United States District Court, S.D. California
CARLY HECK, an individual; SARA LUND, an individual; and ALLY ORTANEZ, an individual, Plaintiffs,
HEAVENLY COUTURE, INC., a California Corporation, Defendant.
ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION [DOC. NOS. 10 AND 11]
Cathy Ann Bencivengo United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court on Heavenly Couture's motion
to dismiss [Doc. No. 10] and motion for an order compelling
arbitration and/or immediately staying civil action [Doc. No.
11]. The motions have been fully briefed and the Court deems
them suitable for submission without oral argument. For the
reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is
GRANTED with leave to amend as to the FLSA
claim, and the motion to compel arbitration and/or stay civil
action is deemed moot and DENIED without
prejudice. The Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over, and dismisses without prejudice to filing
in state court, Plaintiffs' state law claims.
Carly Heck, Sara Lund, and Ally Ortanez (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) bring this hybrid collective action
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201,
et seq. (“FLSA”), and a class action,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”)
Rule 23 for violations of California state law. Plaintiffs
also bring a representative action for enforcement of
California's Private Attorneys General Act
(“PAGA”). Plaintiffs were non-exempt, hourly,
in-store employees of Defendant Heavenly Couture, Inc., a
California corporation which operates a chain of retail
clothing stores. Plaintiffs allege Defendant forced
Plaintiffs to work uncompensated regular and overtime hours.
Plaintiffs also allege Defendant failed to provide
state-law-mandated meal and rest breaks, and that Defendant
attempted to conceal such conduct by failing to provide
accurate wage statements. Plaintiffs allege Defendant
maintains a policy requiring employees to work off the clock
during breaks and meal periods, and that Defendant failed to
compensate Plaintiffs for overtime hours worked as required
by FLSA and California law. Plaintiffs allege Defendant's
employment practices are in violation of the FLSA, the Code
of Federal Regulations, the California Labor Code, the
California Code of Regulations, California Industrial Wage
Commission Wage Orders, and California's Unfair
Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200,
originally filed this action in the San Diego Superior Court
on October 11, 2016. Defendant filed a motion to compel
arbitration in that action on January 13, 2017. [Doc. No.
11-2, ¶2.] Prior to the hearing scheduled for February
10, 2017 on that motion, the Plaintiffs dismissed their state
court action without prejudice on January 31, 2017. [Doc. No.
11-2, ¶¶3-5.] Plaintiffs subsequently filed the
current action in this Court on the same day with the
additional cause of action under the FLSA.
argues that the Plaintiffs' cause of action under the
FLSA should be dismissed because Plaintiffs “fail to
allege any specific facts regarding which plaintiff
supposedly worked off-the-clock, on what occasions and for
how long.” [Doc. No. 10-1 at 8.] Defendant also argues
that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' California state law
claims. [Doc. No. 10-1 at 10.] Defendant argues that the
Plaintiffs' “state law claims and federal claim do
not arise from a common nucleus of operative fact.”
[Doc. No. 10-1 at 11.] Defendant alleges that the only
connection between the Plaintiffs' state law claims and
federal claim is that both derive from the Plaintiffs'
employment relationship with the Defendant. Defendant also
asserts that Plaintiffs' state law claims substantially
predominate over their federal claim. [Doc. No. 10-1 at 13.]
MOTION TO DISMISS
survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, the Court
“accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true
and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.
2008). On the other hand, the Court is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see
also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th
Cir. 2001) (“Conclusory allegations of law are
insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss”). Nor is
the Court “required to accept as true allegations that
contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or . . .
allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted
deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”
Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d
992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). “In sum, for a complaint to
survive a [12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory
factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content,
must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the
plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations
U.S.C. Section 1367 provides in pertinent part that:
“district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Even when claims are so related to claims within the original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy, federal district courts are not always required
to entertain them. Thus, the statute expressly provides that
district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law;
(2) The claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the court has ...