United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO
DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE
RE: DKT. NO. 26
GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
Lorenzo Adamson brings this civil rights action against
defendants City and County of San Francisco
(“CCSF”) and Gregory Suhr alleging a single claim
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983for violation of his
Constitutional rights to equal protection, due process, and
to be free from selective or malicious prosecution and
pre-trial punishment. (See Dkt. No. 23, First
Amended Complaint [“FAC”] ¶¶ 45.)
have filed a Motion to Dismiss the FAC and to Strike certain
allegations. The motion to dismiss is based upon claim
preclusion and failure to state a claim. The motion to strike
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) is based on
the contention that certain allegations related to Suhr are
“redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous
carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings
in this action, the matters judicially noticeable,
for the reasons set forth below, the Court Grants In Part and
Denies In Part the Motion to Dismiss With Leave To Amend. The
motion to strike certain allegations is Denied.
alleges that he is black man, a peace officer, and a
long-time employee of the San Francisco Police Department
(“SFPD”). He was hired by SFPD as a peace officer
on June 1, 1998. On May 30, 2013, Adamson was subjected to a
traffic stop by three SFPD officers. Adamson was off-duty and
on a disability leave. He was operating his personal vehicle
without license plates attached. Though Adamson repeatedly
identified himself as a peace officer, he was tackled,
dragged to the ground, and arrested. On June 4, 2013, Adamson
and his then-attorney held a press conference criticizing the
police conduct in connection with the May 30 arrest, and
decried the incident as racial-profiling and part of a larger
problem within SFPD. Sometime thereafter, SFPD initiated an
investigation and placed Adamson on suspension.
November 12, 2013, Adamson filed a civil suit (Adamson
I) against CCSF, Suhr, and the individual officers
involved in the arrest alleging excessive force, violation of
equal protection, and violation of due process. (RJN Exh. B.)
That action progressed through discovery and motion practice.
April 14, 2014, during the pendency of Adamson I, a
criminal complaint was filed against Adamson at the behest of
SFPD and Suhr, charging him with resisting arrest, both as a
felony and misdemeanor, and with various Vehicle Code
19, 2014, summary judgment was granted in favor of two
defendants, SFPD and Suhr, on the single Monell
claim against them in Adamson I.
the criminal trial ended in acquittals on certain counts and
dismissal of the remaining counts in August 2014.
the Adamson I civil case proceeded to trial as to
the other defendants, ending in jury verdicts in favor of two
of the officer defendants, and a hung jury as to the other,
on November 15, 2015. On March 10, 2016, the parties entered
into a stipulated dismissal of Adamson I.
alleges that, thereafter, on June 1, 2016, the San Francisco
Police Commission determined that he could return to work in
his previous capacity and would be awarded backpay.
filed the instant action, Adamson II, on August 3,
2016, alleging that Suhr's efforts to terminate him were
based on his race and meant to retaliate against him for the
public humiliation of the press conference in connection with
his civil lawsuit. Adamson alleges that Suhr admitted, on or
about October 9, 2014, that the filing of Adamson I
led to additional charges and allegations against Adamson in
SFPD's efforts to terminate him.
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or a
‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.'” Id.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements” will
not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The complaint
“must contain sufficient allegations of underlying
facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to
defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652
F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Further, “the factual
allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require
the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of
discovery and continued litigation.” Id.
Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion Based On ...