United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 30-DAY
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF No.
12) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL (ECF No. 13) THIRTY DAY DEADLINE
Reynaldo Solorzano is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
before the Court are (1) Plaintiff's motion for a 30-day
extension of time to file a second amended complaint (ECF No.
12), and (2) Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of
counsel (ECF No. 13), both filed on June 21, 2017.
seeks a 30-day extension of time to file a second amended
complaint, contending that he has requested information and
documentation to identify the Doe defendants in this action,
but is awaiting further information. (ECF No. 12.) Good cause
being shown, Plaintiff's request for an extension is
further states that he has been requesting information to
identify the Doe defendants, with some difficulty. He also
attaches documentation in support. The Court notes that it
appears Plaintiff has been provided information relevant to
the incident in which he claims he was battered on June 6,
2014. That information includes a general chrono, medical
report, ad-seg placement notice, classification chrono, and a
CDCR 128G form. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff is encouraged
to carefully review that documentation to attempt to
determine the identity of the Doe defendants.
is also reminded that although Doe pleadings are disfavored,
he will be afforded an opportunity to identify unknown
defendants through discovery, unless it is clear that
discovery will not reveal their identities or the complaint
must be dismissed for other reasons. Gillespie v.
Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980).
requests the appointment of counsel, asserting that he is
indigent, that his claim is meritorious, that a lawyer would
better enable him to obtain records regarding the incident
complained of, and that he has no legal training and a 9th
grade education with difficulty in comprehension, reading and
writing. (ECF No. 13.)
does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in
this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525
(9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require any attorney to
represent plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),
Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in
certain exceptional circumstances the court may request the
voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section
1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.
a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the
court will seek volunteer counsel only in the most serious
and exceptional cases. In determining whether
“exceptional circumstances exist, the district court
must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the merits
[and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims
pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues
involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The test for exceptional circumstances
requires the Court to evaluate the Plaintiff's likelihood
of success on the merits and the ability of the Plaintiff to
articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of
the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v.
Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986);
Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983).
Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal
education and limited law library access, do not establish
exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for
voluntary assistance of counsel.
present case, the Court does not find the required
exceptional circumstances. Although the Court found Plaintiff
had stated some cognizable claims in his first amended
complaint, at this early stage, the Court cannot find a
likelihood of success on the merits. Further, the record
reflects that Plaintiff can sufficiently articulate his