United States District Court, E.D. California
SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND (ECF No. 8) THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE
BARBARA A. MCAULIFFE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
William Jones (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was
referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
filed an unsigned complaint in this action on September 19,
2016, (ECF No. 1), which was stricken with leave to file a
signed complaint on September 30, 2016, (ECF No. 7).
Plaintiff then filed a signed complaint on October 14, 2016,
(ECF No. 8), which is currently before the Court for
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against
an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion
thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or
malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),
(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a
plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts
“are not required to indulge unwarranted
inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive
screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible,
which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court
to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129
S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United
States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.
2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted
unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with
liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949
(quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
is currently housed at the California Substance Abuse
Treatment Facility (“SATF”) in Corcoran,
California. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1)
Stuart Sherman, the Warden at SATF; (2) D. Romeo, a staff
psychologist (Ph.D.) at SATF; (3) G. Martinez, a
“(CEO)A” at SATF; and (4) CDCR./// Plaintiff
alleges as follows: Plaintiff is a marine veteran with combat
related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).
Plaintiff came to prison due to a crime directly related to
his PTSD. In August 2015, Plaintiff was placed at
SATF. SATF offers rehabilitation programs for
domestic violence, drug rehabilitation, criminal thinking,
and reentry programs. There are hundreds of prisoners at SATF
who suffer from combat related PTSD, and there are no
programs, activity groups or services, or treatment courses
Sherman, as Warden at SATF State Prison, is in charge of the
institutional activities, and is aware of all the programs,
activities, and services required under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Under this Act, all
Americans with disabilities are ensured programs, activities,
and services. California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) claims that they are
understaffed and cannot provide PTSD treatment for veterans
with disabilities. CDCR only offers rehabilitation services
to non-disabled inmates.
was seen by mental health provider D. Romeo, and was only
offered ten minutes every 90 days where he was asked if he
was okay and was then “sent packing.” PTSD is
considered a factor in the crime Plaintiff committed, and
other inmates are given treatment classes to help them
reintegrate into the community. G. Martinez only offers
medication for treatment. They have the authority to
implement a course of action to help the hundreds of veterans
in CDCR. However, medical officials intentionally deny and/or
delay Plaintiff's access to treatment. Plaintiff's
PTSD is worsening, with hyper-vigilance, anxiety, flashbacks,
insomnia. This is worsened when Plaintiff was placed in the
kitchen, where there are extremely loud bangs from pots and
pans. Plaintiff was also placed in a confined space,
exacerbating his combat-related PTSD.
December 2, 2015, Plaintiff was placed in the kitchen as his
work assignment. Before Plaintiff was incarcerated, his PTSD
was known and he was receiving treatment and counseling
through the veterans for a few years, before seeing
improvements. Plaintiff was diagnosed with PTSD before being
brought to prison, and it is severely worsening his life and
future by being imprisoned with no available treatment.
Plaintiff's PTSD causes hyper alertness, bi-polar
disorder, and anxiety attacks when exposed to loud noises and
December 4, 2015, Plaintiff spoke with CCI Espenoza and was
told that he would have to speak with mental health to get a
job change, knowing his chronic medical condition and his
incarceration for a crime caused by this disorder is in fact
public and court record. Plaintiff then spoke with mental
health on December 10, 2015 about his work assignment.
is receiving medication but it only helps manage his
symptoms, and does little if anything to actually help to
improve his disorder. Plaintiff believes it to be cruel and
unusual punishment by CDCR to know of his disorder and yet
place him in an environment that caused him pain and
health, CDCR, Stuart Sherman, G. Martinez, D. Romeo, CCI
Espenoza, Dr. Hashemi (G-yard doctor) have all played a part
in Plaintiff's lack of treatment that has resulted in his
pain and suffering. This pain and suffering includes hyper
alertness, anxiety, combat related flashbacks, and insomnia.
Plaintiff's condition is worsening by the day. The longer
the inactions continue and no treatments are made available,
the worse Plaintiff becomes a threat to his own safety and to
the safety of others at SATF and in the outside world.
is seeking emergency injunctive relief, monetary damages,
punitive damages, and to be awarded therapy.
Deficiencies of Complaint
1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of
Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by
persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v.
Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long
v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
Cir. 2002). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection,
between each defendant's actions or omissions and a
violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California
Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75
(9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011).
allegations must demonstrate that each defendant personally
participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v.
Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This
requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient
to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572
F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
has failed to name certain persons, such as CCI Espenoza and
Dr. Hashemi, as defendants. Further, Plaintiff has made no
factual allegations regarding any actions or inactions by Dr.
Hashemi that violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
If Plaintiff wishes to proceed against these defendants, he
must name them as defendants, and allege sufficient facts
showing how each person acted or failed to act in violation
of his constitutionally-protected rights.