United States District Court, C.D. California
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE.
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
(IN CHAMBERS): ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND 
the Court is Plaintiff Omran Hamid's
(“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand
(“Motion”) (Dkt. 13). The Court finds this matter
appropriate for resolution without oral argument.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; L.R. 7-15. Having reviewed the papers and
considered the parties' arguments, the Court hereby
DENIES Plaintiff's Motion.
February 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action in state
court. See Notice of Removal (Dkt. 1) Ex. A at 1. In
the operative complaint, the First Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff brings causes of action against Defendants Nike
Retail Serivces, Inc. (“Nike”); R.J. Hill
(“Hill”); and Rianna Marie Lopez
“Defendants”) for (1) unlawful collection or
receipt of wages due under California Labor Code §§
221, 224, 225; (2) failure to indemnify for expenditures
incurred in discharge of duties under California Labor Code
§ 2802; (3) illegal terms of employment under California
Labor Code § 432.5; (4) failure to pay all wages due to
discharged or quitting employees under California Labor Code
§§ 201-03; (5) failure to furnish itemized
statements under California Labor Code §§ 226,
246(i); (6) failure to provide paid sick days under
California Labor Code §§ 245.5-49; (7) failure to
maintain records under California Labor Code §§
558, 1174, 1174.5, 274.5(a); (8) failure to provide seats
under California Labor Code § 1198, Industrial Welfare
Commission Order No. 7 § 14; (9) failure to furnish safe
and healthful employment and place of employment under
California Labor Code §§ 6400, 6401, 6306, 6403,
6407; (10) failure to pay minimum wage under California Labor
Code §§ 1197, 1194, 1194.2, 1197.1; and(11)
coercion under California Labor Code § 450. Notice of
Removal Ex. B (“FAC”). Plaintiff further seeks:
(12) injunctive relief; (13) penalties under the Private
Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) under California
Labor Code § 2699 et seq.; and (14) penalties
under California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)
under California Business & Professions Code § 17200
et seq. Notice of Removal Ex. B (“FAC”).
April 3, 2017, Defendant removed the case to this Court,
invoking this Court's original jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d). See Notice of Removal ¶ 9.
an Oregon corporation, Hill is a Colorado resident, and Lopez
is a California resident. FAC ¶¶ 4-6. Plaintiff is
a California resident. Id. ¶ 2.
is a “Retail District Director” employed by Nike,
and Plaintiff contends that she directly oversaw, controlled,
and managed multi-store operations and exerscised
“significant control” over putative class members
“overall working conditions.” Id. ¶
6. Plaintiff further alleges that Lopez “permitted,
authorized, approved, and ratified” the labor law
violations that putative class members suffered. Id.
Plaintiff also provides a job description for Lopez:
Nike's Retail District Directors are held by Nike to be
“accountable for the overall leadership and people
management of the district, including human resource
planning, proactively recruiting and hiring top talent,
training and development, managing performance, rewards and
recognition programs, succession and career planning,
coaching and counseling.” NIKE Stores - Retail District
Director, Job Description, ID 822758.
Id. ¶ 8.
filed the instant Motion on April 3, 2017. Plaintiffs opposed
on April 22, 2017 (Dkt. 16), and Defendants replied on April
26, 2017 (Dkt. 17).
at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal
of a case from state to federal court is governed by 28
U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in pertinent part that
“any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.” The removing
defendant must file a notice of removal in the appropriate
United States District Court, together with all process,
pleadings, and orders served upon the defendant. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(a). Notice of removal must be filed within 30
days of receiving a copy of the original complaint, or
“within 30 days after the service of summons upon the
defendant, if such initial pleading has then been filed in
court and is not required to be served on the defendant,
whichever period is shorter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
Remand may be ordered for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
or any defect in the removal procedure. 28 U.S.C. §
applies to class action lawsuits in which the proposed class
has at least 100 members and the primary defendants are not a
“States, State officials, or other governmental
entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed
from ordering relief.” § 1332(d)(5). A federal
district court has original jurisdiction over such class
actions if the amount in controversy exceeds $5, 000, 000 and
any plaintiff is diverse from any defendant. §
1332(d)(2), (5); Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478
F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007). Under CAFA, “the
burden of establishing removal jurisdiction remains . . . on
the proponent of federal jurisdiction.” Abrego
Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir.
statute, there are two sets of circumstances under which a
district court must decline to exercise jurisdiction over a
class action it has CAFA jurisdiction over: the “local
controversy” and “home-state controversy”
exceptions. See § 1332(d)(3)-(4). Once it is
established that a court has jurisdiction under CAFA,
“the objecting party bears the burden of proof as to
the applicability of any express statutory exception . . .
.” Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1024.
to protect the jurisdiction of state courts, removal
jurisdiction should be strictly construed in favor of remand.
Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689,
698 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp.
v. Sheet, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941)). However,
“no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking
CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of
certain class actions in federal court.” Dart
Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct.
547, 554 (2014); see also S. Rep. No. 109-14, p. 43
(2005) (noting CAFA's “provisions should be read
broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class
actions should be heard in a federal court if properly
removed by any defendant.”).
Defendants argue that this Court has original jurisdiction
under CAFA. See Notice of Removal ¶ 9.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants have failed to show that
this action meets CAFA's amount in controversy
requirement. Mot. at 14. Further, Plaintiff argues that even
if this Court has jurisdiction, it is required to decline to
exercise it because of either the local controversy exception
or the home state controversy exception. Mot. at 3, 13.
not a suit against a State, State official, or other
governmental entity. Nike has offered evidence, and
Plaintiffs do not appear to contest, that there are 10, 030
putative class members. See Declaration of Steven
Nelson (“Nelson Decl.”) ¶ 6. Accordingly,
CAFA is applicable here. See § 1332(d)(5).
this Court can exercise original jurisdiction under CAFA,
Defendants must demonstrate that CAFA's diversity and
amount in controversy requirements are met. See Abrego
Abrego, 443 F.3d at 685.
diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is
“deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign
state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or
foreign state where it has its principal place of
business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The phrase
“principal place of business” refers to the place
where the corporation's high level officers direct,
control, and coordinate the corporation's activities.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2010).
Nike is incorporated under the laws of Oregon and has ...