Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Ramirez-Contreras v. Sessions

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

June 8, 2017

Moises Ramirez-Contreras, Petitioner,
v.
Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney General, Respondent.

          Submitted February 6, 2017 [*] Pasadena, California

         On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A077-301-159.

          Angelica Navarro Sigala and John R. Alcorn, Law Offices of John R. Alcorn, Irvine, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

          Corey L. Farrell, Attorney; Greg D. Mack, Senior Litigation Counsel; Joyce R. Branda, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent-Appellee.

          Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Andre M. Davis, [**] and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

         SUMMARY [***]

         Immigration

         The panel granted Ramirez-Contreras's petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision concluding that his conviction for fleeing from a police officer under California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that rendered him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.

         In holding that Ramirez-Contreras's conviction is not a crime of moral turpitude, the panel accorded minimal deference to the BIA's decision due to flaws in its reasoning.

         Applying the categorical approach, the panel viewed the least of the acts criminalized under California Vehicle Code § 2800.2, and concluded that an individual can be convicted under subsection (b) for eluding police while committing three traffic violations that cannot be characterized as "vile or depraved." Therefore, the panel held that California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 is not a crime of moral turpitude because the conduct criminalized does not necessarily create the risk of harm that characterizes a crime of moral turpitude.

         The panel also held that the modified categorical approach does not apply because the elements of California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 are clearly indivisible.

          OPINION

          SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

         We deal once again with the question of whether a crime of conviction supporting an order of removal was a crime of moral turpitude. Such a conviction renders noncitizens statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). In this case, Petitioner Moises Ramirez-Contreras was convicted under California law for fleeing from a police officer. The California statute under which he was convicted is similar to many other statutes in that it criminalizes willful flight while driving in a wanton or reckless manner. It is unusual, however, in that it defines such conduct as including driving while violating traffic laws, some of which would not rise to a level of seriousness to qualify as a crime of moral turpitude. Because the test is whether all of the conduct covered by the statute was turpetudinous, we grant the petition.

         The California statute is in two parts, with part (a) providing the elements of the crime and part (b) defining the "willful or ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.