In Chambers): ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND 
the Court is Plaintiff Jonathan Chuang's Motion to Remand
(the “Motion”), filed April 7, 2017. (Docket No.
27). Defendants Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., Mott's
LLP, and General Mills, Inc. (collectively,
“Mott's”) filed their Opposition on May 1,
2017. (Docket No. 28). On May 12, 2017, Plaintiff replied.
(Docket No. 35). The Court has reviewed and considered the
papers submitted on the Motion and held a hearing on June 5,
Motion is DENIED. The Court has jurisdiction over each of
Plaintiff's claims, and thus remand is inappropriate.
filed this putative class action in Los Angeles County
Superior Court on February 6, 2017, alleging that Mott's
misrepresented the fruit content and nutritional qualities of
Mott's brand fruit snacks. (Notice of Removal (Docket No.
1), Ex. 1 (“Complaint”) (Docket No. 1-1)). On
March 8, 2017, Mott's removed the action to this Court
under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(“CAFA”). (Notice of Removal at 3). Plaintiff now
seeks to remand any claims for which the Court concludes that
Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. (Mot. at 6).
CAFA, the Court has “original jurisdiction of any civil
action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $5, 000, 000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
is a class action in which” there is minimal diversity.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The parties do not contest that
the removed action meets either of CAFA's basic
Plaintiff contends that the Court may conclude at
some future date that Plaintiff lacks standing, under Article
III of the Constitution, to request injunctive relief for his
false advertising claims. (Mot. at 6). Accordingly, Plaintiff
seeks a remand of the entire action to the Superior Court;
barring that, Plaintiff seeks a partial remand of those
claims over which the Court lacks jurisdiction. (Id.
establish Article III standing, “a plaintiff must show
(1) [she] has suffered an ‘injury in fact' that is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3)
it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC)
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). “Standing
exists if at least one named plaintiff meets the
requirements.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2011).
Ninth Circuit, courts are split as to whether plaintiffs in
false advertising actions lack standing to pursue injunctive
relief. See Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. SA CV
12-0215 FMO, 2015 WL 1526559, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23,
2015) (describing the split). “In some cases, courts
have denied standing to seek an injunction for consumers who
have been deceived by false advertising based on the notion
that the consumer's knowledge makes it unlikely that they
will be deceived again, ” whereas other “courts
have found standing because it would prevent federal courts
from enjoining false advertising under California's
consumer protection laws . . . .” Id. at
contends that the action should be remanded because this
Court might conclude that Plaintiff lacks standing
to pursue injunctive relief. In a sense, Plaintiff's
argument puts the cart before the horse: the Court has not
yet determined whether Plaintiff has standing to pursue
injunctive relief, and thus Plaintiff has no basis from which
to contend that any claim should be remanded for lack of
assuming that the Court would agree that Plaintiff lacks
standing to pursue his request for injunctive relief,
however, remand would be inappropriate. In Lee v.
American National Insurance Co., 260 F.3d 997 (9th Cir.
2001), the Ninth Circuit explained that “the presence
of at least some claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction is sufficient to allow removal of an
entire case, even if others of the claims alleged are beyond
the district court's power to decide.” Id.
at 1002-03. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's refusal to remand an action over which
the court had subject matter jurisdiction over at least some
of the claims. Id. at 1007. Here, the Court has
jurisdiction at least over Plaintiff's request for
damages. Plaintiff's request that the Court remand the
action in its entirety because the Court might
conclude, but has not yet concluded, that Plaintiff lacks
standing to pursue an injunction is precluded under
the Court may not remand only the request for injunctive
relief. The Court has considered this very issue in a similar
case: Cabral v. Supple, LLC, No.
EDCV-12-00085-MWF(OPx), 2016 WL 1180143 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24,
2016) (slip op.). In Cabral, as here, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant's advertisements mislead
consumers and sought a partial remand under the theory that
she may have been foreclosed from seeking injunctive relief
in federal court. Id. at *1-2. The Court determined
that the plaintiff was not entitled even to a partial remand
because, in part, “Plaintiff is seeking not to remand a
claim but to remand a specific
remedy” and “[n]either
the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) [statute outlining
procedure for remand] nor the policies underlying CAFA
support such ...