United States District Court, E.D. California
August 23, 2016, Charles Billingsley, proceeding pro se,
moved to terminate his supervised release, which began on
November 11, 2014. Mot., ECF No. 82. The United States
opposed the motion. Opp'n, ECF No. 84. The court held a
hearing on December 21, 2016, at which Billingsley appeared
pro se and Richard Bender appeared for the United States. The
court GRANTED the motion from the bench at hearing. The
following order explains the reasons for the court's
pled guilty on September 11, 2003, to one count of Possession
of a Firearm During a Trafficking Offense, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924, and one count of Possession of Equipment
Used to Manufacture a Controlled Substance, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6). ECF No. 41. The court sentenced
Billingsley on December 23, 2003, to a term of 180 months of
imprisonment followed by 60 months of supervised release.
Id. The court also imposed a $200 special assessment
and further recommended Billingsley participate in the
500Hour Bureau of Prisons Substance Abuse Treatment Program
(RDAP). Id. at 2, 5.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the court may terminate a term of
supervised release after the expiration of one year of
supervised release if it is “satisfied that such action
is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the
interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).
“[T]he language of § 3583(e) gives district courts
broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion to
terminate supervised release.” United States v.
Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing
United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 557 (9th Cir.
2006)). “The expansive phrases ‘conduct of the
defendant' and ‘interest of justice' make clear
that a district court enjoys discretion to consider a wide
range of circumstances when determining whether to grant
early termination.” Emmett, 749 F.3d at 819.
Nonetheless, “[a] district court's duty to explain
its sentencing decisions must also extend to requests for
early termination of supervised release.” Id.
It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate termination
of supervised release is justified. Weber, 451 F.3d
at 559 n.9 (citing United States v. Weintraub, 371
F.Supp.2d 164, 167 (D. Conn. 2005); United States v.
McKay, 352 F.Supp.2d 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
determining whether termination is warranted, the statute
directs the court to consider several factors relevant to
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553:
1.) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant, 18 U.S.C.
2.) the need for the sentence imposed--to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct . . ., 18 U.S.C. §
3.) the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. §
4.) the need for the sentence imposed and to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D);
5.) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
established for . . . the applicable category of offense
committed by the applicable category of defendant as set
forth in the guidelines . . . in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced . . ., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4);
6.) any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the
Sentencing Commission . . . in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5);
7.) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); and
8.) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7); 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e). In deciding whether to terminate a term of