United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE United States Magistrate Judge.
the Court is Defendant CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc.'s
(“Defendant”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Nora
Ledesma's (“Plaintiff”) complaint and to
strike Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief,
disgorgement, and attorneys' fees. For the reasons
discussed below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff's amended complaint shall be due by July 18,
complaint alleges as follows. Plaintiff brings claims as an
employee against her former employer. Dkt. 1, Ex. 3
(“Cmpl.”) ¶ 1. She was employed by Defendant
as a truck driver for approximately 11 years until her
termination in 2014. Id. ¶ 13-14. Throughout
that time, Plaintiff was an excellent employee and received
an award in 2012 for her work and safe driving. Id.
March 11, 2014, Defendant's dispatch office contacted
Plaintiff to see if she was available to pick up a load in
Victorville, CA. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff accepted
the assignment. Id. The next day, on March 12, 2014,
Plaintiff observed a weather advisory pursuant to which
high-profile vehicles were not advised in the Victorville, CA
area. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff contacted the
dispatcher and informed him that, due to inclement weather,
she was unable to go pick up the load. Id. ¶18.
The dispatcher advised Plaintiff that she was required to
complete the assignment, despite the inclement weather.
Id. Plaintiff reiterated that she could not complete
the assignment because it was too dangerous to do so.
then received a call from her immediate supervisor, Fleet
Manager Fernando Jimenez (“Jimenez”).
Id. ¶ 20. Like the dispatcher, Jimenez informed
Plaintiff that she was required to complete the assignment
because she had already accepted it and the trip was set.
Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff set off for San
Bernardino. Id. ¶ 21. She called the dispatcher
to notify him that she was en route. Id.
Plaintiff was driving, Jimenez called her. Id.
¶ 22. According to Jimenez, the dispatcher had informed
Jimenez that Plaintiff told the dispatcher that Jimenez had
forced Plaintiff to complete the assignment. Id.
Jimenez was furious and yelled at Plaintiff. Id. She
informed him that she was willing to complete the assignment,
but he responded that she should “just go home.”
Id. After arriving home, Jimenez notified Plaintiff
that she would be terminated. Id. ¶ 23.
Plaintiff requested another chance at employment, but Jimenez
filed her complaint on March 10, 2016 in Los Angeles County
Superior Court, bringing claims for (i) wrongful termination
in violation of California Labor Code Sections 6310 and 6311,
and (ii) unfair competition in violation of California
Business & Professions Code Section 17200. In connection
with her unfair competition claim, Plaintiff seeks
“preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, including
but not limited to orders that Defendant account for,
disgorge, and restore to Plaintiff the compensation
unlawfully withheld from her.” Cmpl. ¶ 38.
removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, which then transferred the action to
this Court. This case is related to putative class action
Valadez v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., Case No.
3:15-cv-05433-EDL. Defendant filed this motion to dismiss and
to strike on April 27, 2017, and the Court held a hearing on
June 13, 2017.
complaint will survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it contains “sufficient
factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
The court's “inquiry is limited to the allegations
in the complaint, which are accepted as true and construed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y
Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).
A court need not, however, accept as true the complaint's
“legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Id. at 679. Thus, a reviewing
court may begin “by identifying pleadings that, because
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Id.