United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO
L. Nunley United States District Judge
matter is before the Court on Defendants Skyway House, Inc.
and Jennifer Carvalho's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) and
Defendant Skyway House LLC's separate Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 8). Plaintiffs Jane Doe and Ron Doe
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motions.
(ECF Nos. 11 & 12.) Defendants filed replies. (ECF Nos.
13 & 14.) Having reviewed the briefing filed by both
parties and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby
GRANTS Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 7 &
Factual and Procedural Background
allege Jane Doe began receiving medical treatment related to
alcohol abuse in March 2014. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 13.)
Jane Doe was transferred to Skyway House (“the
Facility”), a 24-hour recovery hospital located in
Butte County. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs allege Plumas
County paid for the first 30 days of Jane Doe's residency
and her father, Ron Doe, paid for the remainder of the time
Jane Doe was at the Facility. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 13.)
allege that during the first few weeks of Jane Doe's
residency a male employee began to pay particular attention
to her. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs allege Jane Does
was coerced into leaving the 24-hour intensive rehabilitation
facility by the male employee. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 19.) Jane
Doe was subsequently moved to the Sober Living Environment
(SLE), a less intensive and less supervised center. (ECF No.
1 ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs allege the reason the male employee
“wanted to move Jane Doe to the SLE was to commence a
sexual relationship with her, which was not possible so long
as she remained in the 24-hour unit.” (ECF No. 1 ¶
23.) Once moved to the SLE, Plaintiffs allege the male
employee began taking Jane Doe on outings and eventually had
sexual relations. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs allege
Jane Doe gave “nominal consent” to the
relationship. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 25.)
allege the relationship began in May 2014 and ended when Jane
Doe learned she was pregnant in June 2014. (ECF No. 1 ¶
30.) The male employee was subsequently “terminated by
[the Facility] because of his inappropriate relationship with
Jane Doe.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs allege
Jane Doe left the Facility in July 2014 and did not complete
her dependency recovery program. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 30.)
Plaintiffs allege there is a history of inappropriate sexual
relationships between staff and residents at the Facility.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege this conduct still
continues because Defendant Carvalho has not changed the
policies or procedures to protect residents from these
relationships. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 32.)
Healthcare, Inc. purchased the Facility from Skyway House
Inc., on December 31, 2014. (ECF No. 11 at 3.) Beginning in
January 2015, the Facility was owned and operated by
Acadia's subsidiary Skyway House LLC. (ECF No. 11 at 3.)
Defendant Carvalho was CEO during Jane Doe's stay at the
Facility and has continued on under the new owner. (ECF No.
11 at 3.)
filed an action in California State Superior Court, County of
Butte, on July 29, 2015. (Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF No.
7-2, Ex. 2.) The state court dismissed the action
against Skyway House LLC and Acadia because of the
intervening sale of the Facility. (ECF No. 11 at 3.) On
November 5, 2015, California State Superior Court, County of
Butte, sustained a demurrer filed by Skyway House, Inc. and
granted Plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. (ECF No.
7-2, Ex. 3.) Jane Doe filed a first amended complaint and
thereafter dismissed the state law action without prejudice
in order to pursue her claims in federal court. (ECF No. 7-2,
Exs. 4 & 5.) Plaintiffs filed the instant action on March
24, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges six causes of
action: (1) violation of Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101
et seq; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) physical abuse of a
dependent adult in violation of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 15610.63; (4) neglect of a dependent adult in
violation of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.57; (5)
violation of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15657; and
(6) fraud. (ECF No. 1 at 12-20.)
22, 2016, Defendants Skyway House, Inc. and Jennifer Carvalho
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or in the alternative failure to state a claim.
(ECF No. 7.) On July 29, 2016, Defendant Skyway House LLC
filed a separate motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or in the alternative failure to state a claim.
(ECF No. 8.)
Standard of Law
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(1)
may bring a motion to challenge a court's subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec.
Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). The objection
that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at
any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry
of judgment. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
506 (2006). The challenge can be either facial or factual.
White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).
subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Federal Rule
of [Civil] Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden
of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the
motion.” Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better
Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001) (abrogated
on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
77 (2010)). “‘Unless the jurisdictional issue is
inextricable from the merits of a case, the court may
determine jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)[.]'” Robinson
v. U.S., 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
citations omitted). “A suit brought by a plaintiff
without Article III standing is not a ‘case or
controversy, ' and an Article III federal court therefore
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.”
Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th
Cir. 2004). If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, “the court must dismiss
the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Motion to Dismiss ...